UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA

GERMANY AND THE DIPLOMATIC REVOLUTION

A STUDY IN DIPLOMACY AND THE PRESS 1904-1906

By

ORON JAMES HALE

A THESIS IN HISTORY

PRESENTED TO THE FACULTY OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF THE UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

PHILADELPHIA
1931

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"There is in nature no moving power but mind, all else is passive and inert; in human affairs this power is opinion; in political affairs it is public opinion; and he who can grasp this power, with it will subdue the fleshly arm of physical strength, and compel it to work out his purpose."

—Viscount Palmerston, in the House of Commons, June 1, 1829

PREFACE

BETWEEN 1898 and 1906 the relations of the European Powers underwent a complete transformation. One need only mention the *rapprochement* between England and France, the conclusion of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, the discussions preliminary to the agreement of 1907 between Russia and Great Britain, and the estrangement of England and Germany. To these signal changes in the international constellation the term Diplomatic Revolution may, I think, justly be applied. Since the shift in the balance of power was chiefly to Germany's disadvantage, the efforts of her diplomacy to restore her former position necessarily form the leading thread of this narrative. This study is limited to the two closing years of the period and, more specifically still, to the part played by the European press in creating international friendships and intensifying national antipathies.

As originally planned this volume was to be a study of public opinion based on the assumption that press content was an accurate index of the public mind. My point of view with regard to the function of the press changed somewhat as my work progressed. While there is unquestionably a measure of correlation between press opinion and public opinion, the press may also be regarded as an active agency shaping the relations of the Powers. It is therefore an institution deserving investigation in its own right in addition to its function as a gauge of public attitudes. My approach to the problem was thus changed, and under the circumstances the necessity for carrying the narrative of diplomatic events along with press developments seemed imperative. But I have not aimed to reconstruct in all detail the story of diplomatic maneuvers which did not come to the attention of the public through the medium of the press. This has been competently done by others. Despite much talk since the War of "secret diplomacy" it will be seen, however, that surprisingly little

went on in the foreign offices of Europe that was not made public through the press, even though frequently in a distorted form.

In reconstructing the narrative of diplomatic events I have used not only the best secondary accounts but also the documentary collections published since the War. In a few instances it has been possible to add something to the already known story by the use of unpublished materials.

Most of the newspaper files, which constitute the chief sources for this study, were examined during my visits to Europe. The writer wishes to express his thanks to the officials and attendants of the British Museum, the National Library in Paris, the Prussian State Library in Berlin, the Bavarian State Library in Munich, and the Library of Congress. Dr. Friedrich Thimme kindly lent me the privately printed volume of Paul Von Schwabach's letters and memoranda. Dr. Eugen Fischer interested himself in my work, and his many acts of kindness made smoother the path of a young student in a foreign land. Valuable contacts were made for me through the good offices of Dr. O. K. Bertling of the American Institute in Berlin and Dr. Franz Anton Pfeiffer of the same institution in Munich. For the encouragement and helpful suggestions received from Dr. Friedrich Rosen I shall always be deeply grateful. I am indebted to Dr. Otto Riedner, General Director of the Bavarian State Archives, for access to the reports of the Bavarian Ministers. Mrs. Theodore Roosevelt graciously allowed me to consult President Roosevelt's letters and papers, now in the care of Dr. J. F. Jameson of the Manuscripts Division of the Library of Congress. Through the courtesy of Dr. Tyler Dennett of the Department of State I was permitted to use the archives of his department. I am deeply appreciative of the interest which Professor Sidney B. Fay has taken in this work and for suggestions which he made with regard to one chapter. My opinions as to the function of the press in international relations are in part the outcome of numerous discussions with my friend Mr. G. W. Cadbury of Birmingham, England.

This project was begun under the direction of Professor William E. Lingelbach of the University of Pennsylvania, and in every phase of the work I have had the benefit of his advice and experience. In him I found an able adviser and friendly critic. My wife's criticism of the manuscript and assistance in preparing it for the press has been of the greatest value. Those who gave me assistance and advice must, however, be relieved of responsibility for all errors in fact or interpretation.

O. J. H.

Charlottesville, Va.
February 7, 1931.

ABBREVIATIONS

Belg, D.: Die Belgischen Dokumente zur Vorgeschichte des Weltkrieges, 1885-1914. Ed. by Bernhard Schwertfeger.

B. D.: British Documents on the Origins of the War, 1898-1914. Ed. by G. P. Gooch and Harold Temperley.

Bav. D.: Bavarian documents. MSS, Bayerisches Geheimes Staats-Archiv München.

D. S.: Archives of the Department of State, Washington, D. C.

A. H. R.: American Historical Review.

KSF: Die Kriegsschuldfrage: Berliner Monatshefte für internationale Aufklärung. Ed. by Alfred von Wegerer.

G. P.: Die Grosse Politik der Europäischen Kabinette, 1871-1914. Ed. by J. Lepsius, A. Mendelssohn-Bartholdy, and F. Thimme.

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Chapter I

THE PRESS AS AN INSTRUMENT OF FOREIGN POLICY

PRIOR to the nineteenth century effective public opinion was limited by a restricted electoral franchise, lack of educational opportunities, and inadequate means of disseminating information concerning national and international affairs. A relatively wide suffrage has since replaced the restricted electoral franchise; popular education has replaced the limited opportunities of earlier times; and the modern press supplies the news upon which the widened literate electorate is theoretically supposed to pass judgment. A cross section of this judgment at a given time or on a particular subject has come to be called 'public opinion' and in its formation the press plays a triple rôle. The newspaper influences the public mind by editorial comment, by its selection of news, and by the manner in which the news is presented. With regard to functions of the press, two opposing points of view are frequently expressed: first, that it merely reflects or mirrors the public mind; second, that it manufactures opinion. As a matter of fact, the press functions in both capacities. At times it follows or keeps step with public thinking; on other occasions it leads or directs.

In the field of foreign affairs, as contrasted with domestic, the press more frequently leads than follows. This arises from the fact that it is practically the only medium to transmit news of other nations. Moreover, the average individual is not directly affected by foreign affairs and is inclined to accept the *obiter dicta* of staff correspondents. Then, too, a government, through frequent releases to the daily press or through semi-official organs, often indicates its views on important questions. Every government seeks to advertise its policies, or, perhaps more correctly, what it wants the world

to believe are its policies. Bismarck is reported to have said that

> One learns more from the newspapers than from official despatches, as, of course, Governments use the press in order frequently to say more clearly what they really mean. One must, however, know all about the connections of the different papers.[1]

Likewise Mr. J. A. Spender, a distinguished English journalist, says: "... it is highly important that those who handle foreign affairs, whether ministers, officials or journalists, should know their way about the European Press world and underworld."[2] Does it not follow that the historian, who attempts to unravel the threads of pre-war diplomacy, should also be conversant with the press?

At best, a study based solely upon diplomatic documents, while it may be absolutely accurate, gives only the skeleton of the story. In the pre-war period statesmen were not independent agents with complete freedom of action, nor were they governed entirely by the currents of public opinion operating through Parliament and the press. It is true that governments frequently manipulated the press in order to create opinion favorable to their policies. A careful examination of news and editorial columns is as essential as a study of diplomatic documents, regardless of whether governments acted in accord with the press, or influenced newspapers to create a favorable public attitude. Inspired newspaper comment and official documents are the two faces of the same medal—one designed for public view and the other for officials and statesmen.

When newspaper reports and editorials are studied in close juxtaposition to diplomatic despatches and memoranda, numerous relationships between press and diplomacy become immediately apparent. But they must be considered together. The certainty required by historical scholarship in the field of diplomatic history cannot be supplied by newspaper files alone. Like a biological experiment without a control, history

[1] Moritz Busch, *Bismarck: Some Secret Pages of His History*, I, p. xx.

[2] J. A. Spender, *The Public Life*, II, 137.

based solely upon newspaper evidence can give no unquestionable results. The control, which insures certainty, is in this case the contemporary diplomatic document. When archival material is available historians are inclined to disparage, as reliable source material, inaccurate accounts of newspaper correspondents and editorial comment. It seems worth while, however, to check newspaper reports against the documents to determine the extent of their variation from the truth. This variation would tend to represent the degree to which the reading public may have been misled by newspaper inaccuracies, misconceptions, half-truths, and deliberate falsifications. What the public has read in the past and believed to be true must be taken into account when weighing the intellectual and moral forces that influence a nation's reaction in a future international situation.

The poisoning of public opinion through the newspaper press has been given by Professor Sidney B. Fay as one of the underlying causes of the World War. He points out that

> the newspapers of two countries often took up some point of dispute, exaggerated it, and made attacks and counter-attacks, until a regular newspaper war was engendered, which thoroughly poisoned public opinion, and so offered a fertile soil in which the seeds of real war might easily germinate.[3]

Frequently, these wars of opinion, when they did not end as

[3] S. B. Fay, *The Origins of the World War*, I, 47. Professor Fay lists some studies in this field. To these should be added: K. Rheindorf's important monograph, *England und der deutsch-französische Krieg, 1870–71* (Bonn, 1923), which devotes considerable space to the relations between the press and foreign policy; K. O. Herkenberg, *The Times und das deutsch-englische Verhältnis im Jahre 1898* (Berlin, 1925); M. Sell, *Das deutsch-englische Abkommen von 1890 über Helgoland und die afrikanischen Kolonien im Lichte der deutschen Presse* (Berlin, 1926); W. Langenbeck, "Presse und auswärtige Politik," *Archiv für Politik und Geschichte*, June, 1926, pp. 604–8; Wilhelm Mommsen, "Die Zeitung als historische Quelle," *Archiv für P. u. G.*, III (1926), pp. 244–51; Max Clauss, *Das politische Frankreich vor dem Kriege* (Karlsruhe, 1928); Irene Grüning, *Die russische öffentliche Meinung und ihre Stellung zu den Grossmächten, 1878–1894* (Berlin, 1929); Walter Zimmermann, *Die englische Presse zum Ausbruch des Weltkriegs* (Berlin, 1928); A. Jux, *Der Kriegsschrecken des Frühjahrs 1914 in der europäischen Presse* (Berlin, 1929); and an older but pertinent study by Hermann Oncken, "Politik, Geschichtsschreibung und öffentliche Meinung," *Deutsche Monatsschrift*, Oct., 1903, pp. 355–73, March, 1904, pp. 526–42.

drama, resembled comedy—*à la fin, tout s'arrange.* Sometimes these international polemics were a result of official acts designed to consolidate public opinion. Although often designated as 'acts of firmness,' these pronouncements were in reality pure jingoism intended to stimulate patriotic feeling. The Kruger telegram, the Tangier demonstration, and Lloyd George's Mansion House speech—were in a sense spectacular provocative actions calculated to raise patriotic feeling, crystallize public opinion, and quench opposition. Such utterances, taken up and intensified by the press, oiled the way for naval and army appropriations and distracted attention from unpopular domestic legislation. It has become one of the modern arts of statesmanship to find occasion for such demonstrations and to assure their proper reception by the press.

An amusing characteristic of pre-war newspapers was the manner in which they pictured foreign statesmen as more astute and able than their own. For instance, in the English press British statesmen always appeared as slow, but honest officials—short-sighted, easily taken advantage of, blundering, and incapable of comprehending all the possibilities of a given situation. To German statesmen was attributed a ruthless and daring character—devoid of good faith and common honesty, and dangerously efficient. On the other hand, in the German press it was the hapless German lamb that was taken in by the sly British fox. Not only to Great Britain and Germany did this apply, but it was true in every country that had neighbors with whom relations were not cordial.

The extent to which the press should be informed of the course of critical negotiations is a much debated subject among statesmen and publicists. It is the question of secret versus open diplomacy. Mr. Spender views the pre-war situation as follows:

> The game as played by the diplomats required secrecy, and, so long as the game went on, its dangers were limited by excluding an audience which must have taken sides. What a Foreign Secretary

feared in nine cases out of ten was not the craft of his opponent but the too zealous backing of his own side, which would have cut off his retreat. Keep the public out of it and it was a relatively safe game; let the public in, and it instantly became full of deadly peril. As a rule the public were only let in when the Foreign Secretary or his Government had decided not to retreat.[4]

A war, to be successful, must be a national war backed by all the human and material resources of a nation. These cannot be commanded in an instant and out of a clear sky; there must be a period of preparation. For this reason no diplomacy in time of a crisis is ever absolutely secret. Once a government has decided to stand firm on a certain policy, the journalists become instruments for the mobilization of public opinion,[5] diplomacy is no longer secret, and the vivid representation of humanity as blindfolded on the verge of a precipitate plunge into the abyss of war becomes largely a myth. To prepare the public and to win support the government's position is usually made clear both at home and abroad through the medium of the newspaper press.

No government can act with complete disregard of the modern press; it must court or control the newspapers. The policy pursued has varied with the country and with the circumstances.

An effective unified public opinion, in a political sense, is usually to be found only in states that have enjoyed national unity over a long period of time. It was frequently asserted that the German people, due to late unification, lacked political training and experience in the expression of public opinion necessary to make it master of its foreign policy.[6] France and England had a continuous national history for centuries before Germany became more than a

[4] J. A. Spender, *The Public Life*, II, 40–41.

[5] It should be pointed out here that the writer does not consider 'public opinion' to be identical with 'public press.' The distinction is admirably stated by Wilhelm Mommsen, "Die Zeitung als historische Quelle," *Archiv für P. u. G.*, III (1926), pp. 245–46.

[6] Hermann Oncken, "Politik, Geschichtsschreibung und öffentliche Meinung," *Deutsche Monatsschrift*, March, 1904, p. 533; W. von Mallow, "Auswärtige Politik und öffentliche Meinung," *ibid.*, April, 1906, pp. 16–26.

geographical expression. After 1871 Berlin never played the dominant rôle in the Empire that London played in England, or Paris in France. In Germany, Münich led in art, Hamburg in commerce, Frankfort in finance, and Leipzig in publishing. Berlin had many rivals. A unified national opinion, however, was necessary to carry on the government, even though it had to be manufactured and directed. This was done by Bismarck, and Bülow inherited and improved on his system. Before Bülow's time no statesman paid as much attention to public opinion or worked as consistently to guide and direct it.[7]

Of the political sense of his countrymen, Bülow once wrote:

I do not go as far as Althoff, who is of the opinion that it is an unalterable characteristic of the German people to achieve immortal distinction in art, science, and philosophy, but to be absolutely without any talent for politics. Unfortunately, it cannot be denied that we stand in this respect far below the English and even the French. Such judgments of the defective German political bent of mind result from the dogmatism, pedantry, and crude passion for criticism of which the German newspapers now daily give evidence.[8]

Convinced that the Germans lacked political understanding, the press bureau, under his administration, became one of the most important agencies in the government. At its head was Otto Hammann, a former journalist and trusted subordinate, and through him Bülow kept in close touch with public opinion—guiding it whenever possible. Not only did this bureau arrange press interviews with officials, but information was given out and press releases prepared. The domestic and foreign papers were closely read, clipped, and classified by Hammann and his assistants. Practically no current of opinion escaped their notice.[9] By giving out information on

[7] Otto Hammann, *Bilder aus der letzten Kaiserzeit*, p. 41.

[8] *Ibid.*, p. 46.

[9] On the German press bureau see Lucy Salmon, *The Newspaper and Authority*, pp. 332–35; Sidney Whitman, *German Memories*, p. 233; and G. Valentine Williams, "The German Press Bureau," *Contemporary Review*, March, 1910, pp. 315–25. These writers give the erroneous impression that the entire foreign policy of the authoritative German press was dictated from the Wilhelmstrasse. A press division similar to that in Germany was organized by Lamsdorff in the Russian foreign office, and

foreign affairs and directly inspiring certain semi-official organs the press bureau, which had no official existence, was able in many cases to direct or lead German newspaper opinion. Under this system the German press has been likened, by a hostile English journalist, to

> a powerful and well attuned organ on which the Press Bureau . . . knew how to play with every variety of skilfully contrived effect, sometimes *piano*, rarely *pianissimo*, and more often pulling out all the stops in succession for an impressive *largo* rising to a resounding *forte* or violent *fortissimo*.[10]

Obviously the German government was not greatly influenced by independent currents of opinion. Mr. Spender considered this to be an advantage as well as a drawback. It meant that the government could not be deflected from its course by momentary bursts of popular passion. Hence, as Mr. Spender points out, official policy might remain friendly even when public opinion was decidedly hostile.[11]

Not even the Emperor escaped the influence of the press. In the foreign office, the chancellor's office, and the war and navy departments, papers were clipped and important articles were frequently sent to the Kaiser, who, after reading returned them to their place of origin with his marginal comments. By a judicious selection of press articles, notices, and despatches on a particular subject the ministers could produce the desired impression on the Kaiser.[12]

In Germany, at the beginning of the present century, certain journalists played an important part in the relations of

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he admitted occasional inspiration of the press. In 1904, Hartwig was in charge of the censorship in the foreign office and he reviewed and released all telegraphic despatches dealing with foreign affairs. Scott to Lansdowne, Feb. 5, 1902; *B. D.*, I, 272–73. Hardinge to Lansdowne, Dec. 17, 1904; *ibid.*, IV, 39–40.

[10] Valentine Chirol, *Fifty Years in a Changing World*, p. 277.

[11] *Westminster Gazette*, Dec. 10, 1904. This was certainly the case during the Boer war. See Lascelles to Salisbury, Feb. 9, 1900; *B. D.*, I, 249–52. Buchanan to Lansdowne, Nov. 20, 1901; *ibid.*, I, 262–63.

[12] August Stein, *Es war alles ganz anders*, p. 178; Chirol, *op. cit.*, pp. 276–77. On the Kaiser's personal relations to the press August Stein once wrote: "Er schimpft auf sie, wenn er sich über sie ärgert, er lobt sie, wenn sie ihm gefällt, und er weiss sie zu finden wenn er sie braucht." Stein, p. 180.

the government to the daily press. When important matters connected with public opinion were under discussion, Theodor Schiemann of the *Kreuzzeitung* and August Stein of the *Frankfurter Zeitung* were often called into consultation.[13] The latter was one of the best informed men in Berlin with a host of friends and acquaintances in all circles, and despite the fact that his paper opposed the government he was trusted implicitly by the chancellor and foreign office officials.[14] Schiemann was a Baltic Slav whose opinion on Russian affairs carried considerable weight in the Wilhelmstrasse.[15] He was also in favor at court, having been one of the Kaiser's guests on the Tangier voyage.[16] Holstein undoubtedly used Schiemann as a mouthpiece to influence French and English opinion. Arthur von Huhn, Berlin correspondent of the *Kölnische Zeitung*, was also closely associated with Holstein and Hammann in the publicity work of the foreign office.[17] Theodor Wolff, Paris correspondent of the *Berliner Tageblatt*, played an important rôle as a severe critic of the government's foreign policy.[18]

An important feature of European journalism was the quoting of foreign press opinion. Certain evils in connection with this practice grew out of the existence of official or semi-official newspapers. A foreign paper was frequently quoted, accompanied by a statement that this journal was an organ of the foreign office, the spokesman of the chancellor, or closely

[13] For the action taken on the eve of the Björkö meeting see *G. P.*, XIX, 439.

[14] Hammann (*Bilder*, p. 56) pays Stein a well deserved tribute. When Lloyd George and Harold Spender visited Germany in 1908 they immediately established connections with Stein, who acted as confidential agent for Bülow and the foreign office. *G. P.*, XXIV, 138–43. Unfortunately Stein left no memoirs. *Es war alles ganz anders. Aus der Werkstätte eines politischen Journalisten, 1891–1914*, is a collection of essays and memoranda from the archives of the *Frankfurter Zeitung*.

[15] *G. P.*, XIX, 451. According to Eckardstein (*Lebenserinnerungen*, II, 174), Schiemann was the only journalist with whom Holstein had direct relations.

[16] Theodor Schiemann, "Eine Fahrt ins Mittelmeer mit Kaiser Wilhelm," *Deutsche Monatsschrift*, June, 1905, pp. 303–11.

[17] Hammann, *Bilder*, p. 23. Even when on vacation Holstein kept in close touch with the press department of the foreign office.

[18] Theodor Wolff, *Das Vorspiel* (French translation, *Le Prélude*) is a brilliant account of Franco-German relations at the turn of the century as the author interpreted them to his paper.

connected with the court, whereas, in truth, the publication might have been an opposition organ.[19] This, of course, had the effect of making a government responsible for every wild and misleading statement that appeared in the press. Count Bernstorff recognized this when he wrote to Bülow:

> Our press ought to realize what enormous interests are at stake. It seems foolish to us Germans that anyone should take an article in the *Reichsbote* seriously. Here [England] no one knows the difference between the *Frankfurter Zeitung* and the *Reichsbote*. All German journals up to the Socialist papers are designated without discrimination as official organs.[20]

The Wilhelmstrasse had no control over the papers of the extreme Right and Left, that is, the nationalist and the Socialist press. Nor did the government influence the authoritative Jewish-owned papers—*Börsen Courier*, *Berliner Tageblatt*, and *Frankfurter Zeitung*. The *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung* and *Kölnische Zeitung* were frequent channels for communication of official views, and conclusive evidence exists, as will be indicated in this study, of occasional inspiration of the *National Zeitung*, *Münchener Allgemeine Zeitung*, and *Vossische Zeitung*.

Existence of an official or inspired press makes the task of the historian more difficult. It is not impossible to ascertain which papers generally reflect the official point of view, but to determine which articles, telegrams, and editorials are officially inspired is a difficult and in many cases a hopeless undertaking. Each one presents an almost insuperable problem in internal criticism, for the introductory formula, "We learn from circles close to the government," is by no means a sure

[19] In London *Times*, June 7, 1905, appears Wickham Steed's report from Vienna on Delcassé's resignation, in which he records an attack of the *Neue Freie Presse* on the former foreign minister. The *Neue Freie Presse* was designated as "Count Von Bülow's Vienna organ," thus making the Berlin foreign office responsible for the attack of an Austrian paper upon a French statesman. This was a malicious supposition. Bülow's directions to the press bureau, on June 6, were to restrain the German papers. *G. P.*, XX, 403.

[20] Bernstorff to Bülow, Sept. 8, 1905; *G. P.*, XIX, 641. The Berlin correspondent of *Figaro* (July 12, 1905) designated the *Berliner Tageblatt* as an official organ! Such instances of misrepresentation on the part of foreign newspaper correspondents could be multiplied a hundredfold.

proof of authorized inspiration. More often than not, official despatches had no such introduction.[21]

In France, politics and journalism were so closely related that they hardly admit of separation. "We have not in France a single politician who does not write for the newspapers," wrote J. Reinach in 1882.[22] The same statement held true in the first decade of the twentieth century. Senator Maurice Bunau-Varilla controlled *Matin*; Clemenceau edited *Aurore;* Gerault-Richard was editor of *Petite République;* Jean Jaurès was political director of *Humanité*, while Aristide Briand, Gabriel Bertrand, and René Viviani were frequent contributors. *Siècle* was owned, to 1901, by Yves Guyot, former minister of public works, and it continued under the directorship of M. J. L. de Lanessan, former minister of marine and deputy for Lyon. It numbered among its contributors no less than five former cabinet members. Lucien Millevoye, Nationalist deputy, edited *Patrie;* Jules Méline, former prime minister, owned Gambetta's old organ, *République Française;* and Senator Charles Dupuy owned *Petit Parisien.* André Tardieu had recently left *Figaro* to become foreign editor of the powerful *Temps.* This by no means completes the list of journalistic and political alliances.

Commenting on the close relationship between politics and journalism in French public life, Mr. Spender makes the following criticism:

> This alliance gives a spice to French journalism which is lacking in the English, but it detracts from the power of the Press as a Press, the power which it might exercise as an independent impersonal critic.[23]

With such an array of personal and party papers it is conceivable that there would be a lack of unified opinion on questions of foreign affairs. As a matter of fact, however, French foreign policy shows a remarkable continuity in spite

[21] The difficulties are discussed by W. Langenbeck, "Presse und auswärtige Politik," *Archiv für P. u. G.*, June, 1926, pp. 604–8.

[22] *Nineteenth Century*, Sept. 1882, p. 349.

[23] J. A. Spender, *The Public Life*, I, 235.

of bitter party strife and quick succession of ministries. This was due partly to the bureaucracy and partly to the fact that certain powerful organs such as *Temps*, *Journal des Débats*, *Matin*, and *Petit Parisien* rarely opposed the foreign policy of any cabinet. Moreover, as Mr. Spender points out:

> In some countries—notably France—it is a fair assumption that practically the whole press will be at the disposal of the Foreign Office when it has decided upon what is called a spirited policy. . . .[24]

The papers mentioned above were generally considered to have close contact with the Quai d'Orsay, and were frequently credited with speaking for the foreign office in international debate. Then, too, intimate relations were maintained with the press through a bureau of information in the foreign office presided over by the exceedingly clever and affable Robert de Billy.[25] On occasion, representatives of papers which the government could influence were called into conference.[26] However, the Quai d'Orsay was never as successful in directing press opinion as was the Wilhelmstrasse.

Venality has been the gravest charge brought against the French press. Great sums were reported to have been distributed to French papers during the Panama scandal.[27] According to Iswolski, Count Khevenhüller's judicious distribution of Austrian gold did much to take the edge off unfavorable criticism during the Bosnian crisis.[28] He stated, furthermore, that the most important organs were "almost all only accessible to 'clinking' arguments,"[29] while the small papers were a

[24] J. A. Spender, "The Press and International Affairs," *Yale Review*, April, 1928, p. 494.

[25] *G. P.* XIX, 264; XX, 305; XXI, 153. His skilful handling of the press representatives at the Algeciras Conference contributed greatly to the success of French diplomacy.

[26] *Ibid.*, XXIV, 365.

[27] *Historische politische Blätter*, III (1893), No. 4. On the general subject of French press bribery see *Hinter den Kulissen des französischen Journalismus* (Berlin, 1925), by an anonymous author claiming to be a Paris editor; pp. 27–113, *passim*. His statements must be greatly discounted.

[28] Quoted from Iswolski's correspondence by Friedrich Stieve, *Iswolski and the World War*, p. 34.

[29] *Ibid.*, p. 34.

"hungry horde."[30] We also learn from Iswolski that "French statesmen are very adept in deals of this sort."[31] During the Moroccan crisis, when *Matin* was thundering against Germany, both in person and through agents Bunau-Varilla, owner of the paper, made suspicious advances to the German ambassador.[32]

Perhaps the severest stricture delivered upon the French press was that of an English ambassador, Lord Dufferin. Considering the nature of his remarks it must be remembered that his opinion was delivered before the days of the Entente Cordiale and at a time when France, and not Germany, was regarded as a potential danger to the Empire. Lord Dufferin's report was frequently referred to by his successors:

> The Press of Paris is the worst Press in Europe. The people who contribute to it are very clever, and know exactly how to excite the rancour or inflame the prejudices of their readers. They have a congenital and distinctive disregard of truth, and they lie—not as an Englishman lies when he does lie, of malice prepense—but because they do not feel that a lie matters much one way or the other. They are for the most part absolutely ignorant of the history, the language, the habits, the politics, the modes of thought, and the geography of other countries, and, with a number of honorable exceptions, gain is their only motive, unless when it is spite or revenge . . . . It is said indeed that too much importance should not be given to the utterances of the Paris Press, and that its teachings do not permeate beyond Paris. In the first place this is not true, for the *Petit Journal*, one of the most unscrupulous of the Paris newspapers, and peculiarly hostile to England, has an enormous circulation in the Departments. But in any event, the Paris Press acts very powerfully not only upon the Members of both the Chambers but also upon the public opinion of the Capital; and experience has over and over again exemplified the disproportionate ascendancy exercised by Paris over the rest of France.[33]

[30] *Ibid.*, pp. 67 f.

[31] *Ibid.*, p. 117.

[32] *G. P.*, XX, 623–24, 697–98.

[33] Marquis of Dufferin to Roseberry, Nov. 3, 1893; *B. D.*, II, 285–88. In 1904 Monson, British ambassador at Paris, referred to "the unscrupulousness, the mendacity, the venality and the coarseness of French journalism" as compared to "the infinitely more decent, more moderate and more discreet tone of the British Press." Monson to Lansdowne, Dec. 23, 1904; *ibid.*, IV 67 f.

During the seven years that M. Delcassé was foreign minister in France, *Matin* was credited with being a favored recipient of his confidences and a frequent channel for semi-official communications to the public. During the Fashoda crisis, the British ambassador pointed out to Lord Salisbury how *Matin* was used to prepare public opinion for the Quai d'Orsay's retreat, in direct opposition to national feeling. "The abandonment of Faschoda is perfectly compatible with the preservation of national honor," was the substance of an article which appeared at the moment Delcassé decided to retreat. It went on to depreciate the value of the Nile valley and to point out the danger which France would incur if she saddled herself with fresh territories so far from the Atlantic seaboard and the French base of operations.[34]

The reputation which *Matin* gained as the mouthpiece of the foreign office led to a serious abuse of its position. On April 27, 1905, when public apprehension over the Moroccan question was seriously aroused, *Matin* published an article that caused a war scare in Paris and precipitated a panic on the Bourse. The article in question appeared in the middle of the front page, and in special type—without a heading and without a signature. All readers necessarily concluded that it was directly inspired by the foreign office. The quieting denial of *Temps* and the Havas Agency came too late. The article had done its work. The exchange had fallen sharply and did not recover before closing. The perpetual three per cent Rentes closed at 98.52 against 99.10 for the day before—a serious drop when one considers the effect that a decline of one centime had on French credit relationships. Bear speculators, in whose interest this trick was apparently perpetrated, could congratulate themselves on the dishonorable ruse they had played on the national credit. Next day, *Matin* reproduced the note from *Temps* and Havas Agency to the effect that "the government has made no communication to any paper." To that statement *Matin* coolly added: "The newspaper, to which the above note refers, is *Matin*."[35]

[34] Monson to Salisbury, Oct. 10, 1898; *ibid.*, I, 178.

The English press undoubtedly ranked higher on all points than the French or German. Its foreign news service was unsurpassed, and the literary quality was almost uniformly high; with some notable exceptions it was not unduly nationalistic, and the charge of venality was never brought against it. Furthermore, it was seldom if ever subservient to the government. So strong was its influence on national policies that its designation as the Fourth Estate was by no means unmerited. Nor was its power circumscribed by national or linguistic boundaries. Theodor Schiemann wrote in 1904:

> The English press is today without doubt the one that exercises the widest influence, and whose reports and observations find the strongest echo in the newspapers of every country of the world. In America, it is almost the exclusive channel for the political currents of the Old World, and it signifies in fact an immense advantage for England that across the ocean her voice commands a first and special hearing.[36]

Mr. Spender informs us that "it was never the habit of the British Foreign Office to inspire the newspapers. . . ."[37] It should not be inferred, however, that Downing Street had no relations with the press. True, no press division such as is maintained in all foreign offices today existed at the turn of the century. The foreign office was arbitrary in its dealings with the newspapers, but the wall of secrecy was assaulted daily by the journalists. Harold Spender, a Liberal editor but slightly less renowned than his brother, recalls that

> in my young days the Foriegn Office was almost a closed door to the average newspaper . . . its secrecy was one of the chief difficulties of daily journalism . . . . For the old Foreign Office did not scruple to use its distribution of news as a means for controlling newspapers. If a newspaper criticized a Foreign Secretary too severely he had a very simple means of punishment—he closed the door of the Foreign Office to that paper . . . .[38]

[35] *Humanité, Gaulois, Patrie, Petite République,* and *Figaro* (financial bulletin), April 28, 1905; *G. P.*, XX, 347.

[36] Theodor Schiemann, "Einiges über die englische Presse," *Deutsche Monatsschrift,* Oct. 1904, pp. 114 ff.

[37] J. A. Spender, *Life, Journalism and Politics,* I, 186.

[38] Harold Spender, *The Fire of Life,* p. 154.

Kennedy Jones describes the cold reception which the journalist of the nineties received in the foreign office.

> Here he was ushered into a chilly waiting room by a still more chilly attendant, and after having declared his business was left to his own reflections for an indefinite time. Then the attendant would return, probably munching toast if it was tea-time . . . and with a lofty air would announce: "The Foreign Office has no communication to make, but it may be issuing a statement later."[39]

The press conference method of dealing with the newspapers was employed first in the colonial office by Mr. Chamberlain and his successor Mr. Alfred Lyttelton. It was during the Fashoda crisis that the press was taken directly into the confidence of the government. "For the first time Fleet Street was invited to the Foreign Office."[40] The system developed rapidly until

> Today there is not a single Government Department . . . without a recognized Press agent, whose duty it is to hand out to the representatives of newspapers valuable news items. . . . A daily paper thrives on news. The Government and its Departments have in their possession news—valuable news. This is the way and these the means whereby Downing Street by skilful manipulation has always sought to dominate Fleet Street.[41]

Much has been made of bribery of the foreign press and governmental inspiration of domestic newspapers. Instances can be cited where such policies were pursued. On the other hand, the influence which European foreign offices and embassies exerted over the press at home and abroad was more subtle; it resulted from the unavoidable fact that these agencies had in their possession valuable information which they could release or withhold or color at will.

In England, as in France, the press of the capital city exerted a disproportionate influence on foreign policy.[42] This

[39] *Fleet Street and Downing Street*, p. 95.

[40] *Ibid.*, pp. 96–97.

[41] *Ibid.*, pp. 340–41.

[42] "The provincial press is in this respect insignificant. . . . For a considerable distance around London readers find the London papers on their breakfast tables; even in Manchester and Liverpool they arrive by 10:30 A.M. Add to that the greater

gave such organs as the *Times*, *Daily Telegraph*, *Morning Post*, *Daily Mail*, and *Daily Express* a preponderant voice in shaping the foreign policy of the country. Through establishment or purchase of a number of journals, the centralization of the press which was going on during the first decade of the twentieth century tended to concentrate power not only in the city of London but also in the hands of certain individuals. The two outstanding men in this respect were Mr. Alfred Harmsworth and Mr. Arthur Pearson. In 1905, the latter owned the *Daily Express*, *Standard*, *Evening Standard and St. James Gazette*, *Birmingham Evening Despatch*, *Leicester Evening News*, *North Mail*, *Midland Express*, and *Newcastle Weekly Leader*.[43] The 'bell-wether' of the Harmsworth flock was the sensational *Daily Mail*,[44] followed by the *Evening News*, *Daily Mirror*, *Observer*, *Weekly Despatch*, several provincial papers, and some periodicals including *Vanity Fair*. Control by one man of such a number of papers operated like marionettes signified an extensive concentration in his hands of power over public opinion. In the field of foreign affairs, the owner's personal opinions translated into the policies of his press would be of great moment.

One of the outstanding factors in the European situation at this time was the growing hostility between England and Germany, which manifested itself daily in frenzied newspaper

resources of the London press, its better news service, and all the other advantages that a great city press possesses, it is no exaggeration to say that English public opinion, so far as foreign affairs are concerned, is made in London." Hans Plehn, *Nach dem englisch-japanischen Bündnis*, pp. 112 f. Dr. Hans Plehn was for many years London correspondent of *Kölnische Zeitung*.

[43] London *Times*, Nov. 23, 1904; Sidney Dark, *Life of Sir Arthur Pearson*, p. 123. In the autumn of 1904 Mr. Pearson acquired the dignified and influential Tory *Standard*. This coup raised the ire of the free trade wing of the conservative party, since Pearson supported the Chamberlain tariff group. Dark, *Life of Sir Arthur Pearson*, ch. VI. Winston Churchill, writing to the *Times* (Nov. 21), said: "Mr. Pearson likens it [the acquisition of newspapers] to the spread of a great hotel system. . . . There is nothing discreditable in keeping hotels, but it has usually been held that those who undertake to guide and influence the thought of the nation have a higher and more responsible function in the State than those who provide board and lodging."

[44] For the early history of the *Daily Mail* see Max Pemberton, *Lord Northcliffe, A Memoir*, pp. 53 ff.; Kennedy Jones, *Fleet Street and Downing Street, passim*.

polemics. The attitude of the Pearson and Harmsworth groups counted for much under such circumstances. The Pearson press did not pursue a consistent policy of hostility toward Germany. The *Express*, rival of Harmsworth's *Daily Mail*, was frequently offensive to Germany, but it was the result of sensation-seeking rather than a conscious policy of enmity.[45] Moreover, the *Standard*, acquired by Pearson in the autumn of 1904 and edited by Mr. Gwynne, was friendly to Germany.[46] The Harmsworth press, on the contrary, was as anti-German and pro-French in 1904 as it had been pro-German and anti-French in 1899. Harmsworth himself, according to an interview appearing in *Matin*, had declared:

> Yes, we detest the Germans, we detest them cordially and they make themselves detested by all Europe. I will not permit the least thing that might injure France to appear in my paper, but I should not like for anything to appear in it that might be agreeable to Germany.[47]

The press vendetta on both sides of the North Sea began with the Kruger Telegram incident and was intensified by the attitude assumed by the German press during the Boer war. In Germany it ceased to a certain extent after the re-establishment of peace, but the deep resentment which was left in England was fanned by the development of the German navy, merchant marine, and economic power. While there were no outstanding points of difference between the two governments, and while official relations were correct if not friendly, public opinion was periodically aroused by the newspapers.[48]

Material for these recurrent polemics was frequently fur-

[45] Theodor Lorenz, *Die englische Presse*, p. 114.

[46] *G. P.*, XIX, 661; XX, 19. Mr. Gwynne was foreign editor of Reuter's Agency before he became editor of the *Standard* in 1905.

[47] On the occasion of Stéphane Lauzanne's visit to England in Feb. 1903. Wolff, *Le Prélude*, pp. 150 f.; *Belg. D.*, III, 207.

[48] "The press must bear the guilt that public opinion in both countries does not become tranquil, that ill-will is still nourished, and that both nations are filled with mistrust of the other." W. von Mallow, "Eine Englandfahrt deutscher Journalisten," *Deutsche Monatsschrift*, Aug. 1906, pp. 596 f. See also C. E. Playne, *The Pre-War Mind in Britain*, ch. II, "Panics and the Press" and ch. VII, "Anglo-German Antagonism."

nished by opposing politicians and newspapers. Every statesman spoke, as it were, under a great sounding board that sometimes played havoc with innocent utterances. Moreover, it would seem that many foreign correspondents had a commission to ferret out material for disparagement in order to serve the purpose of international contention. Sir Thomas Barclay, a former *Times* representative, declared that "the correspondents on both sides who fail to provide sensation by picking out such things would be blamed by their editors."[49] The natural tendency of English correspondents in Germany was to quote from the chauvinistic and Pan-German press,[50] while German correspondents in England would quote from the *Times*, *Daily Mail*, *Spectator*, and *National Review*. Thus both countries were filled with suspicion of the evil intentions of the other. In speaking of the respectable *Spectator*[51] (weekly) which had 'gone native' of late years, Theodor Schiemann declared that

> This weekly is perhaps the most drastic example of the mischief wrought by the political attitude of the Pan-Germans, whose frequently childish and laughable exaggerations are represented to the world as the genuine political aims of Germany.[52]

On more than one occasion the German ambassador called attention to the adverse effect on Anglo-German relations,

[49] Interview in *Daily News*, Nov. 17, 1904. "At present the Press, both in this country and Germany, too often fans irritation to a flame instead of allaying it."

[50] The correspondent of the *Standard* offered, on April 11 and 12, 1904, extracts from the notoriously chauvinistic *Reichsbote*, *Post*, and *Rheinisch-Westfälische Zeitung* as representative of German public opinion; on July 16, 1904, extracts from *Frankfurter Zeitung*, *Rheinisch-Westfälische Zeitung*, and *Münchener Neueste Nachrichten*—the extreme national bias of the last two being well-known. Again, March 2, 1906: "One of the leading and most influential conservative newspapers in Germany, the *Reichsbote*. . . ." In England the importance of the *Reichsbote* was greatly exaggerated. Cf. Theodor Lorenz, *Die englische Presse*, p. 134.

[51] Owned and edited by J. St. Loe Strachey. For his attitude toward Anglo-German relations see his *Adventure of Living*, pp. 452–54, 457–61. "I was confident . . . that Germany was preparing for war with this country as part of her world policy . . ." (p. 452).

[52] Schiemann, "Einiges über die englische Presse," *Deutsche Monatsschrift*, Oct., 1904, pp. 114 ff. In an editorial (June 23, 1905) the Socialist organ *Vorwärts* declared: "With the exception of the Social Democrats an independent opinion [on foreign affairs] is manifested only by the Pan-Germans—the Weltpolitikers—who

which might result from the systematic hostility of the *Times* and its followers. King Edward, in 1902, tried to bring about a change in the editorial policy of the great London daily, but was told in effect to mind his own business.[53] Lord Haldane later undertook to reason with the Germanophobe editors. He received no satisfaction from the editor-in-chief of the *Times;* he spoke to Strachey, editor of the *Spectator;* to Maxse, of the *National Review*—a "madman" with whom he he could do nothing; and to the editor of the *Outlook* (weekly), who belonged to Maxse's circle.[54] Needless to say the press campaigns did not cease.

Germany's action in the Moroccan affair in 1905 aggravated English press attacks. A *Daily News* correspondent in Kiel noted that in the future when some historian wrote the history of Anglo-German relations during this period he would assuredly head one of his chapters somewhat as follows:

> Was there in the year 1905 a conspiracy within a large portion of the English Press to provoke an Anglo-German war? No one who carefully studies *The Times* will answer this question with a very confident negative. If war should come, a terrible guilt will rest on those men who have so persistently used the great engines of our press, whether purposely or carelessly towards that issue.[55]

Referring to this same period J. A. Farrer expresses the opinion that "Had such papers as the *Times* and *National Review* desired war, they could hardly have written more effectively to that end."[56]

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speculate restlessly on new divisons of the world map. The views and ambitions of these people find much greater attention abroad than is their due. . . . In England people greatly overestimate the power of this current in Germany and therefore make very false deductions about Germany's official policy."

[53] *G. P.*, XVII, 207–9.

[54] *Ibid.*, XXI, 429. In close relation to this group stood Sir Cecil Spring Rice. From his various diplomatic posts he corresponded with Strachey, Maxse, and Chirol on awakening England to the "German menace." Gwynn, *Letters and Friendships of Sir Cecil Spring Rice*, I, 261, 264, 350n, II, 47, 101, 112, 116, 132, 144–50. The same group in 1903 had raised such an outcry that the government, against its better judgment, had been forced to refuse cooperation in the Bagdad Railroad. Newton, *Lord Lansdowne*, pp. 253 ff.

[55] *Daily News*, Aug. 1, 1905.

[56] Farrer, *England under Edward VII*, p. 117.

If British opinion was seriously alarmed at the suspected aims and ambitions of German policy, similar fears and suspicions were engendered in German minds by the attitude of the English journals during the summer of 1905. This is strikingly illustrated by an entry in Helmuth von Moltke's diary:

When one scans the English newspapers one is horrified at the systematic hostility to Germany that runs through the papers of all parties. The press is decidedly bloodthirsty and would like best to exterminate us root and branch in order to dominate and exploit the world. These same journalists and jingoes cause a great deal of mischief and play unwittingly with fire. To be sure, when it comes to blows they need not expose their bodies to the bullets, but remain comfortably at home, dip the pen in poison and gall and leave it to others to be shot down.[57]

The revolution in English public opinion toward Germany, which had occurred since the Boer war, was marked by a corresponding growth of sentiment favorable to France. This was given tangible form in the accord signed on April 8, 1904. According to Jacques Bardoux, an eminent French publicist writing in the *Journal des Débats* (April 13, 1904), the Entente Cordiale could never have been effected

without the methodically organized press campaign, from the beginning of 1901, by the most authoritative organs of the Conservative party . . . the *Times*, *Spectator*, and *National Review*. . . . First, they seized every occasion to reveal to their compatriots a French success or a quality. . . . But . . . with equal perseverance each of these three organs, in a different form, exerted itself to destroy as far as possible the memory of former sympathies for the German Empire. The *Times* applied itself to signalling the articles and caricatures in which our neighbours from across the Rhine gave expression to their ardent jealousies. The *Spectator* applied itself to an analysis of the Anglophobe propaganda in the German universities. Finally, the *National Review*, in its monthly studies, signalled to the public the dangers of Pan-Germanism. . . . As soon as an incident—diplomatic, economic, or military—occurred . . . the three organs, with common accord, insisted upon the danger and hostility of Germany, and the utility of friendship with France.

Mr. Spender, speaking of Anglo-German tension before the war, has pointed out that British journalists might have assumed one of three attitudes: first, that a war was so certain it would have been criminal not to have aroused their countrymen to the danger; second, that the danger was so great any language calculated to fan the flames should have been avoided; and third, that alarmists had exaggerated the seriousness of the situation and a *détente* would set in when they ceased their tirades.[58] The *Times*, as indicated above, early adopted the first alternative and because of the great reputation it enjoyed abroad, particular significance attaches to its attitude.

It is true that the day was past when the *Times* could almost dictate to the foreign office, as in the days of Delane. Dr. Hans Plehn noted that it carried more weight abroad where the tradition of its preëminence still lingered than it did at home. Especially was this true in cafés on the continent, in India, and the Near East where words of the *Times* were accorded as much attention "as when the Pope spoke *ex cathedra*."[59] In England, it had unquestionably suffered a decline in circulation, advertising, and prestige, but with regard to foreign affairs it was still without doubt the most influential English daily.[60]

The news and editorial policies of a paper are influenced by the opinions and personalities of the owner, the editors, and the staff correspondents. Hence, the personal convictions of those associated with the *Times* merit consideration. Arthur Fraser Walter, the owner, was generally reputed to have dropped his friendliness toward Germany for that of fanatical hatred. This was attributed by rumor to a personal

[57] *Erinnerungen, Briefe, Dokumente*, p. 332. Entry dated Aug. 3, 1905.

[58] Spender, *The Public Life*, II, 139.

[59] Plehn, *Nach dem englisch-japanischen Bündnis*, pp. 115 ff. He also thought that too much weight was given in Germany to the hostility of the *Daily Mail*, which, in spite of its large circulation, did not affect the circles that influenced foreign policy.

[60] On the condition of the *Times* see Max Pemberton, *Lord Northcliffe*, pp. 125 ff.; H. Simonis, *The Street of Ink*, pp. 29 ff.; F. H. Kitchin, *Moberly Bell and his times, passim; Life and Letters of Moberly Bell*, pp. 233 ff.

dispute with Baron Eckardstein.[61] Valentine Chirol, foreign editor, was Berlin correspondent from 1892 to 1897. Formerly an advocate of a close understanding with Germany, his attitude changed completely as a result of the Kruger Telegram incident.[62] Moreover, a warm friendship with Baron Holstein was transformed into bitter personal animosity.[63] Sir Frank Lascelles, British ambassador at Berlin, told Bülow that Chirol was the soul of the English press campaign against Germany.[64] Mr. William Lavino, upon whom De Blowitz' mantle had fallen, was a Belgian Jew. From 1904 to 1906, his reports from Paris apparently aimed to place Germany in the most unfavorable light possible.[65] In 1897, Mr. George Saunders became the resident correspondent in Berlin. It is reported that Baron Richthofen, the Anglophil secretary of state for foreign affairs, told Saunders publicly that "No one has contributed more to the poisoning of public opinion in England against Germany than you."[66]

Wickham Steed represented the *Times* in Vienna. It is necessary to read his memoirs to have a proper understanding of the spirit prompting the steady stream of malevolent and misleading reports that appeared in the *Times* under the

[61] Sternburg to Bülow, Feb. 10, 1905; *G. P.*, XIX, 570–75. Bülow to Metternich, July 22, 1905; *ibid.*, XX, 646.

[62] Gwynn, *The Letters and Friendships of Sir Cecil Spring Rice*, I, 191–93. Spring Rice wrote Roosevelt in 1904 that "His [Chirol's] influence is supreme in the *Times*, when the *Times* has time to think. He is as intimate in the Foreign Office as anyone can be, and absolutely trusted." *Ibid.*, I, 436–37. See also Chirol, *Fifty Years in a Changing World*, pp. 264–303.

[63] Bülow to Metternich, July 22, 1905; *G. P.*, XX, 646. Eckardstein, *Lebenserinnerungen*, II, 175. Chirol maintains that his friendly relations with Holstein, whom he treats in a sympathetic manner, were continued until the latter left the Wilhelmstrasse. Chirol, *op. cit.*, pp. 300–1. See Holstein's letter to Chirol, Jan. 3, 1902, which begins sardonically: "In the first place I send you my best wishes for your health and your good humor in the coming year." *B. D.*, II, 84.

[64] Mem. by Bülow, Nov. 4, 1904; *G. P.*, XIX, 296–97. Lascelles' report did not mention Chirol. *B. D.*, III, 56–58.

[65] He was transferred from Vienna to Paris in 1902; Wickham Steed, formerly in Rome, was then sent to Vienna. Steed, *Through Thirty Years*, I, 188. Jaurès, in a letter to the London *Tribune* in Feb., 1906, protested against his misrepresentations. Lorenz, *op. cit.*, p. 84.

[66] Lorenz, p. 86.

Vienna date line.[67] Mr. Herbert Asquith expressed to the German ambassador, on one occasion, his concern at the manifest purpose of the Berlin and Vienna correspondents to interpret all German thought and action as anti-English. The *Times*, he declared, was poisoning their relations with Germany because it was a source of information on foreign affairs for other journals and the English public in general.[68] Walter Harris was another *Times* representative who occupied a key position during the years 1904–1906. He was the resident correspondent in Tangier, a hotbed of European and Moorish intrigue. He worked hand in glove with the English colony, which was hostile to French ambitions in Morocco. So far as the policy of his paper permitted, he supported the German position against the French.[69]

Sir Donald Mackenzie Wallace—sometimes called King Edward's *missus dominicus*—had been the *Times*' representative in Russia for many years. At this time he was employed as a special correspondent, and as such he represented the great London daily at the Algeciras Conference.[70] He was a warm advocate of an Anglo-Russian *rapprochement* and in his writing he strove to put the traditional enemy in a favorable light before the British public.[71] Mr. Brinckley, Tokio correspondent, was at the same time editor of the *Japan Mail*, a sheet reported to have been subsidized by the Japanese government.[72] Lucien Wolf occasionally wrote special articles

[67] *Through Thirty Years*, 2 vols. (New York, 1924). "For my part, I left Germany profoundly convinced that nothing save a complete change in German methods and tendencies or a complete abdication by England of her place in the world could, in the long run, prevent an Anglo-German conflict; and this conviction, which had been forced upon me by experience and observation in 1896, undoubtedly influenced my judgment of European affairs during the next eighteen years." *Ibid.*, I, 102.

[68] *G. P.*, XVII, 210–11.

[69] *Ibid.*, XX, 244–45, 248–49, 261–62. See also Harris' article on the Moroccan crisis in *Blackwood's Magazine*, Aug. 1905, pp. 293–304. In light of new evidence his article is remarkably accurate and fair, and so far as it is possible places the responsibility for the crisis where it belongs.

[70] *Ibid.*, XXI, 95.

[71] *Ibid.*, XIX, 635; Gwynn, *op. cit.*, II, 99.

[72] Report of the *Vossische Zeitung's* correspondent, No. 556, Nov. 26, 1904. A

for the *Times*. He was once boycotted by the German embassy at London—that is, refused all information—because of inflammatory articles against Germany.[73]

The owner, foreign editor, and most important correspondents of the *Times* were convinced of the unalterable hostility of Germany. Its editorial policy was designed to awaken the British public to the reality of the 'German menace.' An examination of the *Times*' files plainly reveals that the correspondents, either by selection or coloration, 'angled' the news to fit the policy of the paper. At every German gesture of friendship or good will the *Times* assumed a cynical attitude of surprise and disbelief, or else insinuated that behind the action lurked a dark plot to allay the fears of the English until Germany was ready to fall upon them unawares.[74]

It would be easy, perhaps, to exaggerate, as did the Germans, the importance of the *Times*. But, on the other hand, it must be recognized that its influence was not confined to England or the British Empire. For other English newspapers it was one of the chief sources of information on foreign affairs. Moreover, by special arrangement its telegraphic despatches were transmitted to the Paris *Matin*, thus exerting great influence in France. Nor did its influence stop there. The New York *Evening Post*, in an editorial comment-

curious news circle was thus established. Reports from Tokio appearing in the *Times* frequently came back to Japan through Reuter's Agency and were printed in the columns of the *Japan Mail*. This was a process of self-inspiration not uncommon in journalistic circles.

[73] *G. P.*, XXI, 461; XXIII, 560–61. Wolf was animated by a desire for sensational news rather than deep-rooted hostility to Germany. The article entitled "The German Grievance," in *Pall Mall Gazette*, March 6, 1906, and signed "Diplomaticus," was written by Wolf. It was a justification of Germany's Moroccan policy. See Sir William Tyrrell's memorandum on this article in *B. D.*, III, 347–49.

[74] Lorenz, pp. 87–90. The *Times* comment on an interview with Count Bülow, appearing in *Nineteenth Century*, Dec., 1904, is characteristic: "The Chancellor says he is a 'weeder' bent upon eradicating the tares which certain malicious writers have been sowing in the good wheat of the German Foreign Office 'within the last few months.' The educational process to which he refers has lasted for more than a few months. . . . It has gone on since Germany first showed her true disposition towards us in South Africa. If Count Bülow intends to weed it out, he has 'a hard row to hoe'." *Times*, Nov. 29, 1904.

ing on the coloration of foreign news published in the United States, said:

> The international news service, with the exception of the London *Times* (of late years, however, a sinner through chauvinism) . . . is often defective or positively bad. . . . In fact no paper but the *Times* today is served all over the world by its own correspondents. And the extraordinary completeness of its service results in the unhappy but natural result that most of the news we get of Europe, or Europe of itself, is merely the more or less intelligent condensation of the London *Times* despatches—that is, news filtered first through a British correspondent, next through a British editor, and next through a London correspondent before it reaches the home office.[75]

Space does not permit an examination of the foreign policy of each British paper, but the general outline of some of the more important can be briefly sketched. The formula for the *Daily Telegraph's* leaders ran somewhat as follows: Germany has nothing that we consider worth having for we are surfeited with colonies. An indemnity? The loss of life, the misery, and material damage which would result from such a struggle makes the idea preposterous. If the Germans would look at it through British spectacles they would realize that an attack upon Germany is not within the realm of reason. The *entente* with France is based upon a desire for peace,

> but the most passionate lovers of peace are the most keen and prompt to resent aggression. When the more truculent of our German contemporaries have learnt this elementary lesson we shall enjoy for an indefinite period immunity from the war-scares which paralyze industry, and which bring no good to any human being or combination of human beings.[76]

Dr. E. J. Dillon, special correspondent of the *Daily Telegraph*, was closely connected with official Russian circles and was a warm advocate of an Anglo-Russian *rapprochement*.[77] Mr.

[75] New York *Evening Post*, Dec. 15, 1904.

[76] *Daily Telegraph*, Nov. 15, 1904, and Oct. 14, 1905.

[77] *G. P.*, XIX, 635. His relations with Witte are recorded in *The Eclipse of Russia*. Spring Rice called him "The literary agent of the great man [Witte]." Gwynn, *op. cit.*, II, 12. Another figure in the press relations between England,

W. L. Courtney, editor of the *Fortnightly Review*, was on the editorial staff of the *Daily Telegraph*. Although unfriendly to Germany, his personal views were not reflected in the *Telegraph's* policy.[78]

A general formula for the Tory *Standard's* editorials on Anglo-German relations started with the premise that Germany was forced by necessity "to seek a place in the sun." England had nothing to fear from her colonial or economic expansion. If Berlin would only state the extent of her naval program, the suspicion that it was directed against England would be allayed and a great danger removed. Great Britain desired friendship with Germany as well as with France; it was only prejudice and misunderstanding that kept them apart. However, if friendship for one was incompatible with friendship for the other, then France came first.[79]

The authoritative Liberal press—*Manchester Guardian*, *Daily News*, and *Westminster Gazette*—maintained that the danger from the growing German navy was exaggerated. Although it expressed open dislike for the German government and some of its avowed policies, nevertheless it pointed out that the German people were not motivated by deep-rooted hostility to England.[80] The disapproval with which the Liberal organs regarded the anti-German campaign carried on in a part of the Englsih press finds expression in a *Daily News* editorial:

Remembering how vain was the Russian bogey of the last generation, we shall be careful not to rear in its place a German bogey,

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Russia, and Germany was Wesselitzky, London correspondent of *Novoe Vremya*, who attacked German policy in the English reviews, using the pseudonym "Argus." *G. P.*, XIX, 672; Fay, *Origins of the World War*, I, 269–70. "Ellis Barker," who wrote articles warning England against Germany, was German born. His pen name was an anglicized form of his real name—Eltzbacher. *G. P.*, XXV, 261. His chauvinistic output was reprinted from the *Nineteenth Century, National Review, Contemporary*, and *Fortnightly*, in a volume entitled *Modern Germany* which by 1919 was in its sixth edition.

[78] Schiemann, *Deutsche Monatsschrift*, Oct., 1904, pp. 114 ff.; Lorenz, pp. 67, 106.

[79] Lorenz, pp. 114 ff.; *Standard*, Dec. 15, 1904, and Oct. 7, 1905.

[80] *Ibid.*, pp. 123 ff.; *Manchester Guardian*, June 21, 25, Dec. 8, 1904; *Westminster Gazette*, June 24, 1905; *Daily News*, June 7, 1905.

which may appear in the future as mischievous and illusive as its predecessor. . . . For it seems to us that Teutophobia, as preached in organs like *The Spectator* and the *National Review*, is not only a dangerous sentiment in itself, but is founded upon a false conception of the facts.[81]

J. A. Spender was perhaps the fairest and most objective of British editors. In his treatment of foreign affairs he adhered to the principles which he recommended to others: "No snap judgments or hasty conclusions! In case of doubt attribute the best possible motives under the circumstances! Do not misconstrue or exaggerate the facts."[82]

In the first decade of the twentieth century three important European news agencies furnished telegraphic despatches to all papers at a fixed price. They were usually credited with being semi-official, or at least serving on occasion as channels for official communications. Of these three—Reuter's in England, Havas in France, and Wolff in Germany—Reuter's and Havas were old established institutions, highly organized to give service throughout Europe. Wolff, on the other hand, came late on the scene, held a very precarious position until 1870, and never became more than a national institution.[83] For general news outside Germany it was dependent on Havas and Reuter, with whom it had exchange agreements. However, only a small part of the important reports from Reuter's Agency passed through the Wolff bureau. Reuter's furnished, in competition with the German agency, direct reports to the German papers under the heading: "Allgemeine Korrespondenz Reuter." Through this channel, a constant stream of English political thought and opinion found its way directly into Germany.[84]

German papers that did not have their own correspondents were dependent on English and French sources for their

[81] *Daily News*, April 28, 1905.

[82] Lorenz, p. 125.

[83] On the news agencies see H. M. Collins, *From Pigeon Post to Wireless;* H. Simonis, *The Street of Ink*, pp. 157 ff.; Paul Eltzbacher, *Die Press als Werkzeug der auswärtigen Politik* (Jena, 1918).

[84] Schiemann, *Deutsche Monatsschrift*, Oct., 1904, pp. 114 ff.; Lorenz, pp. 14 f.

foreign news. Moreover, news originating in Germany reached the rest of the world through foreign telegraph bureaus. During the Moroccan crisis many German publicists felt that their case was not put fairly before the world. In Paris, Rome, London, and Washington the views expressed in the German press were known only through the short selected extracts reproduced by the Havas and Reuter agencies, while English and French articles were read throughout the world.[85] Dissatisfaction with Reuter's was expressed through an article in *Berliner Neueste Nachrichten*. It began: "Los von Reuter! Los von seinen Affiliierten." It advocated the creation of a worldwide news service by government subsidy, if necessary.[86] In a work entitled *Die Presse und die Deutsche Weltpolitik*, Fritz Waltz charged Reuter and Havas with a conspiracy against German interests. He advocated the organization of an extensive independent German service. This would give Germany direct contact with other countries without all her news first being censored by British and French agencies.[87] The hostility aroused against Reuter's was not fully shared by Professor Schiemann. He maintained that with respect to questions not directly affecting English interests the policies of other governments were handled without a perceptible bias.[88] Much of the hostility to Reuter's Agency was undoubtedly generated by friction during the Moroccan crisis and the defeat suffered by German policy at Algeciras. The fact that German journalists were suspicious of English agencies as news sources and as interpreters to the rest of the world of German thought and opinion was significant of the growing estrangement of the two great Teu-

[85] *Kreuzzeitung*, April 4, 1906.

[86] *Berliner Neueste Nachrichten*, Aug. 1, 1905.

[87] Published anonymously—"Von einem Auslandsdeutschen"—in Zürich, 1906. Lorenz (p. 135) advocated the same plan, but wisely insisted that such an agency be free from official control.

[88] Schiemann, *Deutsche Monatsschrift*, Oct., 1904, pp. 114 ff. His opinion changed somewhat after the Algeciras Conference. See *Kreuzzeitung*, April 4, 1906. H. D. Lasswell (*Propaganda Technique in the World War*, p. 80) notes a German war publication entitled *Die Friedensbedingungen der deutschen Presse—Los von Reuter und Havas* (Berlin, 1915).

tonic nations. It extended even to the field of international communications.

The central factor in the situation was the constant bickering of the German and English journals, through which public opinion was kept in a constant state of agitation. The vendetta was maintained in England by the London *Times*, *Daily Mail*, weekly *Spectator*, and the monthly *National Review*.[89] In Germany it was the Pan-Germans and the Navy League that supplied their critics across the North Sea with ammunition. This fact was recognized by the *Westminster Gazette* (Mr. Spender's organ) when it warned that

> The Teutophobe in England plays all the time into the hands of the Pan-German in Germany. His threats and complaints are translated into German and become so many reasons for increasing the German Fleet and checking British diplomacy. The Pan-German does a corresponding work in this country. His extremely irresponsible literature is quoted as evidence of far-reaching German designs, and used as an argument for increasing expenditure to meet the supposed dangers. There are certain English writers who are worth a battleship a year to Germany, and certain Pan-German Professors who are the equivalent of the whole Navy League in this country. . . . These campaigns tend to produce the very dangers which they allege, and unless sober people step in to stop them, it will get rooted in language and thought that the two peoples are necessarily hostile.[90]

Bismarck once said that indignation was not a political state of mind, and yet the most persistent aspect presented by the European press from 1904 to 1906 was one of mutual recrimination and antagonism. This, then, formed the background against which the diplomatic events of this period took place.

[89] On Aug. 1, 1914, the *Daily News* declared editorially that "for years under the industrious propaganda of Lord Northcliffe, Mr. Strachey, Mr. Maxse, and the militarists, this country has been preached into an anti-German frame of mind that takes no account of the facts." Quoted by H. D. Lasswell, *Propaganda Technique in the World War*, p. 48.

[90] *Westminster Gazette*, Aug. 5, 1905. See also C. E. Playne, *The Pre-War Mind in Britain*, ch. VII, "Anglo-German Antagonism."

Chapter II

ANGLO-GERMAN PRESS RELATIONS AND NEW INTERNATIONAL FRIENDSHIPS

THE revolution that occurred in Anglo-German relations at the turn of the present century has generally been attributed to three main factors: first, economic rivalry; second, the German naval program, signifying her entrance into the field of *Weltpolitik;* and third, a tendency in certain sections of the press to magnify national differences and fan the flames of ill-will. Each of these factors, to the exclusion of others, has been stressed as the chief cause of friction. The part played by the press will be developed as the events of 1904–1906 are treated, but the other two points of view, as expressed by writers and statesmen, require some examination.

"We English have always made war hitherto upon our rivals in trade and commerce," stated the *Saturday Review* (August 24, 1895), "and our chief rival in trade and commerce today is not France, but Germany. In case of war with Germany, we should stand to win much and lose nothing. . . ." Doubtless, this was the opinion of those in England who feared German economic development. A foreign observer, writing in *Temps* (January 11, 1905), declared that "Economic rivalry blossoms into political rivalry; that is the law which governs Anglo-German relations. This law is general and immutable."[1] German writers no less than French and English, held the same opinion. Admiral von Tirpitz and the German Navy League always maintained that Germany was bound to incur the hostility of England, once they met as rivals in industry, commerce, and shipping.[2] In fact, this was

[1] Similar opinions expressed by the Belgian minister at Berlin, Feb. 18, 1905, and the chargé d'affaires, Aug. 5, 1905; *Belg. D.*, Supp. I, 5, 15–17. The thesis is elaborately worked out by Jacques Bardoux, *Essai d'une psychologie de l'Angleterre contemporaine; les crises politiques,* ch. I, "La concurrence allemande."

[2] Von Tirpitz, *Der Aufbau der deutschen Weltmacht,* p. 84; Von Tirpitz, "Über

the basic appeal to the nation for construction of a large navy.[3]

This stock argument has been repeatedly denied, although before the war it was widely supported by German writers and statesmen. Johannes Haller admits that economic rivalry was keen, but emphatically rejects the idea that it was the essential cause of English hostility.[4] He points out that the outcry against goods "Made in Germany" began in the *Saturday Review* as early as 1897, but made no great impression on English opinion. Moreover, the German merchant marine grew and lay for years before the British navy "wie Butter vor ein Messer" (like butter before a knife). It could have been wiped out as easily in 1900 as it was in 1914. The "knife" was never applied to the "butter" because the two countries were, in a certain sense, "commercially married." Germany was one of England's largest customers; it followed that a richer Germany could buy more from England. No good business man would shoot his best customer.[5]

Sir Edward Grey refused to accept the thesis that economic rivalry was the cause of friction with Germany. In his opinion "commercial competition did not affect the political relations and did not have a political effect on public opinion in England."[6] The German secretary of legation in London, Von Stumm, reported that it was his belief that English interests directly affected by German competition were rela-

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Vergangenheit, Gegenwart und Zukunft des deutschen Reiches," *Grenzboten*, Oct. 9, 1921, pp. 35 ff.; Echart Kehr, "Englandhass und Weltpolitik," *Zeit. für Pol.*, XVII (1928), p. 515; L. Lémonon, *L'Europe et la politique britannique*, 1882–1911, pp. 216–32, *passim;* Wilhelm Spickernagel, *Fürst Bülow*, pp. 57 ff. Hans Herzfeld ("Der deutsche Flottenbau und die englische Politik," *Archiv für P. u. G.*, Jan., 1926, pp. 106 ff.) thinks that in the early stages of German economic development after 1870 considerable apprehension and animosity was excited in England, but that this was subordinated after 1905 to the fear of German naval armaments.

[3] Von-Tirpitz, *My Memoirs*, I, 254–62; *Münchener Allgemeine Zeitung*, No. 18 Jan. 12, 1905; *Vossische Zeitung*, No. 6, Jan. 5, 1906.

[4] Johannes Haller, *Die Aera Bülow*, pp. 42 f.; also Walter Hoch, "Der Ursprung des deutsch-englischen Gegensatzes und die Lehren des Weltkrieges," *Archiv für P. u. G.*, March, 1923, pp. 163–64.

[5] Haller, pp. 45–46; and Willy Becker, *Fürst Bülow und England*, pp. 306 ff.

[6] *B. D.*, III, 277.

tively small and unimportant.[7] E. Lémonon[8] has summarized the facts and figures relative to German invasion of British markets.[9] The evidence, however, is far from convincing. If we take his own figures we see that England's trade with her colonies declined from 54 per cent in 1884, to 45 per cent in 1900, and that the English colonial importation of German goods increased from .8 per cent to 2.8 per cent during the same period. It should be pointed out that in 1884 the British colonies took from the United States 8.6 per cent of their imports, and in 1900, 11.8 per cent. That is to say, the United States was invading British colonial markets at double the rate of the Germans. Moreover, the startling reports of one, two, and three hundred per cent German gains in foreign markets during the nineties were due to the fact that Germany had made her first sales in districts where she had never before been represented.

According to another German writer,[10] commercial competition played a relatively small part in Anglo-German relations. He notes that England's empire within itself possessed unlimited possibilities for commercial and economic development; a self-sufficient system could have been erected from which Germany could have been excluded. This is a point of importance, because it was the essence of the Chamberlain program of imperial preference and closer economic relations within the Empire. Periods of commercial and industrial depression in nineteenth century England always resulted in revived agitation for protective tariff. Such periods occurred in 1884–1885 and 1896–1897. The causes were cyclical, but short-sighted people could see no cause other than German competition. To a large extent, the Chamberlain party drew propaganda for their program from examples

[7] Mem. by Stumm, July 9, 1908; *G. P.*, XXIV, 88–89.

[8] *L'Europe et la politique britannique*, pp. 216–32.

[9] Gleaned from Victor Bérard, *L'Angleterre et l'impérialisme* (1900); Georges Blondel, *L'Essor industriel et commercial du peuple allemande* (1900); Maurice Lair, *L'Impérialisme allemand* (1902); Achille Viallatte, *La crise anglaise* (1905); Louis Cazamian, *L'Angleterre moderne* (1911).

[10] Adolf Grabowsky, "Der Primat der Aussenpolitik," *Zeit. für Pol.*, XVII (1928), p. 538.

of ruinous German invasion of their unprotected markets. German competition was used as a club to strike down the free traders. Such books as Edwin Williams' *Made in Germany*, Cox's *Are We Ruined by the Germans* (answered of course in the affirmative), and Rowland Thirlmere's *The Clash of Empires*, formed a part of the protective tariff propaganda.[11] When the curve of economic advance resumed its upward trend after the Boer war, the Liberal party, in 1906, won a notable victory on a free trade platform. With the decline of the protective tariff movement the agitation against German economic competition declined proportionally.

To say that economic rivalry blossoming into political rivalry was an immutable law governing Anglo-German relations is an untenable proposition. Those who advanced it were thinking in terms of seventeenth century mercantilism where trade was a matter of dealing in the marginal production of a self-sufficient state. It disregards the economic interdependence of nations which developed with the advance of the Industrial Revolution. Competition in world markets was not the fundamental factor in Anglo-German political friction. On the other hand, it cannot be denied that the constant reiteration of this thesis, as part of the Chamberlain protective tariff campaign, must have created a psychological state of mind in English circles which made it easy to propagate the idea that Germany was the natural enemy of Great Britain.

Rapid development of the German navy was undoubtedly the root of mutual Anglo-German mistrust.[12] Von Tirpitz' thesis was written into the preamble of the naval law of 1900:

[11] "If, notwithstanding, the English continually refer in their political economy to the critical danger from Germany, it is predominantly a talking point in the protective tariff propaganda." Mem. by Stumm, July 9, 1908; *G. P.*, XXIV, 88–89. This was also Bernstorff's opinion. Bernstorff to Bülow, April 16, 1904; *ibid.*, XX, 18.

[12] Adolf Grabowsky, *op. cit.*, XVII, 538; Hans Delbrück, *Preussische Jahrbücher*, Jan. 1905, pp. 182 ff.; Haller, p. 49; Walter Hoch, *op. cit.*, March, 1923, pp. 163 ff.; Becker, *Fürst Bülow und England*, pp. 294 ff.; *Vorwärts*, No. 214, Sept. 11, 1904, "Flottenargumente"; Bernstorff to Bülow, April 16, 1904; *G. P.*, XX, 14–21.

"Germany must have a fleet of such strength that a war against the mightiest Power would involve risks threatening the supremacy of that Power."[13] This law was introduced with the full realization that the program would arouse English suspicions and incur the danger of a preventive war before the German fleet was completed. This was the "danger zone" through which Germany had to pass before the "risk fleet" could be constructed. The years 1904–1905 were the most critical in the "danger zone," for it was then that England first envisaged the ultimate consequences of the German program.[14]

The policy designed by Bülow to carry Germany through the danger period was outlined in a letter to the Kaiser:

> As Your Majesty has so correctly said—everything as regards England depends on our coming through the next few years with patience and composure, without provoking any unpleasant incidents, and giving no visible grounds for anxiety. Our position is similar to that of the Athenians, who were constrained to erect the long walls to Piraeus under threat of an attack from the more powerful Spartans before they had completed their defenses.[15]

England's original indifference to the development of German sea power was expressed by Edward, Prince of Wales, when he said: "Oh, let him [William II] play with his fleet." This attitude changed slowly after the naval law of 1900, which marked the beginning of battleship construction of the heavier type. The building of a battle fleet was regarded in England as both a challenge and a threat.[16] This changed

[13] This preamble served frequently as a text for English editors. *Manchester Guardian*, June 25, 1904; *Pall Mall Gazette*, Feb. 6, 1905.

[14] Tirpitz, *Der Aufbau der deutschen Weltmacht*, pp. 7, 10; Spickernagel, *Fürst Bülow*, p. 68.

[15] Bülow to the Kaiser, Dec. 26, 1904; *G. P.*, XIX, 372–73. Kaiser's notation: "My dear Bülow, how often in late years have I quoted this example!!!" Tirpitz' naval policy has been the subject of bitter controversy in Germany. Haller (*Die Aera Bülow*, pp. 49–76) attributes Germany's downfall to Tirpitz' policy; Otto Hammann (*The World Policy of Germany*, pp. 228–32) and Willy Becker (Bülow kontra Tirpitz," *Zeit. für Pol.*, XVI, 1926, pp. 297–330; *Fürst Bülow und England*) are severely critical. Spickernagel (*Fürst Bülow*, pp. 57–59) takes the opposite point of view.

[16] Hammann, *World Policy*, pp. 162–64. Hans Herzfeld ("Der deutsche Flotten-

point of view was expressed by the *Times* which declared (February 25, 1905) that "Navies are not toys which concern only those who play with them." Bülow recognized this when he expressed the view that the tension between Germany and England might be relieved if they emphasized defensive naval armaments, rather than construction of a battle fleet.[17] Count Metternich, the German ambassador in London, declared in 1906 that the real cause of Anglo-German tension was not commercial rivalry, but England's uneasiness at the rapid development of the German navy.[18]

Serious agitation began in the English press shortly after King Edward's visit to Kiel in June, 1904, where he and his staff had a first-hand opportunity to observe German naval progress. In 1905, Admiral Fisher made his first proposal to "Copenhagen the German fleet." Thereafter, attention of English publicists and statesmen was fixed primarily on the Kaiser's naval plans, rather than on the danger of German economic development. "England feared a German attack . . . and England's whole policy began to turn toward this one point, as the needle of a compass turns toward the North Pole."[19]

Sharpening of Anglo-German public relations was due in no small part to questions of neutrality and international friendships raised by the outbreak of war, in February, 1904,

bau und die englische Politik," *Archiv für P. u. G.*, Jan., 1926, pp. 117–21) maintains that English superiority was so great in 1905 that it was absurd to talk of real danger; that the Germanophobe press took it up because it was a point which would impress the public; and that it was not until after 1905, when the dreadnaught type was introduced and both nations were put on an equal footing in this category, that real danger was apprehended.

[17] "If in our naval construction we should place the emphasis on defense. . . . much of the principal cause of the tension with England would disappear." Quoted by Hammann, *Der missverstandne Bismarck*, p. 125.

[18] Hammann, *Der missverstandne Bismarck*, p. 144; Haller, p. 49; Becker, "Bülow kontra Tirpitz," *Zeit. für Pol.*, XVI (1926), p. 304. Tirpitz gives Bülow credit for supporting his naval policy, but at the close of his career the chancellor made common cause with Metternich and Von Moltke against the Admiral's policy. Becker, *Zeit. für Pol.*, XVI (1926), pp. 297–330; Bülow's letter of July 10, 1923, printed in Woff, *Le Prélude*, pp. 107 ff.

[19] Haller, p. 53; see also F. W. Hirst, *The Six Panics*, "The Fifth or Dreadnaught Panic," pp. 59–102.

between Russia and Japan. An inquiry into the diplomatic events leading up to the final break lies outside the scope of this study. Professor W. L. Langer has shown that the Great Powers, with the exception of France, were not averse to seeing such a clash; if they did not encourage the rivals neither did they take effective steps toward mediation. A Japanese victory would safeguard English interests in the Far East; the United States would profit from a weakening of both contestants; and as Russia became more deeply involved in the Orient, Germany would benefit by lessened pressure on her eastern frontier.[20]

During the crisis which preceded the outbreak of war, Conservative English journals rejected the idea of mediation, and after hostilities began all sections of the press rallied to support the Japanese ally.[21] Not a single important paper criticized or blamed Japan for her part in precipitating the conflict. The French public was unprepared for the outbreak of war as the press had up to the last moment confidently predicted a peaceful settlement.[22] *Temps* and *Débats* insisted upon strict neutrality,[23] while the Socialists clamored for mediation and loudly denounced the Russian alliance as a menace to French security.[24] Coolness of semi-official organs and open denunciation of Russia by the Left, which was at the time in power, led the Bavarian minister at Paris to think that the Dual Alliance would break up if it were not for financial ties which bound Russia to France.[25]

[20] W. L. Langer, "Der russisch-japanische Krieg," *Europäische Gespräche*, June, 1926, pp. 303, 316–17, 320–22.

[21] *Morning Post*, Jan. 28, Feb. 4, 8, 1904; *Daily Mail*, Feb. 8; *Westminster Gazette*, Feb. 8; *Daily News*, Feb. 8, 9; *Standard*, Feb. 8, 9; *Daily Telegraph*, Feb. 8.

[22] *Temps*, Feb. 5, 6, 9; *Figaro*, Feb. 1 to 7; *Débats*, Feb. 6. The Bavarian minister at Paris reported: "The sudden outbreak of the Russo-Japanese war . . . completely surprised everyone here." Bav. D., No. 29, IV, Feb. 10, 1904. Delcassé, too, apparently misjudged the situation. Radolin to F. O., Feb. 28, 1904; *G. P.*, XIX, 165–67.

[23] *Débats*, Feb. 10; *Temps*, Feb. 10.

[24] *Petite République*, Feb. 8, 9, 10, 22, 24; *Figaro*, Feb. 16, 18, denouncing Jaurès and the Socialists for their attitude toward Russia. See also Georges Michon, *The Franco-Russian Alliance*, pp. 122–29.

[25] Bav. D., No. 29, IV, Feb. 10, 1904.

It was with great difficulty that Bülow prevailed upon the Kaiser to avoid grave indiscretions or compromising and unneutral actions in the early days of the war. "William I and Frederick the Great had not smashed their heads for others," Bülow pointed out.[26] Cooler heads recognized that Germany had more to gain by remaining neutral, while at the same time she must convince the Czar that he had a warm friend on his western frontier instead of a potential enemy.[27] Instructions for guidance of the press were noted by Bülow on February 7: The secondary nature of Germany's interests in the Far East was to be emphasized; friendly relations with all Powers necessitated German neutrality; an unfriendly tone toward Russia, Japan, England, or America was to be avoided. Finally, in direct contradiction to the facts, it was to be given out that within the limits of international practice everything had been done to prevent an armed encounter.[28]

During the Russo-Japanese war, the Kaiser's attitude toward England was governed by his emotional reaction to the fact that she was the ally of Japan against whom, he maintained, Russia was defending western Europe and the white race.[29] The least friction produced a violent reaction upon his impressionable mind. This, however, did not greatly affect foreign office policy. In the summer of 1904, the Russo-German commercial treaty was renewed through personal negotiations between Witte and Bülow. At that time the subject of possible renewal of former close political relations came up for discussion in the German foreign office. Against such action the foreign secretary took a strong stand. In his opinion, King Edward's visit to Kiel, in June, had made a favorable impression, and better relations with England might be expected; to renew the old Three Emperors League would excite suspicion and hostility in England as well as in Amer-

[26] Mem. by Bülow, Feb. 14, 1904; *G. P.*, XIX, 62 f.

[27] Mem. by Bülow, Jan. 16; *ibid.*, XIX, 34. Mem. by Eckardstein, Jan. 17; *ibid.*, XIX, 38–43.

[28] Mem. by Bülow, Feb. 7; *ibid.*, XIX, 165.

[29] *Ibid.*, XIX, 211–12; Friedjung, *Zeitalter*, II, 20 f.

ica. Moreover, he suggested that if Witte broached the subject, Germany should demand, as a prior consideration, the guarantee of the European territorial *status quo*, a condition which Russia could hardly concede in view of her financial and political relations to France.[30] This view prevailed in the Wilhelmstrasse, and is important in light of subsequent developments. Later in the year, when the attitude of the press raised apprehensions of an English attack, the foreign office approved the Kaiser's plan to draw Russia and eventually France into an alliance with Germany.

In 1904, the *Saturday Review* could no longer boast that "All countries stand in need of Britain, and Britain of none."[31] Complete abandonment of "splendid isolation," signified by the Japanese alliance, the Entente Cordiale with France, and cautious feelers extended toward Russia, constituted a striking reversal of Salisbury's policy. The object was to reinsure England's safety. Her self-confidence was left on the battlefields of South Africa. Isolation no longer seemed splendid.

A month before the accord of April 8, 1904, was announced, it was signalled to the press that negotiations for an Anglo-French colonial agreement were under way.[32] A memorandum by Bülow for the direction of the press bureau states that the agreement ought to be received in Germany without "irritation or jealousy" and as a sign of the growing tendency to iron out international difficulties before they became acute.[33] On April 14, when Bebel reproached the chancellor in the Reichstag for conducting German relations in such a way as to have brought about her isolation, Bülow replied that even if this were true—and he emphatically denied it—Germany was strong enough to defend her own house single-

[30] Mem. by Von Richthofen, undated but probably around July 4; *ibid.*, XIX, 194.

[31] *Saturday Review*, Aug. 24, 1895.

[32] *Kölnische Zeitung*, No. 239, March 8, 1904, confirming a previous London telegram.

[33] April 9, 1904; *G. P.*, XX, 12. Hammann noted that the journalists had been prepared for two weeks to meet the agreement in this manner.

handed.[34] Notwithstanding his optimistic statement, considerable apprehension existed in official circles at rumored secret articles of a political character attached to the agreement.[35] The Kaiser realized that it made England entirely independent of German support. Holstein emphasized the agreement as a guarantee against intervention of a third Power in the Far Eastern struggle. He recognized, however, that both parties gained considerable freedom of action and that the new combination would tend to attract Italy from the Triple Alliance.[36]

The *Vossische Zeitung* greeted the announcement as a further indication that Russia was drifting away from France and toward Germany. The danger of isolation, it declared, was less than it had been for many years.[37] The liberal independent *Berliner Tageblatt* expressed the opinion that either Russia would now come to an agreement with England—which under the circumstances seemed unlikely—or accept the hand which Germany seemed all too willing to offer.[38] Theodor Wolff, Paris correspondent of *Berliner Tageblatt*, warned German political journalists not to make a second mistake by assuming that the agreement, which they had all declared impossible, threatened in the least the Franco-Russian Alliance. Everything, he said, was arranged with the full knowledge and consent of Russia, who hoped to benefit indirectly from Anglo-French friendship once negotiations for peace in the Orient were undertaken.[39] In reply to Bülow's Reichstag declaration, the *Tageblatt* noted that "The danger of isolation is not so far removed as Count Bülow would like to believe. And it is a danger."[40] Moreover, it declared that his statements indicated a storm was brewing for which the

[34] *Fürst Bülows Reden*, II, 84.

[35] Bülow to Metternich, June 4; *G. P.*, XX, 27–29. Metternich to Bülow, June 4; *ibid.*, XX, 29–30.

[36] Kaiser to Bülow, April 10; *ibid.*, XX, 22–23. Bülow to the Kaiser, April 20 (despatch drafted by Holstein); *ibid.*, XX, 23–24.

[37] *Vossische Zeitung*, Nos. 166, 168, 175, 180, April 9, 11, 15, 18.

[38] *Berliner Tageblatt*, No. 181, April 10.

[39] *Ibid.*, No. 186, April 3.

[40] *Ibid.*, No. 190, April 15.

necessary lightning conductor had not yet been devised.[41] A week later, Arthur Levysohn, the editor, warned that it would be no harder to find a panacea for Anglo-Russian ills than for the Anglo-French. There were already indications that British mediation in the Far Eastern war might bridge the gap between England and Russia.[42]

The liberal *Frankfurter Zeitung* welcomed the accord as a pledge of peace, which did not affect Germany.[43] It pointed out, later, that the words "German isolation" had been whispered through certain sections of the European press.[44] *Vorwärts*, the Social Democratic organ, interpreted the agreement as an English move to checkmate Germany in the game of *Weltpolitik*.[45]

Criticism of Bülow for not having prevented the Anglo-French *rapprochement* was most severe in the extreme chauvinistic and Pan-German press. In a long memorandum for a newspaper article the chancellor took the chauvinists to task:

. . . through their systematic agitation against England and their fanatical enthusiasm for the Boers they made the Anglo-French *rapprochement* possible. With what lack of judgment was I attacked as I cautioned them against such a senseless emotional policy! In a time when press and public opinion play such a great rôle as they do today, the responsibility for the excesses of both fall in the last analysis upon the country.

It would not be amiss on this occasion to warn the German press and public opinion that foreign questions must be handled with greater coolness, without continual advice and affronts to other countries, without childish sentimentality, political twaddle, and without continually discrediting their own government.

We can learn from the English how an intelligent people can quietly, patiently, and without recrimination suffer a long series of serious military set-backs; from the French how a nation, sensible

[41] *Ibid.*, No. 194, April 17.

[42] *Ibid.*, No. 207, April 24. Pessimistic reports came also from the London correspondent. No. 181, April 10.

[43] *Frankfurter Zeitung*, No. 99, April 9.

[44] *Ibid.*, No. 105, April 15.

[45] *Vorwärts*, No. 86, April 13.

and prudent, can come through such painful incidents as Faschoda. We can learn from both that one does not simply cry over agreements because of what one has not received, but rather be satisfied with what one has attained.[46]

A long article embodying all of the above points and ideas, without the golden opinions of press and public opinion in France and England, appeared shortly afterward in the *Kölnische Zeitung*.[47]

Soon after conclusion of the Anglo-French agreement, the Kaiser again 'went off the reservation' in two speeches delivered at Karlsruhe and Mainz. His bombastic phrases drew the following comment from the English weekly *Spectator:*

> Germany is isolated, and the German Emperor wishes to conceal the fact by talking loudly and fiercely, just as the boy in the story concealed his loneliness and fear by whistling as he went through the churchyard. . . . Germany is now the least liked and most suspected Power in the world. Is it to be wondered then, that she feels herself in a position of isolation?[48]

According to the *Saturday Review*, this interpretation was widely held in England:

> The general tendency of our own Press would lead Continental observers to believe that we welcome the agreement with France less for its intrinsic benefits than because we think it annoys Germany or may tend to loosen the connexion between France and Russia. No unprejudiced person can deny that this amicable attitude is very general in this country.[49]

In a long report on English public opinion and the press, Bernstorff wrote that the anti-German papers were pleased to interpret the Entente Cordiale as a serious check to Germany. Such it would be, he thought, if England fostered aggressive designs, but he was convinced that such was not the case. England was in the grip of a reaction against the jingoism of the Chamberlain epoch, and if the French counted on British support in a war of revenge they would be disap-

[46] Hammann, *Bilder*, pp. 42–43; communication dated April 20.
[47] *Kölnische Zeitung*, No. 408, April 22; "Die Presse und das Ausland."
[48] *The Spectator*, May 7, 1904.
[49] *Saturday Review*, May 20, 1904.

pointed. It was his opinion that the establishment of more harmonious relations was not impossible, as the ill-feeling toward Germany was less perceptible in everyday contacts than in the press. He wrote:

> The English government appears now to desire to counteract the press agitation. At least, Mr. Gwynne, the chief representative of the Reuter Agency, who is very friendly to Germany, informs me that in the foreign office they tell him that he must oppose the present press agitation as far as it is within his power. The government wishes after reaching a reconciliation with France, to begin the same work with Germany. For our part, it is naturally very difficult to influence public opinion since the journalists are already armed with their old prejudices. Frequently at night in their editorial rooms they forget what they have promised me in the afternoon. That can be easily changed if the government will really exercise its restraining influence.

Bernstorff suggested the negotiation of an arbitration treaty which would be harmless but at the same time would have great value in the eyes of the public.[50]

Speculation on the significance of the accord of April 8, 1904, had not ceased when another event of international import occurred to give color to the widely held opinion that the international situation was rapidly changing to the disadvantage of Germany.

The *rapprochement* between Paris and Rome, begun in 1897, was given tangible form during December, 1900, in a declaration of mutual disinterestedness in Morocco and Tripoli. On November 1, 1902, by a further exchange of notes enjoining neutrality upon the Italian government in certain eventualities, Italy ceased to be a loyal member of the Triple Alliance.[51] Although this commitment was kept secret, German statesmen were aware of the direction in which the wind was blowing. By uttering a brilliant witticism on conjugal

[50] Bernstorff to Bülow, April 16; *G. P.*, XX, 14–21. This report was circulated in the foreign office and sent to the Kaiser.

[51] S. B. Fay, *The Origins of the World War*, I, 141–51; Wolff, *Le Prélude*, pp. 157–59; A. Mévil, *De la paix de Francfort à la conférence d'Algésiras*, pp. 119–27; E. N. Anderson, *The First Moroccan Crisis*, ch. II.

felicity, Bülow characteristically attempted to distract attention from the weakening of the Triple Alliance.[52] Early in 1904, arrangements were made for President Loubet to visit the King of Italy, thus to signify publicly the *rapprochement* between the Latin sisters. It so happened that the Kaiser planned a spring cruise in the Mediterranean and a meeting with Victor Emmanuel, which would just precede Loubet's visit. There was some discussion in the press and diplomatic circles of the possibility that all three should meet on Italian soil. The idea was abandoned since it met with little sympathy in Paris.[53]

The Kaiser was received first at Naples on March 26; the reception went off smoothly and the customary courtesies were exchanged.[54] But while the monarchs were exchanging toasts in Naples, great preparations were being made for the reception of the French President. Public enthusiasm and interest in these preparations raised apprehensions in Berlin. Bülow expressed the German view to the Italian ambassador:

> If this visit should be of such great significance as it would appear to be from the newspaper accounts, (launching at Spezia, review of the fleet at Naples, etc.) and if, on the other hand, Italy's relations to Germany during the visit were ignored, it is my firm conviction that it would mean "le glas funèbre" of the German-Italian Alliance.

He declared, furthermore, that in the face of Italy's action he might be forced to denounce their alliance in the Reichstag.[55]

With approval of his government, Count Monts, German ambassador, made strong representations to the Italian foreign minister, insisting that in the toasts to be exchanged between the King and Loubet some reference be made to Italy's connection with the Triple Alliance. The promise was apparently given, but never fulfilled.[56]

[52] Fay, I, 146.

[53] *Vossische Zeitung*, No. 181, April 19; *G. P.*, XX, 106–19, *passim;* Wolff, pp. 165–67.

[54] Monts to F. O., March 26; *G. P.*, XX, 47–48.

[55] Bülow to Monts, March 6; *ibid.*, XX, 39–40; also mem. by Holstein, March 3; *ibid.*, XX, 37–39.

Franco-Italian festivities lasted four days (April 25–29). There were state banquets and receptions, royal banquets and receptions, and diplomatic banquets and receptions. And always toasts—to the two nations, to the armies, and to the navies. The festivities reached their climax at Naples with a great joint review of the French and Italian fleets. When President Loubet boarded the French flagship and the squadron steamed out of the bay, there were indeed few official Italian buttonholes that did not blossom with the colors of the Legion of Honor. And back of it all, like a giant sounding board, was the French, Italian, and English press.[57] It is small wonder that the London *Times* (April 25) envisaged this demonstration as a check to the Triple Alliance and quoted with evident satisfaction the statement of the *Journal des Débats* that M. Delcassé's diplomacy had rendered the Triple Alliance "resolutely pacific."

Count Monts was noted for his caustic wit, and his despatches—always lively and full of interest—were eagerly read and circulated in the foreign office. The situation in Rome at this time gave him occasion for sharp comment. On April 28 he wrote to Bülow:

> Your Excellency, as a warm friend of Dame Italy,[58] did not begrudge her an extra waltz. Now, however, the situation would seem to be more serious if from such coquetting an illicit relation were to develop.[59]

The next day he summed up the situation as follows:

> The final result is, that the three toasts exchanged were silent as death in regard to the Triple Alliance, that none of the promises made to us was kept, and that the festivities, through the direct intervention of the Italian King and his government, have been

[56] Monts to Bülow, April 16 (two telegrams); *ibid.*, XX, 52–53, 53–54. For Italian excuses see *ibid.*, XX, 57–60.

[57] London *Times* reports from Paris and Rome, April 25 to 29; report of the Bavarian minister at Rome, April 28; Bav. D., 113, XI.

[58] Bülow's wife was the daughter of Madame Minghetti around whose salon centered much of Italian political life.

[59] Monts to Bülow, April 28; *G. P.*, XX, 60–62.

exaggerated in an extraordinary way even beyond the expectations of the French.[60]

And finally, in a general criticism of Italian policy, he quoted approvingly the words of a colleague, who declared that "Ils ne font ici qu'une politique de mendiants."[61]

The Austrian, as well as the German government, was offended by Italy's attitude inasmuch as the festivities were accompanied by an irredentist demonstration. The *Tribuna*, an official organ, referred to Solferino and Franco-Italian comradeship in arms.[62] It is not strange that the Germans were convinced that Italy had a secret agreement with her Latin sister. Monts told the Bavarian minister that he was certain an agreement existed, perhaps of a nature to insure the situation in the Adriatic. He believed, furthermore, that at the last renewal of the Triple Alliance, Italy had given France guarantees inconsistent with her obligations to her allies.[63] The German military *attaché* reached the same conclusion after observing the change in Italian military plans and organization.[64] Official declarations to the contrary were frequent and profuse,[65] and in September, 1904, Giolitti, the Italian premier, journeyed to Homburg where he assured Bülow that Italy was loyal to the Triple Alliance.[66]

Bülow was not deceived by these assurances, but his policy

[60] Monts to Bülow, April 29; *ibid.*, XX, 63–64.

[61] Monts to Bülow, May 6; *ibid.*, XX, 69–71. Count Lanza, Italian ambassador at Berlin, told Monts, with regard to the festivities accompanying Loubet's visit, that "the ambassador Barrère, so to speak, put the pistol to His Majesty's breast. . ." *Ibid.*, XX, 80.

[62] Bav. D., Rome, May 7, No. 124, XIII.

[63] *Ibid.*, same report. Monts to Bülow, April 30, May 6; *G. P.*, XX, 64–66, 69–71.

[64] Monts to Bülow, Dec. 18: *G. P.*, XX, 88–92.

[65] Mem. by Bülow, May 12; *ibid.*, XX, 73–74. Monts to Bülow, May 12; *ibid.*, XX, 74–77. One means of conciliating the Wilhelmstrasse was a long unofficial assurance from Luzzatti, Italian minister for finance, communicated by Paul von Schwabach, president of the Bleichröder bank, to the foreign office. That Italy considered the Triple Alliance still to be the chief framework of her foreign policy, was the gist of the memorandum dated May 18, 1904. The reply, communicated July 7, 1904, through the same channel, was cool but polite. Paul von Schwabach, *Aus meinen Akten*, pp. 49–50, 52.

[66] Mem. by Bülow, Sept. 28; *ibid.*, XX, 81–84. A formal communication to that effect was given by the Italian government on Feb. 25, 1905; *ibid.*, XX, 96–97.

was to preserve outwardly, if possible, the solidarity of the alliance. This is clearly shown in a communication to the Kaiser:

> The façade of the Triple Alliance must be kept as intact as possible, especially so, because as long as the Italians are still in the Triple Alliance, they will be regarded with distrust on the enemy's side. But in case of complications, we need certainly give ourselves no illusions as to active Italian cooperation. However, it will be a gain, not to be lightly valued, if Italy remains neutral instead of going with France.[67]

All this took place, so to speak, behind the curtain. A striking example of Bülow's determination to put up a bold front is his manipulation of the German press to save the government and his policy from embarrassment. On April 20, for the direction of the press bureau, he wrote:

> Toward Loubet's visit to Italy, our press must remain very calm. The Triple Alliance has been renewed. It has been recently confirmed in an unequivocal manner in Naples, and by Tittoni's journey. Up to the last moment, our Emperor repeatedly found the friendliest welcome in Italy. Hence, we must not lose our nerve if Italy, who for the sake of peace and for economic reasons as well as many others, wishes to stand well with France, and receives Loubet with southern European enthusiasm.[68]

Bülow suggested that the demonstration might be counteracted if the German press emphasized that it came from malcontent radical Republicans. Another factor, which at the moment added to the popularity of the French in Italy, was Loubet's refusal to visit the Pope. This might be neutralized, according to Bülow, by press announcements that Delcassé would call upon Merry del Val, the papal secretary of state.[69]

The chancellor's directions for the press bureau were reflected in the comment of the German papers. The *National-Zeitung* declared that Germany had no cause to be alarmed at the approaching demonstration; that the Triple Alliance was still the cornerstone of Italian policy; and that she could

[67] Bülow to the Kaiser, March 5, 1905; *ibid.*, XX, 95. Quoted by Fay, I, 150.

[68] Hammann, *Bilder*, p. 43.

[69] Bülow's notes on Monts' despatch, April 2; *G. P.*, XX, 49.

be friends with France just as Germany was with Russia.[70] On April 25, the same journal stated editorially:

In Germany, the view has consistently been held that it can only promote the interests of European peace if Powers who belong to the Triple Alliance at the same time maintain friendly relations with other Powers. From this point of view, the Franco-Italian *rapprochement* must be regarded as involving a fresh pledge for the preservation of the peace of Europe.[71]

Similar views were expressed by the *Börsen Courier* on April 25. *Kölnische Zeitung* published a long description, by the Italian correspondent, of the festivities—the perceptible object of which was to minimize the reception of Loubet and his entourage.[72] Editorially, it noted that the hope of breaking up the Triple Alliance had sweetened, for the French, the bitter pill of an open rupture with the Vatican; but here they were deceived, for the Italian statesmen knew full well the value of the Triple Alliance.

True to the Triple Alliance, but France's friend, that is the honorable policy of the men who are today the counsellors of the King of Italy. If they thought otherwise on the other side of the Vosges, they were laboring under a beautiful illusion.[73]

Vossische Zeitung, referring to the exultation in the French press at German isolation and the break-up of the Triple Alliance, remarked that the wish must be father to the thought. But it could not be denied, it went on to say, that a noticeable *rapprochement* between the Latin sisters had taken place and that the situation had changed appreciably since Italy had joined Germany and Austria-Hungary in the Triple Alliance.[74] The independent *Frankfurter Zeitung*, summing up the international situation, remarked that Italy officially remained in the Alliance; however, the tone of the Italian press, and its echo in France, made it clear that statesmen in both countries considered the Triple Alliance to be

[70] *National-Zeitung*, Nos. 226, 229, April 10, 12.
[71] *Ibid.*, No. 262, April 25.
[72] *Kölnische Zeitung*, No. 445, May 1.
[73] *Ibid.*, No. 419, April 25.
[74] *Vossische Zeitung*, No., 192, April 25.

defunct. It would be premature to speak of German isolation, it continued, but it could not be denied that Germany's friends were falling away; and at the end there would remain only the Sultan and the Pope, the two most notoriously reactionary powers in the world.[75]

Echoes of the Franco-Italian demonstration had hardly died away before the press was speculating aloud as to the significance of the approaching reunion of King Edward and the Kaiser at Kiel. The political importance of the announcement was at first exaggerated in Germany. This led the *Frankfurter Zeitung* to quote with approval the warning of the London *Standard* that "Thinking people on both sides of the North Sea will not overestimate the importance of the meeting."[76] *Kölnische Zeitung*, in an article generally regarded as officially inspired, declared that the importance and position of those attending the Kiel festivities were such as to justify the supposition that important political conversations would take place. However, it continued, in all probability many more regattas would be sailed at Kiel before Germans and Englishmen could mutually, and before all the world, assert their common interests and blood relationship. It warned that if the threads were once more mended, it would be the duty of public opinion in both countries to see that they were not again broken.[77] The *Frankfurter Zeitung* disapproved of the tendency in certain quarters of the German press to make too much of the political importance of the event and declared against an *entente* with England; Germany had no desire to be on bad terms with the non-English half of the world as the price of her friendship.[78]

In general, the English press regarded the meeting with

[75] *Frankfurter Zeitung*, No. 146, May 26.

[76] *Ibid.*, No. 138, May 18; also London *Times*, June 3, "German Misapprehensions." The reunion took place June 25–30. For accounts of the festivities and the political conversations which took place see J. A. Farrer, *England under Edward VII*, pp. 103–4; Sidney Lee, *King Edward VII*, II, 292–97; *G. P.*, XIX, 186–90; *Belg. D.* II, 167.

[77] *Kölnische Zeitung*, No. 639, June 23.

[78] *Frankfurter Zeitung*, No. 177, June 27.

an attitude of reserved suspicion. The Liberal *Manchester Guardian* (June 21) hoped that the event would "help to form in both countries a habit of judging each other by their best and not by their worst." The radical *Daily News* (June 23) expressed its profound mistrust of German statesmanship and hoped that no new "mésalliance" was contemplated. It did, however, signify its desire for a more cordial tone in the relations between the two countries. Mr. Spender, in the *Westminster Gazette* (June 22), took occasion to say a few kind words concerning Germany and German policy. He recalled that during the Boer war "we never found in Germany exact parallels to the Anglophobia of the *Libre Parole* and *Intransigeant* and the scurrilous *Assiette au Beurre*. . . ." He pointed out that the agitation in England as to what were designated as German "aims and aspirations," "consists of carefully selected extracts from Pan-German pamphlets and newspaper articles, which could easily be paralleled in the Jingo literature of other countries." He added that the authors of these "*grands desseins et vastes pensées*" were wholly without influence in German political circles. The Liberal *Daily Chronicle* (June 24, 27) denied that the reunion had political significance; it could not be interpreted as a counterblast to the Anglo-French *entente*, although it ought to show that there was no point in that agreement directed against Germany.

The Conservative *Morning Post* (June 25) reviewed the shortcomings and iniquities of German policy from the foundation of the Empire, but closed with the hope "that the King's visit to Kiel will mark the beginning of a new era in the relations of the two peoples, both of which may do well to reconsider their views of policy." A few days later, the *Post* contributed to this "new era in the relations between the two peoples" by publishing (June 28) a long satirical and offensive letter from their correspondent in Kiel. Harmsworth's *Daily Mail* (June 23) declared that

> We do not doubt that His Majesty will have a cordial reception in Germany, but British and German policy stand apart, and al-

though attentions shown to our King by the German people will be welcome in this country, as a compliment to his gracious personality, we shall be in no danger of ascribing such action to other causes than international courtesy.

The Tory *Standard* (June 23) was convinced that if the visit had political results they would parallel and not conflict with the French agreement. The Conservative *Daily Telegraph* (June 23) expressed the opinion that the "Kiel meeting cannot of itself change the fundamental character of Anglo-German relations, but it can at least improve the tone in which the two peoples discuss their relations."

John St. Loe Strachey's weekly *Spectator* (June 4) declared that

> The *entente cordiale* with France is the best piece of work done in foreign affairs for the last fifty years, and it would be the height of folly to detract from it, and from the possibility of reaching a better understanding with Russia under French auspices, by committing a *bêtise* with Germany.[79]

The London *Times* (June 24) denied that the meeting was of political import; it was a courtesy visit, a family affair, and a sporting event—nothing more. "Anglo-German relations,"

[79] In the monthly reviews at this time articles were appearing favorable to a Russian understanding. In the *Fortnightly* for May, 'Coloniensis' in an article entitled "Can we Trust Russia?," answered his own question in the affirmative. He advocated such an agreement as a means to check Germany, who was determined to seize the first favorable opportunity to "assassinate our Empire." Dr. Dillon had a similar article in the June *Contemporary;* the July number contained articles by Dillon and the bitter enemy of Germany, 'Calchas,' on the same subject. These were accompanied by tirades against German policy. 'Olem Berolinensis' in the *National Review* (June) declared that England did not begrudge Germany her place among the Powers or her commercial prosperity, "but we cannot afford to lend our strength to further the schemes of a rival whose road to supremacy lies across our backs." Sir Rowland Blennerhasset and M. Paul Doumer published articles in the same number on the Entente Cordiale, interpreting it as an instrument for checking Germany. 'A. B. C.,' in the July issue of the *National Review*, stressed German ambitions and the inevitability of the conflict with England if Germany continued to seek her future on the ocean and in colonial expansion. 'Julius,' in the July *Contemporary*, enlarged upon Germany's sinister policy in Egypt, which aimed at the removal of Lord Cromer. Alarmist writers in the English reviews concealed their identity. For a list of pseudonyms and discussion of possible identity see Lorenz, *Die englische Presse*, pp. 90–95.

it remarked, "are neither so embittered as to make agreement a matter of urgency, nor so spontaneously warm as to induce it as a matter of course."

Reports of English newspaper correspondents at Kiel centered attention upon the progress of German naval plans. The *Times* (June 27) correspondent described the German ships and dockyards in some detail, concluding that it was "a scene of such busy preparation that it must present to every one the spectacle of a new naval power arming in a hurry." Editorially, the *Times* commented (July 1):

> No phantom as to German aggression haunts us, but the consciousness we feel that it is our duty to watch the progress of German naval power, and to consider the possible purposes for which it might be used, will certainly not be lessened by what we have seen at Kiel or by any such assurances as we have heard there.

The *Manchester Guardian* (June 21) discussed the German naval program as a bid for the balance of naval power in Europe, which was not an illegitimate object of policy however inconvenient it might be for England. Spencer Wilkinson, in the *Manchester Guardian* for June 25, reviewed the significance of Germany's navy from the imperialist point of view. Commenting on the activity in Kiel, the *Standard* pointed out that "The dockyards are a visible token of the earnestness with which Germany is devoting itself to the construction of a powerful Navy. . . ."

The Kaiser's inordinate love of display led him to parade the entire German fleet before King Edward and his staff at Kiel. Tirpitz noted that King Edward displayed keen interest in the German ships and dockyards and that "during his inspection of our ships, he exchanged many meaning looks and words with Selborne, the First Lord of the Admiralty, which impressed me unpleasantly."[80]

The English sovereign's visit to Kiel was followed within two weeks by the appearance of a German squadron at Plymouth and announcement of an Anglo-German arbitration treaty. The former added fuel to the press debate on German

[80] Tirpitz, *Memoirs*, I, 262–63.

naval plans, while the latter was received in cold silence.[81] Harmsworth's *Daily Mail* (July 11) insinuated that the German squadron came to spy on the British fleet, which was preparing for maneuvers. A long article by the *Daily Telegraph's* naval correspondent (July 11) drew attention to the uniformity, the efficiency, and the fine appointments of the German ships as well as the excellent morale among the men. The *Standard* (July 11), in reviewing the history of the German naval program, manifested some anxiety as it contemplated its future development. The weekly *Spectator* (July 16) noted that the visit of the powerful German squadron "has caused a considerable amount of perturbation in the public mind, or, at any rate, in the public Press."

Saturday Review (July 16) ridiculed the anxiety displayed in certain circles, pointing out the immense superiority of English over German forces. Commenting on the *Daily Mail's* assertion that the German squadron "is pre-eminently a fighting force designed and trained for battle and battle alone," the *Saturday Review* cuttingly remarked that "it is not easy for the layman to understand for what other purpose a navy is built, and we confess ourselves that we contemplate unmoved the evidence produced that German battleships are meant for fighting." An examination of the English press at this time confirms the opinion of the German ambassador, Count Metternich, that the visit was to a certain extent a mistake, and only served to remind England that her control of the seas might some time in the future be challenged.[82]

Announcement of the arbitration treaty was received without comment, as in the case of the *Times*, or with qualified statements of approval or disapproval. The parallel between the events of June and July—Edward's visit to Kiel, German squadron at Plymouth, and arbitration treaty—and the inauguration of the Entente Cordiale with France, occasioned articles placing English policy toward Germany in its true

[81] London reports to *Kölnische Zeitung*, Nos. 708, 713, 717, July 12, 14, 15.
[82] Metternich to F. O., July 12; *G. P.*, XIX, 194–95 note.

light. The *Spectator* (July 16) thought that the government had done right in "acceding to Germany's request for such a treaty," but hoped that they would publicly declare its true nature "and not allow it to be supposed by Continental public opinion that it denotes a movement towards Germany like that so happily consummated in the French agreement. We cannot be close friends both with France and Germany. . . ." *Daily Telegraph* (July 13) asserted that the arbitration treaty signed with the French had been supplemented by a complete liquidation of all differences. "No such momentous readjustments of diplomatic relations is involved in the Anglo-German agreement," it declared, "nor, indeed, do the respective situations of the two countries call for anything of the kind." *Daily Mail* (July 13) stated that the arbitration treaty with France had been followed by a sweeping political agreement because both parties were convinced that the other harbored no hostile designs. This, it declared, was not the case with Germany; the Entente must remain the keystone of British foreign policy. Even the Liberal and scholarly *Manchester Guardian* (July 14), though it welcomed the treaty, expressed the view that Anglo-German hostility "springs from forces too manifold and lying too deep to be radically affected by an Agreement of this slight description." The arbitration treaty, which Bernstorff thought would be harmless, but valuable as a public gesture,[83] failed dismally in its purpose and served to irritate rather than to quiet the public press.

Anglo-German press relations after 1870 were first disturbed by the growing economic and commercial power of Germany and the consequent invasion of British markets. The debate was further embittered by the hostile tone of the German press during the Boer war. In 1904–1905, English editors repeatedly referred to this previous attitude of the German newspapers as expressing the real sentiments of the German people for their English cousins.

Agitation against Germany on the economic and commer-

[83] Bernstorff to Bülow, April 16; *ibid.*, XX, 19–20.

cial pretext was declining as the Chamberlain campaign for protective tariff was checked by the advance of the Liberal free traders. It shifted during 1904–1905 to a new ground—the German naval program. Henceforth, this constituted the strongest argument to whip up national feeling. More and more, the infant German fleet was regarded by the British press as an ultimate threat to England's naval supremacy.

Announcement of the sweeping Anglo-French colonial agreement was received calmly in the responsible German papers that echoed the chancellor's optimistic views. The diplomatic documents reveal, however, that among officials in the foreign office it was regarded as an event highly unfavorable to Germany's interests and position as a World Power. Although Lord Lansdowne assured Bülow that the understanding had no point against Germany, certain English circles—*Times*, *Daily Mail*, *Spectator*, and *National Review*—welcomed it as a check to the neighbor across the North Sea. When a *rapprochement* between the Latin sisters was signified by the enthusiastic welcome accorded Loubet by the Italians, Bülow again put the best possible face upon the matter by influencing the authoritative German press. The growing feeling that Germany was being isolated found expression in independent organs and persisted despite the views of the chancellor and the semi-official press.

English and German statesmen sincerely desired to bring about a *détente* in the "war of opinions." King Edward's reunion with the Kaiser at Kiel, the visit of the German squadron to Plymouth, and the conclusion of an Anglo-German arbitration treaty failed completely to give a more friendly tone to Anglo-German public relations. The English press regarded with undisguised distrust any move for better associations with Germany. It clearly emphasized that English friendship had been bestowed upon France, and resented any government action that might cast a shadow upon the recently concluded French agreement. Even had the government been inclined to go further in negotiating a clearing agreement with Germany, such as that concluded with

France, it would have incurred the unalterable hostility of the influential British press. This consideration was a dominant factor that henceforth conditioned the policy of the British foreign office.

Chapter III

THE PRESS AND THE ANGLO-GERMAN WAR SCARE, NOVEMBER–DECEMBER, 1904

PUBLICATION of *Die Grosse Politik* revealed that in November and December, 1904, it was believed in official circles in Berlin that Germany was in immediate danger of an English attack. The German ambassador in London was summoned to Berlin to discuss the situation and measures thought necessary to meet it. Officials attached to the London embassy were required to report at length their views on British policy and opinion toward Germany. The countermove contemplated by the Wilhelmstrasse was an alliance with Russia, and direct negotiations with Nicholas II were undertaken by the Kaiser. The apprehension raised in Berlin resulted primarily from loose talk in naval circles and irresponsible statements appearing in the English press, rather than any official expression of ill-will on the part of the British government. Events of these troubled months strikingly illustrate the mischief that can be wrought in the field of international relations by sensational and unprincipled journalists.

Underlying factors out of which press disputes arose were: Germany's friendship for Russia during her struggle with England's ally in the Far East; development of German seapower and corresponding English precautions; and the complete change of front in English foreign policy signified by the conclusion of the Entente Cordiale.

On September 14, 1904, the *Times* published a long article from "an exceptionally well-informed correspondent," charging that during the month of August, while Witte and Bülow were negotiating the commercial treaty at Norderney, they had also concluded a secret agreement with regard to their mutual interests in the Far East. "The importance of the

new engagements," declared the correspondent, "exceeds that of Bismarck's 'reinsurance' treaty . . . which was mainly confined to the European balance of power." This thesis was endorsed in a long editorial which concluded that although the exact terms of the secret treaty were not known, "the general outline of such an arrangement is sufficiently indicated by the present plight of Russia and by the historical relations between her and her neighbors."

Not a shred of evidence existed to substantiate the statements, which were apparently inspired by the suspicions of the foreign editor, Valentine Chirol.[1] *Kölnische Zeitung* replied in an article which was reproduced in the *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung*, thus receiving the official stamp. It characterized the assertions as entirely imaginary and fostered by "the urgent necessity under which *The Times* finds itself of saving the Capital from the alleged German menace once in every eight days."[2] Concluding a long article on the misrepresentations of the *Times*, the *Frankfurter Zeitung* declared that "it is a blind, senseless hate of Germany that finds expression in this paper on every occasion."[3]

Such vigorous counter attacks provoked an angry leader from the *Times* (September 19) directed against the *Kölnische Zeitung* and the press division of the foreign office. A few days later (September 24), in an even more bellicose editorial, it charged Germany with open violation of her neutrality in regard to the Russo-Japanese war:

> The services which the Hamburg-America Company and the North-German Lloyd have rendered, and are still rendering, to Russia are a feature of the present situation of which we can only hope the German Government may, however tardily, have begun to realize the gravity.

Kölnische Zeitung replied that although the *Times* was the self-appointed guardian of other nations' neutrality, protests to carry any weight must proceed from a belligerent

[1] Mem. by Bülow of a conversation with Lascelles, Nov. 4, 1904; *G. P.*, XIX, 296–97.

[2] No. 948, Sept. 16.

[3] No. 257, Sept. 15.

and not from a neutral. If German actions were open to objection, protest should be made by the government of Japan, whose interests were affected, and not by the London newspapers.[4]

A majority of the London papers stood aside from this acrimonious debate, while the *Manchester Guardian*, *Westminster Gazette*, and *Daily Graphic* openly expressed their disapproval of the attitude and tactics of the *Times*.[5]

Further newspaper polemics were occasioned by the *Times* report from Peking that the Chinese government, by virtue of its sovereignty over Tibet, was inclined to withhold its approval of the treaty negotiated by Colonel Younghusband with the Tibetans. The English expedition, sponsored by Lord Curzon and commanded by Younghusband, was closely followed in the German press where it was generally interpreted as a move to create a diversion on Russia's flank.[6] After the 'political mission' had been transformed into a military expedition by the slaughter of numbers of half-armed natives, the Liberal English journals were even more severe in criticism than the German press.[7]

On October 18, the *Times* published a Peking despatch from Dr. Morrison, attributing to German machinations the hesitation of the Chinese government to recognize the Tibetan treaty. The *Morning Post* (October 19) played up this false report in a pointed editorial which concluded that "Most people would have thought that Germany had recently had a sufficient experience of the results of interfering in our concerns to deter her from any such course of action in the future." Count Metternich was much perturbed, and wired his superiors in Berlin that the *Times* had chosen the

[4] *Kölnische Zeitung*, No. 991, Sept. 27.

[5] *Manchester Guardian*, Sept. 20; *Westminster Gazette*, Sept. 19; *Kölnische Zeitung*, No. 965, Sept. 20, quoting *Daily Graphic*.

[6] *National-Zeitung*, Nos. 213, 215, 218, March 31, April 2, April 6; *Frankfurter Zeitung*, Nos. 93, 106, 141, 267, April 2, 6, May 21, Sept. 23; *Berliner Tageblatt*, No. 170, April 3; *Kölnische Zeitung*, No. 239, March 8.

[7] *Westminster Gazette*, April 2, Sept. 10; *Daily Chronicle*, April 14; *Daily News*, June 18: "The Government helpless in the hands of its prancing pro-consuls"—"An outrage upon the liberties of an unoffending people"—"a dishonour to our name."

best means to arouse opinion in political circles against Germany.[8] According to the German minister in Peking, the report was without foundation and the Reuter representative had refused to follow Morrison's lead in sending it out.[9] An official denial was promptly drafted in the foreign office and appeared on October 20 in the *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung*.[10] To this, the *Times* replied (October 21) in a long editorial which began with Gortchakoff's famous phrase—"On sait joliment démentir à Berlin." The foreign editor maintained the truth of their correspondent's report and charged, moreover, that when the treaty had been published in a Chinese newspaper, a campaign had been instituted against it—led by "the native newspaper in the pay of the German Legation, for, true to its traditions, German diplomacy has its subsidized organ in Peking as in other capitals." *Kölnische Zeitung*, in an official tone, declared that the despatch which originated in Peking, and since confirmed by Wickham Steed in Vienna, was wholly without foundation. "Nowhere can a political event take place, and above all anything disagreeable for England, without it being charged to the Machiavellian intrigues of Germany," declared *Kölnische Zeitung*.[11] Some time later, Bülow, in a conversation with the English ambassador, referred to the newspaper campaign that charged Germany with interfering in the Tibetan negotiations. Ambassador Lascelles admitted that the *Times* deliberately sought to sow mistrust of German policy; Chirol was the soul of this campaign though he, Lascelles, would not admit that the *Times*, *National Review*, and others were deliberately working for a war with Germany.[12]

This constant tendency of a section of the English press to exhibit the German bogey in all diplomatic affairs was exemplified during the Dogger Bank incident. When news

[8] Metternich to F. O., Oct. 20; *G. P.*, XIX, 652.

[9] Schwartzenstein to F. O., Oct. 21; *ibid.*, XIX, 654.

[10] Mem. by Richthofen, *ibid.*, XIX, 653. "German diplomacy has taken no step whatever in the Tibetan question either officially or confidentially in Russia, or in China, or in other places." *Norddeutsche*, Oct. 20.

[11] No. 1079, Oct. 21.

[12] Mem. by Bülow, Nov. 4; *G. P.*, XIX, 296–97.

of the Russian outrage of October 21 reached London in time for the Monday morning papers, the press seethed with indignation.[13] The sensational *Daily Mail* uttered resounding war-whoops and the headlines screamed insults at the Russians: "Drunk as Usual"; "First Act of Heroism of the Baltic Fleet."[14] The organs of all shades of opinion were firm in their demand for immediate explanation, apology, and reparation.[15] When the Russian fleet left Vigo, only four subordinate officers, declared to have been responsible for the incident, were put ashore. The London dailies expressed grave dissatisfaction with the government's agreement to submit the dispute to the Hague Tribunal.[16] Curiously enough, Liberal organs backed the Conservative prime minister and the settlement which he accepted.[17]

With exception of the *Münchener Allgemeine Zeitung*,[18] the responsible German press maintained a quiet reserve or openly approved the firm stand taken by England.[19] Even the Berlin correspondent of the *Times*, Mr. Saunders, was forced to admit that "There has been no reason to complain of the bearing of the German Press on this occasion, and I can discover no trace of any motive except indignation at an outrage which indirectly touches the honour and the interests of all nations."[20]

[13] *Morning Post, Daily Telegraph, Times, Standard,* Oct. 24 to 28.

[14] *Daily Mail,* Oct. 24, 25, 26, 28, 31.

[15] Note 13 above, and *Daily Chronicle,* Oct. 24, 29, 31; *Manchester Guardian,* Oct, 25, 31; *Daily News,* Oct. 24, 25, 29; *Westminster Gazette,* Oct. 25, 26.

[16] *Morning Post,* Oct., 29, 31; *Daily Mail,* Nov. 2; *Daily Chronicle,* Nov. 2; *Pall Mall Gazette,* Nov. 1, 2; *Standard,* Oct. 29, Nov. 2, 3. For the action of the English government see *B. D.,* IV, 5–41.

[17] *Manchester Guardian,* Nov. 2; *Daily News,* Oct. 29; *Westminster Gazette,* Nov. 2. On the final settlement see the account of a participant: Baron Taube, *La politique russe d'avant-guerre,* pp. 3–43. This incident proved to be one of the seeds of the later Anglo-Russian *rapprochement.*

[18] No. 502, Nov. 3, "Ein diplomatischer Misserfolg Englands."

[19] *Kölnische Zeitung,* Nos. 1094, 1110, Oct. 25, 29; *Frankfurter Zeitung,* Nos. 296, 299, 300, Oct. 24, 27, 28; *Norddeutsche,* Oct. 29; and an article by Admiral Valois, "Russen und Engländer auf der Doggersbank," *Deutsche Revue,* Dec., 1904, pp. 276–79. *Vorwärts,* of course, was loudest in its denunciation of the "Russian barbarians." No. 251, Oct. 25, and subsequent numbers.

[20] *Times,* Oct. 27.

However, this favorable opinion of Germany's attitude changed quickly in consequence of a report from the *Times* Paris correspondent (October 29). He stated that in the St. Petersburg correspondence of the Paris papers there was substantial ground for the belief that Germany had warned Russia that there were Japanese torpedo boats lurking in the North Sea, and that the Russian fleet must be on its guard. The obvious inference drawn from the reports, which seemed to have originated simultaneously with the Lassan Agency and the Russian correspondent of *Echo de Paris*,[21] was, in the last analysis, that Germany was responsible for the murder of the English fishermen.

Count Bülow promptly notified Metternich that the report was without foundation,[22] and in a conversation with Lascelles he assured him that no warnings, either direct or indirect, had gone out from Berlin.[23] Later, at Metternich's suggestion,[24] an official denial was published in the *Norddeutsche*, and a similar communication in the form of a Berlin despatch appeared in the *Münchener Allgemeine Zeitung*.[25] The Berlin correspondents of the *Manchester Guardian* (November 9) and the *Standard* (November 8) characterized the *Times* report as idle gossip, and the former reproduced the official *communiqué* which had appeared in the *Norddeutsche*. The *Daily Telegraph* (October 31), the *Times*' great rival, branded the rumor as a Russian attempt to play the *tertius gaudens* between Germany and England. But, in the words of the *Daily Mail* (November 12), England, so far as Germany was concerned, must remain "always on the watch for some cleverly devised piece of mischief."

It is not a mere coincidence that when the English press

[21] *Kölnische Zeitung*, Nos. 1103, 1121, Oct. 27, Nov. 2. Spring Rice later told Metternich that St. Petersburg journalists had hurried to the British embassy with this story. Mem. by Metternich, Dec. 25, 1904; *G. P.*, XIX, 371.

[22] Bülow to Metternich, Nov. 4; *G. P.*, XIX, 295. In the Reichstag on Dec. 5, 1904, Bülow called it "a shameful lie."

[23] Mem. by Bülow, Nov. 4; *ibid.*, XIX, 296–97.

[24] Metternich to F. O., Nov. 6; *ibid.*, XIX, 297–98.

[25] No. 512, Nov. 9.

exhibited such inordinate ill-will and suspicion toward Germany negotiations were undertaken for a close understanding between Germany and Russia.

Bülow's policy of maintaining a "free hand" toward Russia and England[26] threatened to break down entirely if the Anglo-French *entente* should lead, in time, to a reconciliation between Russia and England. Indications were not lacking that such a move would follow conclusion of the war in the Orient; grave apprehensions were raised in Berlin at the danger of isolation.[27] This could be averted by establishing a close understanding with Russia, a policy that had been rejected by the Wilhelmstrasse in July, when, due to King Edward's visit to Kiel hopes were still held of establishing friendlier relations with England. The attitude of the English press showed the futility of this hope. Hence, Bülow and Holstein, in October, adopted the Kaiser's plan to draw Russia and eventually France into an alliance with Germany. The British journals, in attacking Germany for her benevolent attitude toward her eastern neighbor, played into the hands of the Kaiser and the foreign office, for English press hostility directed against both Powers provided *un terrain d'entente.*

This arose directly from the contract undertaken by the Hamburg-America company to furnish coal to the Russian Baltic fleet on its journey to the Far East.[28] Although this

[26] That is, no definite or continuous support of either contestant in the Far East, Central Asia, or Persia. Cf. Stieve, *Deutschland und Europa*, pp. 44 ff.; Brandenburg, *From Bismarck to the World War*, pp. 149–53, 184–86; Fay, I, 139–40; Meinecke, *Geschichte des deutsch-englischen Bündnisproblems*, pp. 85–89; Hammann, *World Policy*, p. 123.

[27] Mem. by Holstein, Feb. 2, 1905; *G. P.*, XIX, 349–50. Holstein justified the Russian negotiations in the autumn of 1904 on two grounds: first, that France was working for an understanding between Russia and England which might have been accomplished by a general division of Chinese territory; and second, that this disadvantageous grouping could only be prevented by Germany herself drawing close to Russia.

[28] Huldermann, *Albert Ballin*, pp. 147–49; mem. by Klehmet, Sept. 14; *G. P.*, XIX, 247–48; promemoria submitted by Ballin, Sept. 29; *ibid.*, XIX, 253–55. The coal was to be transported from Cardiff to neutral ports; the chief sub-contractor was an English firm.

involved no breach of international law, the London press commented on it in a bitter tone.[29] The paroxysm of anger engendered by the Dogger Bank incident focused attention upon German coaling of the Russian fleet. The resultant danger for Germany was the chief reason advanced by Holstein to Count Osten-Sacken, Russian ambassador at Berlin, for the necessity of some agreement which would not leave her isolated in case England intervened forcibly to prevent delivery. Holstein pointed out that if France, Russia, and Germany stood together on this question, England would hardly dare to interfere. This conversation took place on October 24.[30] Three days later, at the height of the crisis precipitated by the Dogger Bank incident, the Kaiser wrote in a similar vein to the Czar.[31] Bülow, too, expressed the same fears to the Russian ambassador and suggested a like course of action.[32] The Czar, in reply to the Kaiser, asked him to suggest terms for a treaty.[33] A draft was forwarded on October 30. It provided that in case either party were attacked by a European Power, the other would come to its assistance and jointly they would remind France of her obligation to Russia under the Dual Alliance.[34] German proposals seriously aroused the suspicions of Osten-Sacken and Lamsdorff.[35] A serious hitch in negotiations occurred when the Russian foreign minister convinced the Czar that the treaty must be communicated to France before signature. German objections to this condition were stated by the Kaiser in a communication to Bülow:

The Hohe Herr is beginning to get cold feet as far as the Gauls are concerned. . . . It is, in my opinion, impossible to let Paris

[29] Bülow to Romberg, Oct. 4; *ibid.*, XIX, 257–59. *Times*, Sept. 19, 22, 24, 26; *Kölnische Zeitung*, No. 959, Sept. 19, in reply to the *Times* report that the coaling of the vessels would take place on the high seas at points known only to the Kaiser and the Czar.

[30] *G. P.*, XIX, 303 note; Osten-Sacken to Lamsdorff, Oct. 27; *Kriegsschuldfrage*, Nov., 1924, pp. 456–58.

[31] Kaiser to the Czar, Oct. 27; *ibid.*, XIX, 303–5.

[32] Osten-Sacken to Lamsdorff, Nov 4; *KSF*, Nov., 1924, 463–64.

[33] Czar to the Kaiser, Oct. 29; *G. P.*, XIX, 305.

[34] Kaiser to the Czar, Oct. 30; *ibid.*, XIX. 305–8.

know anything about it before we have Väterchens signature. Communication to Delcassé before signing means a telegram to Cambon, publication the same evening in the *Times* and *Figaro*, and with that the affair is over. . . .[36]

As a result of heavy pressure, a limited commitment was secured from the Czar and Lamsdorff, which assured Germany support if an armed encounter resulted from her delivery of coal to the Baltic fleet.[37] Holstein pointed out that this commitment was practically worthless because of the limited *casus foederis*.[38] The Kaiser and Bülow were disappointed if they thought that this guarantee would pave the way for the wider agreement for which they were working. The Czar, prompted by Lamsdorff, steadfastly refused to conclude the treaty without previously informing his French allies. The negotiations were finally dropped.[39] On December 28, the Kaiser wrote to Bülow: "A completely negative result after two months of earnest work and negotiations. The first failure that I, personally, have experienced."[40]

In the meantime, following the Dogger Bank incident, the Kaiser and his ministers were gravely concerned with the possibility of an immediate British attack. Their unfounded apprehensions were based on irresponsible press articles, gossip in English naval circles, and the redistribution of British maritime strength.

[35] Lamsdorff to Osten-Sacken, Nov. 10; Osten-Sacken to Lamsdorff, Nov. 17; Lamsdorff's report to the Czar, Nov. 28. *KSF*, Nov., 1924, pp. 464–65, 465–67, 473–75.

[36] Kaiser to Bülow, Nov. 23; *G. P.*, XIX, 316–17.

[37] Bülow to the Kaiser, Dec. 6; Kaiser to the Czar, Dec. 7; Bülow to Alvensleben, Dec. 6; Alvensleben to F. O., Dec. 12. *Ibid.*, XIX, 263–65, 322, 320–21, 328–29.

[38] Note by Holstein on Alvensleben's telegram, Dec. 12; *ibid.*, XIX, 328–29.

[39] Kaiser to the Czar, Nov. 26; Czar to the Kaiser, Dec. 7; Kaiser to the Czar, Dec. 21. *Ibid.*, XIX, 318–19, 322–24, 340–41. Lamsdorff's memoranda quoted by A. Savinsky, "Guillaume II et la Russie," *Revue des Deux Mondes*, XII (1922), 792–94.

[40] Kaiser to Bülow, Dec. 28; *ibid.*, XIX, 346–47. For a more detailed account of the negotiations see S. B. Fay, "The Kaiser's Secret Negotiations with the Czar, 1904–1905," *A. H. R.*, Oct., 1918, pp. 48–72; Anderson, *The First Moroccan Crisis*, ch. X; Savinsky, *Recollections of a Russian Diplomat*, pp. 96–109; Taube, *La politique russe d'avant-guerre*, pp. 46 ff.

On November 18, an alarming report was drafted by the German naval *attaché* at London, in which he dealt at length with hostile English sentiment engendered by German naval development. An English lady, in his presence, had said that a war for the destruction of the German fleet was necessary for England; to wait longer would cost Britain too many ships. The Kaiser commented on this artless expression of opinion: "Unheard-of impudence." With the same report was enclosed an article from *Vanity Fair* which ran in part:

From the naval situation it is clear that Germany contemplates an attack on England somewhere between 1908–1913. Day and night Germany is preparing for war with England.[41] She will strike only when she is ready to strike; that is to say, at the exact moment when England is at the greatest disadvantage, and Germany in the best position to obtain the initial success indispensable in naval warfare. If the German fleet were destroyed, the peace of Europe would last for two generations, for England and France, or England and the United States, or all three, would guarantee the freedom of the seas and prevent the construction of more navies which are dangerous weapons in the hands of ambitious Powers with growing populations and no colonies.[42]

An article only slightly less bellicose in tone appeared shortly after in the *Army and Navy Gazette*. Arnold White, a writer on naval affairs, published an article in the *Sun* in which he advocated a *coup de main* such as was dealt to Denmark in 1807. When this was brought to the attention of Mr. Balfour, he is reported to have said: "Arnold White ought to be hanged."[43] White's views were in line with those of Sir John Fisher, who later bluntly told King Edward that "We ought to 'Copenhagen' the German Fleet at Kiel à la Nelson."[44] The naval *attaché's* alarming report was laid before the Kaiser on November 23. Simultaneously occurred the first serious check in the negotiations with the Czar for

[41] Kaiser's marginal note: "A foul lie."

[42] Captain Coerper's report, Nov. 18; *ibid.*, XIX, 353–56.

[43] Mem. by Metternich, Dec. 18: *ibid.*, XIX, 332.

[44] Fisher, *Memories and Records*, I, 22. Arnold White was Fisher's journalistic mouthpiece. In 1902, Fisher regarded Germany and not France as the dangerous

a defensive alliance. "The situation," wrote the Kaiser to Bülow, "becomes more and more like that which preceded the Seven Years War."[45]

Further apprehensions were aroused in Berlin on December 3, when, on orders from the British foreign office, a Hamburg-America line steamer laden with coal was refused clearance from Cardiff.[46] This was followed, December 12, by submission to Parliament of plans for complete reorganization and redistribution of British naval forces.[47] All obsolete vessels were striken from the active list, large forces were withdrawn from the Mediterranean, and the naval power of Britain was concentrated in the Channel and North Sea. Only a deep feeling of uneasiness and insecurity at the growth of German sea power could have caused such a drastic change in British policy. This rearrangement of maritime forces corresponded with the changed international situation; that is, friction with Germany, friendship with France. "We cannot complain because Germany has laid its plans for the construction of a powerful Navy," declared the London *Standard*, "but we are bound to take note of the fact that even the additions already made have seriously affected the balance of power in the North Sea."[48]

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naval and mercantile rival. A letter dated August 2, 1902, suggests the lines for a press article on the subject. The receiver of the letter is not indicated, but the statement "I casually came across an old number of the *Sunday Sun*, in which I read an excellent article by you on German feeling towards England," clearly indicates that it was written to White. On Fisher's relations to White and the English press see Bacon, *Life of Lord Fisher*, I, 136–40, 156–60, 180.

[45] Kaiser to Bülow, Nov. 23; *G. P.*, XIX, 317.

[46] Bülow to the Kaiser, Dec. 6; *ibid.*, XIX, 263.

[47] *Parliamentary Papers*, Cd. 2335; *Times*, Dec. 12; Fisher, *Memories*, II, 128–53, 241–46; Bacon, *Life of Lord Fisher*, I, ch. XI.

[48] *Standard*, Dec. 2. "It is consequent on our friendliness with France and Italy on the one hand, and on the ambitious naval program of Germany on the other" (*Daily Chronicle*, Dec. 21). "The North Sea has become more than ever a centre of British naval concern. . . ." (*Pall Mall Gazette*, Dec. 12). "Lord Selborne's Parliamentary paper will be closely studied abroad, and we may . . . be surprised at the inference that will be drawn from it regarding British policy" (*Morning Post*, Dec. 12). "The rearrangement . . . officially recognizes that we are far less likely to find ourselves at war with France than with Germany" (*National Review*, Jan., 1905). Cf. also *Belg. D.*, I, Supp., p. 7.

In one of his higher moments, the Kaiser declared that the withdrawal of English forces from the Mediterranean and their concentration in the Channel and North Sea would be a direct threat against Germany and would constitute a *casus belli*.[49] As was frequently the case, a marked difference existed between the Kaiser's words and his actions. However, German war vessels stationed in the Orient were quietly recalled to home waters.[50] Metternich was called to Berlin for a series of important conferences and members of the embassy staff at London were required to draft comprehensive memoranda. The important questions discussed were: first, the danger of an unprovoked English attack; second, the effect of a possible Russo-German alliance on their relations with England.

Schulenburg, the military *attaché*, Eulenburg, third secretary, and Metternich agreed that there was no danger of immediate unprovoked English aggression. On the other hand, hostility and suspicion of Germany was so great that an incident, such as the Dogger Bank, between England and Germany would undoubtedly end in war. They concurred, moreover, in the opinion that King Edward and his government aimed at an eventual understanding with Russia. Eulenburg regarded an alliance with Russia as Germany's only hope to block an Anglo-Franco-Russian alignment. This would heighten English mistrust for the time being, but in the end Germany would benefit from such an agreement. Metternich thought that this would increase immeasurably the danger of war between Germany and the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. He categorically rejected the idea of an agreement, the terms of which were to be communicated to France. He feared the French would not keep it secret. An alliance with Russia alone, not made known until conclusion of the war, would be of great future advantage to Germany, although dangerous while the war was in progress. In conclusion he wrote:

[49] Kaiser to Bülow, Nov. 23, 1904; *G. P.*, XIX, 317.

[50] Memoranda by Richthofen, Nov. 30; Holstein, Dec. 4 and 5; Klehmet, Dec. 4. *Ibid.*, XIX, 356–59.

In a secret dual alliance exists a tacit Russian admission that in the future France would no longer form the pivot of her foreign policy, and thus an Anglo-Franco-Russian grouping would become impossible. I know of no other means than an Russo-German alliance to prevent this combination. Perhaps it will not materialize even without a preventive Russo-German alliance. One cannot see into the future. In any case it must be considered that England is attracted and France is working for it.[51]

Thus ended the ambassador's report in a note of pessimism over the future.

Bülow attempted to stem the tide of hostile English opinion when he granted to Mr. Bashford, an English journalist, an interview that appeared in the December number of the *Nineteenth Century*. It was prefaced by the remarks of Mr. Bashford, who set forth the thesis so widely held in England: namely, that German policy, diplomatic, economic and naval, aimed solely at the destruction of the British Empire.

For the attainment of these ends German diplomacy is said to be everywhere angling in turbid streams, and to be intriguing against England in all the capitals of the world. Whenever an incident unpleasant to England happens in any part of the globe, a German diplomatist or the Central Government in Berlin is said to be behind it.

In the interview itself, which took place on November 15, the chancellor reproved writers and the press on both sides of the North Sea. He specifically challenged recent press misstatements and repudiated the idea advanced that the German navy was in preparation for war with England. Its purpose, on the contrary, was purely defensive. A war between the two peoples, he said, would be "a monstrous crime" and "a dire calamity."

With exception of the *Times*, the English press commented favorably on the chancellor's utterances.[52] The *Times* (De-

[51] Memoranda by Bülow, Dec. 16; Schulenburg, Dec. 13; Eulenburg, Dec. 15; Metternich, Dec. 18. *Ibid.*, XIX, 331–32, 360–65, 366–67, 332–40.

[52] *Manchester Guardian*, Dec. 3; *Daily Telegraph*, Nov. 29; *Westminster Gazette*, Nov. 30; *Standard*, Dec. 10; *Kölnische Zeitung's* London reports, Nos. 1244, 1258, Dec. 4, 8.

cember 10), when it referred to his interview in *Nineteenth Century* and similar declarations made in the Reichstag on December 5,[53] declared:

It will need something more than his honied assurances, whether delivered to interviewers or in the Reichstag, to remove or even to weaken the impression made in this country by the acts as well as the words of German statesmen and publicists throughout a long series of years.

From a private source came a quieting statement which received considerable attention in England and Germany. Professor Friedrich Paulsen, a friend of England and a man whom no one could accuse of writing at the request of the government, published in the *Deutsche Rundschau* a frank statement on Anglo-German relations.[54] He admitted the existence of German ill-will toward England:

It is not to be denied that the enthusiastic admiration and liking for England, English character and English ways, which were strong in the middle of the nineteenth century, have gone through a noticeable cooling off. But the assertion that the German people desires war with England in order to found its own world position upon the prostrated island kingdom is an outrage at the same time against truth and humanity. . . . Millions of Germans would feel that the day which brought war with England was the most unfortunate day of their lives.

He declared that an alliance between Germany, Russia, and France was unacceptable to the majority of Germans. They preferred, on the contrary, a close understanding between Germany, England, and the United States, the three great Protestant nations of the world—united by ties of blood and culture. His letter closed with a timely warning to the Pan-Germans to mind their pens and tongues.

The violence of the press had produced a reaction. Saner minds in both countries undertook to calm the waters. A momentary *détente* set in.

[53] *Fürst Bülows Reden*, II, 122–24.

[54] *Deutsche Rundschau*, Nov., 1904, pp. 357–62. The same article appeared in the *Contemporary Review* for December.

Official circles, too, were reassured by Metternich's positive assertions of England's desire for peace. Lascelles, in a discussion of the naval question and the attitude of the press, assured Bülow that neither the government nor the majority of the English people desired a war with Germany. If the new disposition of the British fleet disquieted Germany, great uneasiness was also caused in England by Germany's concentration on the building of battleships and their maintenance in home waters. If the English press was now hostile to Germany, the German press a few years ago had the same attitude toward England. To this, Bülow replied that it was well known the German press had no influence on the policy of the government—only the government's official policy need be taken into consideration. On the other hand, he pointed out, the attitude of the English dailies was all important, for English policy was directed by opinion created by the press. He stated, furthermore, that England's navy was so far superior to Germany's that the possibility of a German attack was hardly worthy of discussion among sensible folk.[55]

It did not come prominently to the notice of the British public that there had been a war-scare in Berlin until Dr. Paasche, vice-president of the Reichstag, referred in a speech at Kreuznach on January 4, 1905, to the bitterness which of late had characterized Anglo-German relations. His statements were grossly exaggerated by the journalists, who reported him as saying that Germany and England had been on the verge of war; that a sharp exchange of notes had taken

[55] Bülow to the Kaiser, Dec. 26; *G. P.*, XIX, 372–73. The Kaiser estimated that the British had available in the same area forty-three ships of the line and one hundred and forty cruisers against Germany's fourteen battleships and twenty cruisers. On the Lascelles conversation he commented: "The question, why 1) our ships of the line were built, and 2) employed in home waters, is to be answered as follows: 1) because we no longer had any and needed them, since our old ones must be replaced; 2) because we truly did not know where in the whole wide world to send them! since we have not Gibralter, Malta or any other place in Europe!" Von Tirpitz writes (*My Memoirs*, I, 264), that "the size of our fleet at that time was too small to explain such measures as the concentration of British squadrons in the North Sea."

place; and that an armed clash had been avoided only by skilful diplomacy.[56] The story grew in proportion as it spread. The Berlin correspondent of the *Morning Post* (January 9) reported that in December Great Britain had sent an ultimatum to Berlin forbidding any further increase in the German navy; the war scare was not over, but the fleet was still mobilized at Kiel. An official contradiction of the exaggerated rumors was published in the *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung* on January 9.[57]

Metternich wired from London asking that every means be used to prevent the 'English menace' from being played up before the German people. Many in England, he stated, considered the press agitation as the first move in a demand for increased German naval appropriations.[58] In a private communication to Bülow, he declared that fears of an English attack were groundless, that the turning point had been reached, and that a gradual *détente* had begun.[59]

King Edward, in a conversation with Captain Coerper, the German naval *attaché*, alluded to the war scare in Berlin. "How can it be," he asked, "that people in Germany think that we wish to attack them?" Captain Coerper answered that "the coincidence between certain newspaper articles and the new distribution of Your Majesty's fleet have been to blame for our apprehensions." The King replied:

> You can verbally report to His Majesty, the Kaiser, what I now say to you: first, that I am determined to remain at peace with all countries; second, that England will provoke a war with no nation whatsoever, least of all Germany, for there exists absolutely no cause for it, and then war between the two countries would be the greatest misfortune for both. I desired to show by my visit to Kiel last summer that we wished to maintain good relations with Germany.

[56] *Ibid.*, XIX, 376 note. A Reuter despatch, appearing in *Daily Mail*, Jan. 12, 1905, stated that so great had been the apprehension in Berlin that all Christmas leaves had been cancelled in the navy.

[57] Reproduced in *Kölnische Zeitung*, No. 30. Jan. 10.

[58] Metternich to Bülow, Jan. 11; *G. P.*, XIX, 376.

[59] Metternich to Bülow, Jan. 11; *ibid.*, XIX, 377–78.

Of course, he added, the growing strength of the German navy was not left out of account in the distribution of English naval forces. "How strong your fleet already is we have seen in Kiel and Plymouth."[60]

Both Metternich and Lansdowne noticed an improvement in the tone of the British daily and periodical press after the first of the year,[61] but this was only a lull before a new storm.

In a speech to his constituents at Eastleigh, Sir Arthur Lee, civil lord of the admiralty and a member of the ministry, referred to the recent reorganization of the British navy. As first reported in the *Standard* (February 4, 1905), he said that

> The balance and center of naval power had been shifted during the last few years. They had not so much to keep their eyes upon France and the Mediterranean as they had to look with more anxiety, though not fear, towards the North Sea. . . . If war should unhappily be declared, under existing conditions the British Navy would get its blow in first, before the other side had time even to read in the papers that war had been declared.

His statement was reproduced throughout Germany. Its effect was electric. The Kaiser called the British ambassador, and urged that Lee be officially disavowed or "else a storm would break loose in our press such as could only be averted by immediately bringing in a colossal new building program, which will be forced on us by public opinion."[62]

The Berlin correspondent of the *Standard* wrote that Lee's speech, which had been given the widest publicity, had created "the worst possible impression."[63] *Vossische Zeitung*, comparing his remarks to those of Dr. Paasche, kindly said that "it would be a mistake to attribute more importance to Mr. Lee's indiscretions at Eastleigh than to other tactless words uttered in the excitement of a public political meeting."[64] Conservative and nationalistic organs almost without exception interpreted Mr. Lee's utterance as a threat of war

[60] Coerper's report, Jan. 12; *ibid.*, XIX, 379–80.

[61] Metternich to Bülow, Jan. 11 (two despatches); *ibid.*, XIX, 376, 378.

[62] Kaiser to Tirpitz, Feb. 4; *Aufbau der deutschen Weltmacht*, p. 14.

[63] *Standard*, Feb. 6.

[64] *Vossische Zeitung*, No. 62, Feb. 6.

in time of peace. All seized the opportunity to point out the necessity for preparedness and called for adequate extension of the naval program to meet the new danger.[65]

Responses of a varying nature were evoked from the British journals. The Conservative *Daily Telegraph* (February 7) ridiculed German apprehension. The *Pall Mall Gazette* (February 6) declared that "If Germany distrusts our intentions it is because she is conscious that we have good reason to distrust hers." Two of the leading Conservative organs, *Standard* (February 9) and *Morning Post* (February 8), concluded that the agitation was encouraged in Germany in order to secure increased naval appropriations from the Reichstag. In conclusion the *Post* inquired: "Is it possible that within the last few days the Germans have been seeing their own image in the glass and have somehow mistaken it for us?" The *Times* (February 6) stated that England in reorganizing her navy had only prepared against an unexpected outbreak of war. "Are we to suppose," it asked, "that Germany is more likely to precipitate such an outbreak than other Powers?"

Liberal papers, probably for reasons of internal politics, were not so charitable to Mr. Lee. *Manchester Guardian's* Berlin correspondent (February 9) pointed out that

> Last month, it was possible to meet the German apprehensions of British menaces, said to underlie articles in the *Army and Navy Gazette* and *Vanity Fair*, with the natural rejoinder that these journals did not represent British official or national sentiments. Those of us who submitted these arguments are now confronted with the counter-argument that a British Minister has corroborated the fears then expressed in Germany.

The *Daily Chronicle* (February 4) thought that the "Uncivil Lord of the Admiralty"[66] had made "an indiscreet and very

[65] *Berliner Post, Magdeburger Zeitung, Berliner Neueste Nachrichten,* Feb. 5; *Münchener Allgemeine Zeitung,* Nos. 59, 60, Feb. 6, 7. The issue of February 7 contained an article entitled, "Die Pflichten im deutschen Hause," which concluded: "Also nach aussen mehr denn je in einer Stunde des Reiches EN VEDETTE!"

[66] *Daily News,* Aug. 29, 1905.

inconsiderate speech."[67] The *Westminster Gazette* (February 6), reviewing the situation, stated that England must watch the naval policy of Germany,

> but we can do nothing worse or less dignified than to make perpetual and open complaint because Germany does what she has a perfect right to do, what we probably should do, if we were in her place, and what at all events we have no means of preventing her from doing.

The net result of the agitation over Mr. Lee's speech was to make the task of the German Navy League easier, and to increase the numbers of those who clamored for increased naval appropriations and an accelerated building program.[68]

Echoes of Mr. Lee's indiscretions had scarcely died away before the naval question was once more on the front page of the newspapers. In a letter to the *Deutsche Revue*, Admiral Thomsen of the German navy inquired as to why, in England, Germany was continually pictured as a robber waiting to seize other people's possessions. This was the reason to which most English publicists attributed the German desire for a fleet. German officers, wrote Admiral Thomsen, did not believe in the possibility of unprovoked English aggression any more than British officers gave credence to the theory of a German surprise attack on the coasts of England.[69]

Admiral Penrose Fitzgerald of the British navy was asked by the editor of *Deutsche Revue* to reply to Admiral Thomsen. Fitzgerald vigorously defended the statements made by Mr. Lee at Eastleigh. The most significant passage in his communication, and the one that gave the greatest offense in Germany, ran in part:

> We know that Germany is not ready as yet to make war upon England, but if within the next few years . . . England should be troubled on the Indian frontier or elsewhere, then Germany will

[67] An anonymous writer in *Daily Chronicle* (Feb. 6) considered Mr. Lee's statement, "assuming that it was uttered on behalf of the Cabinet, a wise and pacific declaration of the unalterable purpose of the Mistress of the Seas." For the reaction of a neutral see *Belg. D.*, I, Supp., 3–5.

[68] Tirpitz, *Aufbau der deutschen Weltmacht*, pp. 14–16; *Memoirs*, I, 264.

[69] *Deutsche Revue*, March, 1905, pp. 276 ff.

probably try to take by force the greater part of the world's trade now in British hands, and will seek to annex fresh territories at British expense. I should regard an Anglo-German war as a grave misfortune. But if such a war is inevitable, I prefer that it should break out tomorrow, rather than be postponed for a number of years, when Germany would be stronger at sea, and perhaps able to gain an advantage over us.[70]

Fitzgerald's frank statement was met by the Conservative German press with demands for increased armaments.[71] The liberal *Vossische Zeitung* (May 5) was forced to admit that the "article means nothing more and nothing less than that England must make war on Germany as soon as possible, unless Germany ceases to increase her Navy, to compete in international trade, and to seek opportunities of expansion." It made a profound and lasting impression on some German statesmen, adding to the chain of circumstantial evidence which led them to believe that Germany was seriously threatened with an English preventive war.[72]

The Anglo-German war scare in the autumn of 1904 resulted in part from the benevolent attitude assumed by Germany toward Russia in her struggle with Japan; in part from the intemperate articles in the British press; and, in part from English suspicions that the Eastern autocracies had concluded secret agreements affecting England's interests. Moreover, in Anglo-Russian incidents such as the Dogger Bank affair, Germany was the lightning conductor for the bolts hurled by the British press. The very root of Anglo-German hostility, however, was the question of naval armaments. With the development of the German navy, the North Sea assumed singular importance in the calculations of the British Admiralty. Concentration of English maritime strength in that area, begun in 1904, continued until "eighty-

[70] *Ibid.*, May, 1905, pp. 230 ff.

[71] *Berliner Neueste Nachrichten, Börsen Courier,* and *Berliner Post,* May 5.

[72] Mühlberg to Bülow, Aug. 10, 1905; *G. P.*, XIX, 494. "England's attitude in 1904–5 showed that England was strongly inclined at that time to destroy the whole of Germany's position in the world with one war-like blow." Also Tirpitz, *Memoirs,* I, 263.

six per cent of the English guns were trained on Germany."[73] Fisher's reforms and subsequent building programs were achieved only by mobilizing public opinion through the press. Germany was 'painted as the devil on the wall.' In the German journals, English precautions were of course regarded as preparations, and they formed the basis of propaganda to win public support for increased building programs. No one questions the sincerity and patriotism of Admirals Fisher and Tirpitz, but both countenanced the use of the public press in a manner that unquestionably poisoned public opinion in England and Germany.[74]

By May, 1905, the Moroccan question had come to the front to furnish the press with new material for international polemics.

[73] Bacon, *Life of Lord Fisher*, II, 79.

[74] *Ibid.*, I, 53, 136–40, 156–60, 180, II, 120; Tirpitz, *Memoirs*, I, pp. 142 ff.

Chapter IV

THE MOROCCAN QUESTION IN THE EUROPEAN PRESS APRIL 1904–MARCH 1905

IT IS a new era which opens in Anglo-French relations and in the history of the world," wrote Alcide Ebray in *Journal des Débats* (April 10, 1904), on the announcement of the accords that gave tangible form to the *rapprochement* between England and France. This was the general spirit with which the event was received in French political circles. Only the Nationalist press criticized the agreement.[1] In England, too, press opinion was almost unanimous in approving the action of the governments. The Liberal *Daily News* was loudest in its praise. The *Daily Chronicle*, representing the Liberal imperialist tradition, was more reserved, while the Conservative *Times*, *Daily Telegraph*, *Standard*, *Daily Graphic*, and *Daily Mail* received the news with outspoken satisfaction. A similar attitude was assumed by the Liberal *Westminster Gazette*.[2]

Public interest in the announcement centered on the convention that assured Great Britain a free hand in Egypt in

[1] *Figaro*, April 9: "C'est assurément un des événements les plus heureux de ces dernières années." *Temps*, April 16: "En France, il a été l'occasion—trop rare—d'une union sans réserve des républicains. Il appartenait aux nationalistes de prouver leur incorrigible inconscience des intérêts nationaux en attaquant le traité." Similar opinions were expressed by *Petite République*, April 9, *République Française*, April 10, and *Matin*, April 11. *Libre Parole* and *Autorité*, Nationalist papers, and *Lanterne*, Radical, criticized the agreement, according to the correspondent of *Frankfurter Zeitung*, No. 102, April 12. Contrasted to the unrestrained enthusiasm of the French press at an earlier period for the understanding with Russia, the reception accorded the agreement with England was cool. See G. Michon, *The Franco-Russian Alliance*, pp. 71 ff.

[2] Metternich to Bülow, April 9; *G. P.*, XX, 13–14. Editorials in *Daily News*, *Daily Chronicle*, *Daily Telegraph*, *Daily Mail*, *Standard*, *Times*, and *Westminster Gazette*, April 9.

return for English recognition that "it appertained particularly to France to preserve order" in Morocco, "and to provide assistance for the purpose of all administrative, economic, financial and military reforms which it may require." Equality in customs duties in Egypt and Morocco was mutually guaranteed for a period of thirty years; France agreed to come to an understanding with Spain in view of her Moroccan interests; and the two Powers pledged one another their diplomatic support in carrying out the provisions of the declaration.[3] This agreement meant in its entirety, and no one could well mistake it, that all England had done in Egypt and all that she hoped to do, was to be conceded the French in Morocco. It was generally accepted by the European press that eventually France would establish a *de facto*, if not a *de jure*, protectorate.[4] Moreover, secret articles attached to the convention envisaged an eventual partition between France and Spain.[5]

This part of the general agreement was criticized by certain organs in England. The *Morning Post*, self-appointed guardian of imperial interests, protested vehemently against the sacrifice of Morocco.[6] *Manchester Guardian*, although it approved the sweeping settlement with France, regretted that Lansdowne had not secured in perpetuity Great Britain's trade interests in Morocco.

As it is, the thirty years of Free Trade in Morocco may not mean so much as we think. The process of 'Pacific Penetration' of Morocco such as France has in mind may well take thirty years; and then just when French authority is established and our trading

[3] *B. D.*, II, 374–407, *passim;* and other citations in Fay, *Origins*, I, 55.

[4] Radolin and the Kaiser thought that French control would amount to a virtual protectorate; Radolin to Bülow, March 23; *G. P.*, XX, 5–7, and Kaiser's comments. *Kölnische Zeitung*, Nos. 308, 357, March 26, April 9; *Berliner Tageblatt*, No. 198, April 19; *Frankfurter Zeitung*, Nos. 99, 314, April 9, Nov. 11; *Journal des Débats*, March 31, April 5, 10; *Temps*, April 10, 11, 12; *Daily Telegraph*, April 11; *Morning Post*, April 9; *Saturday Review*, April 16; *Daily Mail*, April 9.

[5] The secret articles were not revealed until 1911. *B. D.*, II, 374–407; *Documents parlementaires, Chambre, sess. extr.*, 1911, No. 1413, pp. 304–37; *Parliamentary papers*, Cd. 5969, *Treaty series*, 1911.

[6] *Morning Post*, Jan. 15, April 7, 9, 11, 12.

rights are in danger, this Free Trade agreement lapses, another neutral market is imperiled, and we are left without anything to bargain with.[7]

Westminister Gazette (April 9) pointed out that "Morocco belongs neither to France nor to Great Britain, and that in disclaiming ambitions for ourselves, we are not presenting her to France." *Saturday Review* (August 7) predicted that as French influence spread in the country, "we shall find our trade going the way it has gone in Madagascar and Tunis."

In Germany, the ardent supporters of *Weltpolitik* expressed considerable dissatisfaction with the Moroccan settlement. "Is the German Michael to get nothing?" asked the *Rheinisch-Westfälische Zeitung*. "Where is Germany's place in the sun?" queried the *Reichsbote*.[8] The more responsible organs such as *Berliner Tageblatt*, *Kölnische Zeitung*, and *Frankfurter Zeitung* expressed considerable anxiety for the future of German trade in Morocco. Territorial ambitions were generally denied, but the clause that guaranteed England alone the 'open door' for thirty years, was almost universally deplored.[9] Moreover, Bülow, in his remarks before the Reichstag on April 12, stressed the necessity for protecting German economic interests.[10] *Kölnische Zeitung* emphasized and expanded this view in two significant articles which bear signs of official inspiration.[11] "On this point," reported the Berlin correspondent of the *Daily Chronicle* (April 11), "there is almost universal soreness. . . ."

Germans interested in export trade regarded Morocco as a

[7] *Manchester Guardian*, April 11.

[8] Quoted in London *Times*, April 12. On the attitude of the Pan-Germans, see Mildred Wertheimer, *The Pan-German League*, pp. 169–75; Friedjung, *Das Zeitalter des Imperialismus*, II, 37–40.

[9] *Kölnische Zeitung*, No. 372, April 13; *Berliner Tageblatt*, No. 184, April 12, despatch from Theodor Wolff in Paris, reporting that in diplomatic circles the guarantee of free trade for only thirty years was regarded as a decided disadvantage for the trade of other Powers. *Ibid.*, No. 198, April 19, "Das französisch-englische Abkommen und der deutsche Handel"; *Frankfurter Zeitung*, No. 99, April 9; *Deutsche Rundschau*, May, 1904, pp. 305–6.

[10] Fay, *Origins*, I, 179; *Fürst Bülows Reden*, II, 74.

[11] *Kölnische Zeitung*, Nos. 827, 1150, Aug. 13, Nov. 10.

field of unlimited possibilities. Moreover, reports were current that valuable mineral deposits existed, which needed only capital and technical knowledge to be profitably exploited. Numerous articles in the periodicals attested to Germany's interest in these undeveloped resources.[12] The Germans had begun a concentrated drive on Moroccan markets, and despite the longer experience of France and Great Britain they successfully entered and laid foundations for their trade expansion.[13] Due to the lack of accurate statistics, the extent of German trade with Morocco cannot be determined. During 1905, and especially on the eve of the Algeciras Conference, statistics were published to show that German interests were negligible or that they were considerable, depending on whether the figures emanated from France or Germany. Manifestly these were *chiffres de polémique.* It seems safe to conclude that in the Moroccan trade, Great Britain ranked first, France second, and Germany third, though in some of the southern ports such as Mazagan, Mogador, and Safi, the Germans had outstripped the French.[14]

Immediately after announcement of the Anglo-French agreement, England secured the fruits of her accord by negotiating with the Powers interested in Egypt. A new Khedival Decree, releasing Egyptian surplus funds from former international restrictions, was promulgated with the assent of the Powers. Italy, Russia, and Austria-Hungary gave their adherence without reservation, but Holstein re-

[12] Among the more important are to be noted, Ludwig Feuth, "Die Schätze Marokkos," *Deutsche Revue*, May, 1905, pp. 133–36; A. Wirth, "Marokko," *Preussische Jahrbücher*, July, 1905, pp. 176–81; Theobald Fischer, "Die weltwirtschaftliche Bedeutung Marokkos," *Deutsche Rundschau*, Sept., 1905, pp. 434–56.

[13] W. B. Harris, *Modern Morocco*, ch. XIII, gives a good account of the development of German trade in Morocco and the methods employed in building up the market.

[14] Camille Fidel, "Les intérêts français et les intérêts allemands au Maroc," "L'opinion allemande et la question du Maroc," "Le commerce du Maroc en 1904," *Bulletin du comité de l'Afrique française*, supps. July, Sept., Nov., 1905; *Temps*, Jan. 30, 1906; *Hamburgischer Korrespondent*, April 6, 1905; *Frankfurter Zeitung*, No. 1, Jan. 2, 1906; *Vossische Zeitung*, No. 24, Jan. 16, 1906. Figures given by Sir Thomas Barclay, *Thirty Years Anglo-French Reminiscences*, p. 276 (quoted by Fay, *Origins*, I, 157), are probably as trustworthy as any.

garded the question as a "test of strength" (*Kraftprobe*) and advised that Germany resist the first effort of the Entente to bend her according to their will.[15] After a spirited exchange of notes, the same guarantees received by the French were secured for German interests in Egypt.[16]

In accord with Article VIII of the Anglo-French convention, Delcassé began negotiations with Spain to define the limits of her sphere of influence in northern Morocco. The Spanish ambassador at Paris found M. Delcassé "hard and unsympathetic from the first, and he despaired of getting him to take a fair view of the position in which Spain was placed and of the demands which her past relations with Morocco had compelled her to make."[17] The Spanish were at a disadvantage, however, as France and England had already reached an agreement. Lansdowne gave them little support in dealing with the French, who adopted a 'take it or leave it' policy. An agreement finally reached between the representatives of the two Powers was embodied in two documents signed on October 3, 1904. The first was a public declaration of Spanish adherence to the Anglo-French accord and a reaffirmation of the principles of Moroccan independence and the sovereignty of the Sultan. The second was a secret convention contemplating the eventual partition of Morocco. The sphere of influence accorded Spain, in which she should not act without French consent, was much smaller than that assigned to her in the unratified Franco-Spanish convention of 1902.[18]

Mr. E. N. Anderson, the most recent and authoritative writer on the diplomacy of this period, judges the agreement and the policy motivating it as follows:

The convention was a logical extension of the accord of April 8. Both agreements anticipated a change in the political status of

[15] Mem. by Holstein, June 5, 1904; *G. P.*, XX, 144 f.

[16] The negotiations took place between April 20 and June 19, 1904, and were concluded before King Edward's visit to Kiel. *G. P.*, XX, 123–65; *B. D.*, III, 17–24.

[17] Monson to Lansdowne, Sept. 14, 1904: *B. D.*, III, 47.

[18] The course of negotiations can be followed in *B. D.*, III, 25–48; *G. P.*, XX, 169–94. For the declaration and secret convention see *B. D.*, III, 49–52.

Morocco and made provisions for a future division of the land. . . . Both accords violated the principle of the open door. In fact, had the secret articles of the two agreements been known, they would have proved that the clauses concerning the independence and integrity of Morocco and the sovereignty of the Sultan were complete shams. In declaring to the other Powers that commercial freedom would be absolutely respected, M. Delcassé was equivocating and attempting to disarm suspicions concerning his real intention of destroying economic freedom in Morocco.[19]

Delcassé could not possibly have been unaware of the importance with which the Germans regarded their Moroccan trade. But in contrast to Lansdowne, he made no move to consult Germany or to give assurances that her commercial interests would not be prejudiced. In fact, he did not even consider it necessary to inform Berlin officially of the Anglo-French agreement. According to the Belgian minister at Paris, the hungry group of colonialists in the Chamber had threatened to oppose the ratification of the accord with England if Delcassé made too great concessions to Spain.[20] Any move to open negotiations with Germany would undoubtedly have aroused their suspicions. This might account for the foreign minister's action. Other evidence seems to indicate that his disregard of Germany was based on personal considerations.

When Delcassé, according to Paul von Schwabach, approached a Parisian banker, soliciting coöperation of financial interests in the penetration of Morocco, he informed the financier that he had come to an agreement with the signatories of the Madrid Convention, namely, England, Italy, and Spain. When the banker added: "And with Germany?" Delcassé cried: "Avec l'Allemagne, jamais de la vie."[21] Sir Sidney Lee recounts how Delcassé, when warned that his policy would invite German intervention, replied: "Quant à Berlin, il n'y a rien à craindre de ce côté là."[22] It is probable

[19] Anderson, *The First Moroccan Crisis*, p. 125.

[20] *Belg. D.*, II, 167–69.

[21] Schwabach, *Aus meinen Akten*, p. 35.

[22] Lee, *King Edward VII*, II, 338.

that Delcassé shared the opinion expressed by Alcide Ebray, who statèd in *Débats* (April 17) that owing to the Russian alliance and to the Moroccan agreements with Italy, Spain, and England, Germany would find herself quickly isolated if she tried to create difficulties for the French.[23] If Delcassé had approached Germany immediately after conclusion of the accord with England, it is quite possible that her assent to French action in Morocco might have been secured at the same price England paid for her adherence to the Khedival Decree. Arthur Nicolson, British minister to Morocco in 1904, told Jules Cambon that when he was at Tangier he had "some ground for believing that the German Government were prepared to recognise the Convention [of April 8] provided their commercial interests were secured for the future on the same footing as the British."[24] Since there was no legal necessity for such action, as in the case of Egypt, Delcassé disregarded Germany.

German commercial and economic interests in Morocco were guaranteed by the commercial treaty of June 1, 1890, and Article XVII of the Madrid Convention of 1880.[25] As long as these were not infringed, she had no legal right to complain of French action. Hence, Berlin raised no objection during the summer of 1904, but came to an agreement with England in regard to Egypt, and quietly watched developments in Morocco and the course of Franco-Spanish negotia-

[23] See also Fay, I, 168; *Anderson*, pp. 125–27.

[24] Nicolson to Lansdowne, Feb. 12, 1905; *B. D.*, III, 59.

[25] On the interpretation of this article see Anderson, p. 234 n. The French maintained that it granted most favored nation treatment only in regard to native *protégés;* the Germans contended that it applied to commercial and industrial interests as well. On Aug. 8, 1905, the American consul general reported: "I was very doubtful whether the 'most favoured nation' clause, Article XVII of the Convention of Madrid of 1880, upon which . . . most of the countries represented in Morocco based their rights in this direction, was necessarily applicable to any other contingency than that of protection. . . . The German Legation here have subsequently taken this subject up and state that they have what is to them satisfactory affirmation from the Moorish Government that by the latter this Article of the Convention above mentioned is considered to apply to all matters as well as protection." D. S. Consular Letters, vol. 27, Hoffman Philip to Asst. Secy. of State, Aug. 8, 1905.

tions.[26] It was the conduct of French policy in the Sultan's empire after April, 1904, and not the agreement itself that gave Germany grounds for protest and interference.

The fundamental principles of French 'pacific penetration' of Morocco were stated in two articles in *Journal des Débats.*

> Economic domination could easily transform itself into political domination; it follows itself, in our opinion, that we shall not be able to prevent the progress of a rival Power which opposes our political preponderance with her economic expansion.

However, continued *Débats,*

> Morocco is in need of capital; why should not this capital be furnished by the French public? The nation that aids Morocco to civilize herself will evidently monopolize the public works; why should not the nation that builds the ports and railroads be our own? And if the country possesses rich mineral deposits, as they say, why should they not be exploited by our compatriots?[27]

Execution of this policy required close cooperation between the government and private enterprise.

In order to awaken public interest, a great banquet was held at the Grand Hotel on June 15; it was attended by over three hundred persons "despite the somewhat high price charged for tickets." The foremost bankers, politicians, explorers, colonizers, industrialists, exporters, and publicists joined in demonstrating their interest in the vast field of enterprise that was about to open to them. The banquet also consecrated the transfer of powers from the old Comité de l'Afrique française to the newly organized Comité du Maroc, which was henceforth the protagonist of Moroccan penetration.[28] The new society was headed by M. Etienne, who was

[26] These were the reasons advanced by Bülow in favor of a policy of reserve. Bülow to Radolin, July 21, 1904; Mühlberg to Metternich, Aug. 7, 1904. *G. P.*, XX, 210–11, 218.

[27] *Journal des Débats,* March 31, April 5, 1904. This had long been the program advocated by the French colonial party in their organ, *Bulletin du comité de l'Afrique française.*

[28] *Temps,* June 17; *Figaro,* June 16. *Bulletin,* June, 1904, pp. 176–85, gives in full the speeches of Prince d'Arenberg and M. Etienne, outlining the work of the new organisation.

vice-president of the Chamber, president of the committee on foreign affairs and colonies, deputy for Oran, and later minister of interior in Rouvier's cabinet.[29] A subscription list was opened by the Comité du Maroc for funds to promote French interest in Morocco and to win support and coöperation in executing the policy of 'pacific penetration.' Henceforth, the Comité subjected the French public to a heavy stream of propaganda in the form of press articles and bulletins on the resources, markets, political life, geography, and international position of Morocco.[30]

Figaro, *Temps*, and *Débats* led in giving publicity and support to proposed French action in the Sherifian empire.[31] Adoption of a high-sounding phrase—*pénétration pacifique*—to disguise a policy of rank imperalism, won the support of the Left parties in France. *Petite République* summed up the position of the Left when it declared that for a systematic extension of their colonial empire by means of aggression and military conquest, they could only repeat the old socialistic formula—"pas un sou, pas un homme." However, in the work that was before them in Morocco—the extension of their moral influence, the augmentation of economic prosperity and the substitution of civilization for a state of barbarism—it was the duty of all parties to give their support.[32] Monarchists and Nationalists, however, opposed the move-

[29] "Deputy from Oran, M. Etienne has always watched attentively over the affairs of South-Oran. A militant colonialist, he has carried on active propaganda for the extension of our influence over the whole of North Africa. . . . For several years past it has been his custom to assemble at a monthly luncheon the politicians and publicists who are especially interested in Morocco. If our government finds at the present time a well-informed public opinion in this country to support its policy . . . it certainly owes a great deal to these reunions . . . *Temps*, May 18.

[30] Among the largest contributors to the Comité's fund were: Rothschild Frères, 20,000 fr.; Compagnie de l'Ouest algérienne, 10,000 fr.; Crédit algérien, 5,000 fr.; Crédit Lyonnais, 10,000 fr.; Banque de Paris et des Pays Bas, 10,000 fr.; *Figaro*, 2,000 fr. *Figaro*, June 24; *Bulletin*, July, 1904, pp. 224 ff. After April, 1904, the *Bulletin* carried the supplementary title—*Organe du Comité du Maroc.*

[31] *Figaro*, May 28, June 16, 19, 21, 24; *Temps*, April 11, May 18, June 17, 28; *Débats*, July 30; and subsequent issues of the *Bulletin*.

[32] *Petite République*, June 2; *ibid.*, July 15, article by Henri Turot, "L'expansion coloniale"; Jaurès in *Humanité*, Sept. 3, Nov. 11.

ment from its inception.[33] "Pacific penetration," wrote René d'Aral in *Gaulois*, "is nothing but an empty formula, inasmuch as it is not accompanied by military penetration." The European situation at the moment demanded all their attention and the conservation of their military forces at home. They could not afford to embark on hazardous colonial adventures, he declared.[34]

Thus, the policy of penetration depended on the political support of the Center and the Left. Support of the Left, however, was conditioned on the employment of pacific means. Any suspicion that Delcassé or the government contemplated military action would have thrown the Radicals and Socialists into opposition. This fact necessitated the greatest care on the part of the ministry in dealing with the Moroccan situation.

French bankers made the first move toward carrying out the policy of 'pacific penetration.' A consortium was organized and negotiations with the Sultan undertaken, which resulted in an agreement on June 12, 1904. The entire Moroccan debt was refunded and brought into French hands. It was secured by the customs receipts at eight ports in which the consortium was authorized, through its own agents, to survey and control the customs. Moreover, the French syndicate secured an option on all future loans, on the coinage of money, and the purchase and sale of silver and gold.[35] The agreement, concluded with the assistance and sanction of the French government, constituted a long step toward complete financial control of Morocco.

Later, in July, the Moorish government permitted the organization of its military forces at Tangier under French officers.[36] No further advances were made by the French

[33] *Presse*, July 26; *Patrie*, July 26; *Gaulois*, July 6.

[34] *Gaulois*, Aug. 6, Dec. 26, 28. On the subject of French parties and imperialism see "Notre expansion coloniale et les partis politiques," *Quest. dipl. et col.*, Jan. 15, 1903, pp. 69 ff.

[35] *Affaires du Maroc, 1901–5*, pp. 140 ff.; Mévil, *De la paix de Francfort*, pp. 170 f.

[36] *Ibid.*, pp. 160–62; Tardieu, *La Conférence d'Algésiras*, p. 29.

until after the accords with England were ratified by the Chamber in November, 1904.[37]

The policy of the government was now approved, and as Delcassé had declared, deeds and not words were needed to carry out the Moroccan program.

> With a sigh of relief the politicians set to work—to talk. There were '*déjeuners Marocains*,' with speeches about railways; and '*dîners Marocains*,' with speeches about banks; and '*soupers Marocains*' with mutual congratulations on '*le Maroc français*'—and that was all.[38]

The apparent paralysis which had seized the French was due to the situation that had developed in Morocco.

The Sultan was neither consulted nor informed in advance with regard to the Anglo-French convention, the Franco-Spanish agreement, or the policy of 'pacific penetration.' In this case, as in similar instances of imperialism, the theory was that if the Powers agreed on the medicine, the Sultan and his subjects could be forced to swallow it. However, when the French undertook to execute their policy, which they called "harmonizing their diplomacy with the Maghzen," the Moorish tribesmen showed a singular lack of appreciation of the generous offer to do for them what France had done for their neighbors in Algeria and Tunis. Internal disorders increased with the circulation of the ridiculous rumor that the Sultan had sold them out to the French for a *peseta* per head.[39]

Delcassé, through the press, kept up the fiction of a friendly coöperative policy with the Sultan and his subjects, but to observers in Morocco the unpopularity of all foreigners

[37] For the debates in the Chamber and Senate see *Journal Officiel, Débats parlem., Chambre,* Nov. 7–12, 1904, pp. 2301–2431, *passim; ibid., Sénat,* Dec., 5–7, 1904, pp. 1003–1056, *passim.* Also *B. D.,* III, 1–17.

[38] Walter Harris, "The Morocco Crisis," *Blackwood's Magazine,* Aug., 1905, pp. 294–99.

[39] Tangier report to *Morning Post,* Nov. 9; report of the Belgian minister, Nov. 30, *Belg. D.,* II, 171. In an interview appearing in London *Times,* Dec. 3, Kaid MacLean attributed the disturbed state of Morocco "not only to the Pretender's revolt against the Sultan, but to the bitterness that had arisen on the question of a French protectorate and the growth of the influence of that country in Morocco."

in general, and hatred of the French in particular, was quite evident.

S. R. Gummere, the American consul general in Tangier, commented on native hostility to the French, in a cable message of June 16.[40] On August 1, he reported that "The placing of French supervisors at all the customs on the coast is very unpopular and has created antagonism."[41] Later, he wrote that the Hill Tribes had sent a delegation to the foreign representatives in Tangier, asking them in the interest of peace between natives and foreigners to restrain the French from further aggression.[42] The situation was summed up by Hoffman Philip, the vice-consul general, in a report to Washington on February 13, 1905.[43]

> The fact cannot be overlooked that at the present time there appears to exist throughout Morocco a strong feeling among the Moors that the assumption by the French Government of a leading rôle in the administrative affairs of this country is undesirable and a thing to be resisted. . . . That another Power engaging in the same task as has been assumed by the French Government would experience numerous and similar difficulties cannot be doubted, yet, a special obstacle to peaceful methods devised with a view to immediate French predomination arises from the proximity of Algeria, bordering as it does upon Morocco. The actual knowledge of Algeria and its people, on the part of the vast majority of the inhabitants of Morocco, is extremely limited; they but unite in considering the Algerians a conquered and subdued people with whom they have no sympathy, and they are also united in the wish to avoid a similar fate. This appears to be the basis of a particular lack of sympathy evinced at this period by the natives of Morocco toward the French Nation as among other Christian Powers.

Native hostility to all foreigners was indicated in May, 1904, when Mr. Perdicaris, an American citizen, was seized by a hostile tribe and held for ransom. President Roosevelt acted with characteristic energy. He appealed to France and

[40] D. S. Consular Letters, vol. 27, telegram to D. S.
[41] *Ibid.*, No. 606, Aug. 1, 1904.
[42] *Ibid.*, No. 612, Aug. 18, 1904.
[43] *Ibid.*, No. 646, Feb. 13, 1905.

England for diplomatic concurrence to bring pressure on the Sultan, and sent cruisers to Tangier to enforce his demands. Perdicaris was released.[44] The request for diplomatic support was exaggerated by the French press, and by later writers, as a recognition of the new status France was to occupy in Morocco by virtue of the agreement of April 8.[45] As a matter of fact, the French played a relatively insignificant part in bringing about Perdicaris' release. During the whole affair, Gummere acted in the closest accord with the British minister, Sir Arthur Nicolson,[46] even forwarding confidential telegrams through the English legation and foreign office.[47] In a telegram to the secretary of state, Mr. Gummere corrected the misrepresentations broadcast by the French:

> Articles in continental and English journals evidently inspired by French Foreign Office, praising French diplomatic action, assigning to it all accomplished here and much more. So far as known by the British Minister and myself their action has been confined to letter sent to the French Secretary at Fez at our request and to services also at our request of the Wazan Shereefs who are French subjects. . . . It should not be overlooked that the French are most unpopular with both government and people, which may account for apparent French apathy.[48]

In view of the actual circumstances it cannot be maintained that American diplomatic action constituted, either expressly or impliedly, recognition of the Moroccan accord of April 8.[49]

In December, the local situation became more acute. It was announced that M. St. René Taillandier, French minister

[44] *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1904, pp. 496 ff.

[45] *Temps*, June 5, 10; *Figaro*, June 1; Tardieu, *La Conférence*, p. 64; Mévil, *De la paix de Francfort*, pp. 171 ff.; *Affaires du Maroc, 1901–5*, pp. 152, 155, 157.

[46] D. S. Consular Letters, vol. 27, Nos. 587, 589, 599; Gummere to Loomis, May 23, 26, July 7, 1904.

[47] *Ibid.*, telegram May 26.

[48] *Ibid.*, Gummere to Secy. of State, June 16.

[49] Von Kühlmann's statement (*G P*, XX, 32) that "The United States during the Perdicaris affair implicitly recognized the agreement of April 8, 1904," is not justified; nor is Adolf Hasenclever's similar conclusion in "Theodore Roosevelt und die Marokkokrisis von 1904–1906," *Archiv für P. u. G., Heft* 2/3 (1928), p. 192; and Anderson, p. 131 note.

at Tangier, would leave shortly for Fez to press on the Sultan a complete program of reform, which France would 'aid' him to institute in his dominions.[50] A statement made by the French minister to the American representive indicates that the French contemplated more rigorous methods than 'pacific penetration.'

> His excellency strongly assured me that should the Maghzen appear not disposed to carry out the suggestions of the French Government in regard to reforms, etc., the suggestions would most undoubtedly be strengthened by the offered alternative of having a large number of French troops enter the country from the Algerian border.[51]

Taking cognizance of the movement of opinion among the tribesmen, the Sultan's government adopted a strongly anti-European tone. It was announced that all foreign missions, civil and military, in the Sultan's service, would be dismissed—the French not excepted. Because of the openly announced plan of some tribes to combine and capture his mission, Taillandier was forced to abandon the direct overland route to Fez for a more circuitous one. "This fact," in the opinion of Mr. Harris, "should demonstrate to the French public that the hopeful picture painted by the inspired French press does not quite faithfully represent the situation."[52] *Débats* admitted that certain events unpleasant to France had occurred in Morocco, but delcared, "In all of that, there is nothing to inspire in us the least discouragement."[53]

When the news reached Paris that the Sultan had dismissed his foreign advisers, including the French military mission, it was regarded by the press as an insult requiring severe action. "The Government Press however," reported the British ambassador, "is not yet prepared to admit that the policy of 'pacific penetration' will have to be aban-

[50] Delcassé to Taillandier, Dec. 15, 1904; *Affaires du Maroc, 1901–5*, pp. 178–83.

[51] D. S. Consular Letters, vol. 27, No. 630; Hoffman Philip to D.S., Dec. 24, 1904.

[52] London *Times*, Dec. 19.

[53] Alcide Ebray in *Débats*, Dec. 22.

doned."[54] According to *Débats*, an encouraging factor in the situation was

the unanimity with which, at Tangier, the diplomatic and European world takes our part on this occasion. It recognizes that the preponderant situation which devolves upon us in Morocco makes it our duty not to admit the attitude that the Sultan has taken.[55]

A report of the American representative at Tangier reveals the extent to which the Powers took France's part on the occasion to which *Débats* referred. On December 22, Taillandier informed the foreign legations that in view of the Sultan's action his special mission to Fez was indefinitely postponed; that the French military mission was to be recalled; and that the vice-consul had been instructed to withdraw from Fez with all French citizens. Only Great Britain acted in concert with France, and sent similar instructions to Fez. Germany, Spain, Italy, and the United States did not follow the French lead. The American vice-consul general reported on the situation:

I find there is a more or less general feeling among the Representatives of the other Powers in Morocco, with the possible exception of Great Britain, that in order to best protect their various interests . . . it is advisable not to acquiesce too implicitly and hastily in the initial moves of the French policy, which as yet cannot be considered, from here, as clearly defined in all respects.[56]

Reporting further developments, he wrote on January 3, 1905:

. . . the late assumption by the Government of France of the pacification of Morocco, does not appear to be accorded any degree of sympathy or enthusiasm by the various Powers of Europe as far as can be judged at this place.[57]

French threats to break off diplomatic negotiations and to

[54] Monson to Lansdowne, Dec. 26; *B. D.*, III, 55.

[55] *Débats*, Dec. 25.

[56] D. S Consular Letters, vol 27, No 633, Philip to D. S., Dec. 28; and enc. 1, transmitting Taillandier's communication.

[57] *Ibid.*, No. 634; Philip to D. S., Jan. 3, 1905. His account of the incident is confirmed by Kühlmann's despatches in *G. P.*, XX, 239 ff.

withdraw their consul from Fez produced the desired effect upon the Sultan. He decided to retain the French military mission and advisers, and it was announced that Taillandier would soon start for Fez.[58]

The initial moves of France in Morocco, the increased anarchy and insecurity that they occasioned, and the critical situation which developed in December over the dismissal of the Sultan's 'advisers,' did not pass without notice or comment in the British press. R. B. Cunningham-Graham, in a letter to the *Saturday Review* (November 19, 1904), expressed the sentiment of certain English circles that were opposed, in principle, to imperialism:

> Strange, in Morocco and in Turkey and in all countries of the same kidney, that the touring stranger is the loudest in the cry for change, and for immediate moral sanitation, after the school of Wall Street and Mark Lane. For him all is abomination, and he is certain that the Moors or Turks are willing, one and all, to become British subjects, elect their County Councillors, wear shoddy clothes, and rub their stomachs when they see the Union Jack. Those who know more about the places . . . opine that strive as best we may by purifying justice, making both life and property secure, teaching our faith and our morality, and putting down good drains, we do not add a tittle to the Oriental's joy of life.

French action was severely criticized by the Conservative *Morning Post*: "What the French Government has to realize is that the Moorish people do not want the help which France is so anxious to offer, and that the Sultan . . . does not want it either, at the price he would have to pay for it."[59] The Liberal *Manchester Guardian* (December 24) stated editorially: "Morocco is not under many obligations to its degenerate Sultan, but it would be under still fewer if he were incapable of indignation at a plan which is designed to make his country another Algeria without the trouble of another

[58] *Ibid.*, telegram, Philip to D. S., Jan. 5, 1905; London *Times*, Jan. 2; *Affaires du Maroc, 1901–5*, pp. 183–91.

[59] *Morning Post*, Dec. 21. On Dec. 27, the Madrid correspondent telegraphed that "The Spanish Premier states that Spain will duly carry out the secret portion of the Franco-Spanish Agreement." In a long editorial the *Post* inquired what such a statement meant.

Algerian war." Arguments of the anti-imperialists and the dissatisfaction of British commercial interests trading with Morocco were summed up in Moussa Aflalo's *The Truth about Morocco; an indictment of the policy of the British Foreign Office*. . . . It is significant that the British ambassador at Paris, writing at this time, regretted that "the coming difficulties of France in Morocco seem to receive insufficient sympathy in the London Press."[60] The situation was apparently explained to the journalists for no such frank criticism appeared thereafter in the English newspapers.

Hearty support of French aims and ambitions was given only by the *Spectator* and *Daily Telegraph*. The latter, sounding an official note, assured France that "Should it be necessary to substitute for the policy of 'pacific penetration' a policy of active intervention, our neighbors may rest assured that Great Britain will 'keep the ring,' and forbid any outside interference."[61]

"What will Germany, who has always emphasized her commercial interests in Morocco, say to the Declaration and the Franco-Spanish Agreement?" asked the Bavarian minister at Paris, referring to the recent Moroccan accords. "Politicians here have been asking themselves this question for months," he continued, "but Germany has remained persistently silent and has officially ignored the agreement between France and England as well as the long negotiations between France and Spain."[62] The outward reserve with which Berlin regarded the developments in French Moroccan policy was not to be interpreted as indifference.

On March 23, 1904, Delcassé casually informed Radolin, the German ambassador, that France and England were discussing a series of colonial questions, which had long caused friction between the two Powers. He admitted that one of these was Morocco, and explained that France hoped

[60] Monson to Lansdowne, Dec. 23; *B. D.*, IV, 68.
[61] *Daily Telegraph*, Dec. 29; also *Spectator*, Dec. 24.
[62] Bav. D., No. 214, XIII, Oct. 13, 1904.

to restore order there in the interests of all nations.[63] A week later Bülow sought the Kaiser's permission to send a war vessel to Morocco to enforce claims arising from the arbitrary imprisonment of a native *protégé*.[64] The Kaiser refused Bülow's request on the grounds that Anglo-French negotiations were well advanced and such a step would arouse their suspicions. Moreover, he had just assured the King of Spain, at Vigo, of Germany's disinterestedness in Morocco, except in so far as they had commercial and economic interests. The Kaiser was foolish enough to believe that if Spain, England, and France were informed of Germany's difficulties with the Sultan, they would coöperate in bringing pressure on him to meet German demands.[65]

Foreign office officials and local representatives in Morocco agreed that some action should be taken to maintain Germany's prestige as a Great Power and to secure her economic interests in Morocco. Direct action in the form of a naval demonstration to secure a settlement of German claims against the Sultan was blocked by the Kaiser's attitude. If Germany approached France directly it would constitute recognition of her privileged position in Morocco without making certain a favorable result in the question of German economic security. English policy, too, was a factor in that the extent of her diplomatic support to France under the terms of their agreement was problematical. The negotiations between France and Spain were not proceeding without friction, and until they were concluded and both the English and Spanish accords ratified by the Chamber there was always the possibility of developments that might be turned to Germany's advantage. Hence from April, 1904, to the end of the year, although the Moroccan question was much discussed in the Wilhelmstrasse, no policy requiring definite action was adopted.[66]

[63] Radolin to Bülow, March 23, 1904; *G. P.*, XX, 5–7.

[64] Bülow to the Kaiser, March 30; *ibid.*, XX, 197–99.

[65] Tschirschky to Bülow, April 3; *ibid.*, XX, 199–201.

[66] See G. P., XX, 202 30; *B. D.*, III, 53 ff.; Fay, *Origins*, I, 179 ff.; Anderson, pp. 147–158; R. J. Sontag, "German Foreign Policy, 1904–1906," *A. H. R.*, Jan., 1928, pp. 283 ff.

Officials in Morocco were not alone in urging the government to take action to secure their interests. Throughout the summer, German commercial associations demanded protection against the threat of French monopolization. As long as Morocco remained independent, the most favored nation treatment was guaranteed to Germany by the commercial treaty of June 1, 1890. This did not cover concessions and industrial enterprises. But Article IV of the Anglo-French convention reserved the right to see that concessions for public works "are only granted on such conditions as will maintain intact the authority of the State over these great undertakings of public interest." If the French gained political control in Morocco, would they not feel it dangerous to grant concessions to any but French firms? This was a point that raised apprehensions in Germany.[67] It is not strange that Berlin was bombarded with petitions and protests. Such petitions were received from the royal government of Saxony acting for the Leipzig chamber of commerce, from the senate of Bremen acting for the city chamber of commerce, from the director of the Oldenburg-Portuguese Steamship company, and from the firm of Haessner and Joachimsohn of Tangier.[68] A general memorandum from those commercially interested outlined the satisfactory development of German commerce. This trade, it concluded, was condemned to destruction if Morocco came under French protection.[69]

Others, too, entertained fears for their commercial future in Morocco. On December 24, 1904, the American consul general proposed that future American trade be secured by a commercial treaty with the Sultan.[70] He made a similar recommendation on August 8, 1905, concluding that

If nothing occurred . . . to change the policy of the French Government, Morocco would in the course of some years come so

[67] Mühlberg to Metternich, Aug. 7, 1904; Metternich to Bülow, Aug. 15. *Ibid.*, XX, 217–19, 219–22.

[68] Mem. by Kries, Oct. 22; *ibid.*, XX, 231–32.

[69] "Denkschrift betreffend den Schutz des deutsch-marokkanischen Handels durch das Reich," summarized by Camille Fidel, *Bulletin*, supp. Sept., 1905

[70] D. S. Consular Letters, vol. 27, No. 630, Philip to D. S., Dec. 24, 1904.

entirely under the political and financial tutelage of France as to be unable to uphold treaty obligations without assistance and that in respect to commerce the country would of necessity in the future assume like conditions as exist in Algeria and Tunisia.[71]

Similar fears of the deadly French colonial tariff were expressed in the editorials of the *Manchester Guardian*, the memorial of the Manchester chamber of commerce forwarded to the foreign office, and an open letter by Samuel Lamb, a Manchester merchant interested in North African trade.[72] The latter stated the case in part:

> The extension of French authority in the countries named [Algeria, Madagascar, and Tunis] has meant the extinction of the interests of other European Powers, a clear loss to European trade, and the annihilation of our commerce, sometimes straightforwardly and at others by evasion. . . . Her [France's] freedom to impose hostile tariffs after twenty-nine years in Morocco will effect the same result as has already been achieved elsewhere.

Berlin's policy of watchful waiting was by no means unwise. England secured the benefit of her accord with France by negotiating with the Powers interested in Egypt. France had not followed the same course; consequently, there existed grave danger of international complications.[73] Moreover, the situation was confused by native opposition and internal disorder. In October, Von Kühlmann, young chargé at Tangier, shrewdly remarked: "The Egyptian question is dead, the Moroccan question very much alive."[74] He advised that the attitude "*muette et enigmatique*" be maintained, for every day it became more apparent that the Moroccan question could not be settled without Germany. He recommended that "paper ships" be sent out through the press to remind Delcassé that he had not discussed Morocco with Berlin.[75] In November, he warned Taillandier that Germany expected

[71] *Ibid.*, No. 4, Philip to Adee, Aug. 8, 1905.

[72] *B. D.*, III, 112; *Manchester Guardian*, June 7, 1905.

[73] This was recognized in France. See Auguste Terrier, "Les difficultés de notre action au Maroc," *Quest. dipl. et col.*, Sept. 16, 1904, pp. 337 ff.

[74] Mem. by Kühlmann, Oct. 1, 1904; *G. P.*, XX, 33.

[75] Kühlmann to Bülow, Nov. 9; *ibid.*, XX, 232–34.

France to come to an agreement with her. The French minister probably regarded this as the personal opinion of an ambitious young official, and did not communicate the warning to Delcassè.[76]

Up to this point the main concern of German statesmen had been to bring pressure on the Sultan to effect a settlement of unsatisfied claims against Morocco. At the same time, gestures were made calculated to induce France to broach the subject of economic guarantees and compensation. German policy was given a new orientation early in January, 1905. When the inspired Paris press asserted that France had the unanimous backing of the other Powers for the restoration of order in Morocco, Bülow telegraphed Kühlmann, on January 2, to inform the Sultan that Germany was not engaged with regard to the reform and reorganization of his empire.[77]

Taillandier, at the head of his special mission, arrived in Fez on January 25 and was received by the Sultan four days later. The Sultan, however, had undertaken reform on his own account; he had summoned two chief men from every town and populous district to consider the action to be taken on French reform proposals. In calling such a representative assembly, the first in the history of Morocco, the Sultan instituted a far-reaching reform. This was unwelcome to the French, for it was generally agreed that the native representatives would never tamely accept French tutelage.[78] While the tribesmen were slowly gathering in Fez, Taillandier was obliged to stand idly by as the opposition forces daily gained strength. Kühlmann was instructed to see that the German point of view was made known to the Assembly

[76] *B. D.*, III, 67; Wolff, *Le Prélude*, p. 171. Kühlmann also informed Arthur Nicolson that Germany did not recognize the Anglo-French agreement. When Nicolson reported this statement to his French colleague, the latter replied: "Nous sommes parfaitement tranquilles du côté de Berlin." Harold Nicolson, *Lord Carnock*, pp. 159–60.

[77] Bülow to Kühlmann, Jan. 2, 1905; *G. P.*, XX, 242–43. The German position was further clarified by Bülow to Kühlmann, Jan. 16, 30; *ibid.*, XX, 245, 247.

[78] *Ibid.*, XX, 255 note; Kühlmann, to Bülow, Jan. 29; *ibid.*, XX, 248–49; London *Times*, Jan. 30; D. S. Consular Letters, vol. 27, No. 646, Philip to D. S., Feb. 13.

of Notables.[79] The Sultan was encouraged to undertake, with the assistance of his Assembly, the reorganization and restoration of order in his country.[80] When the French press began to berate him for the delay occasioned by the calling of the Notables, Berlin encouraged him to stand by his decision.[81]

At the same time Von Kühlmann bluntly informed the French chargé d'affaires at Tangier that Germany had never recognized recent international agreements regarding Morocco and did not consider herself bound by them.[82] In the semi-official French press and in the *Yellow Book*, published in the autumn of 1905, this communication is emphasized as a complete reversal of German policy, which by previous silence had accepted the new order inaugurated by the Anglo-French and Franco-Spanish accords. However, Arthur Nicolson, British minister at Tangier in 1904, when informed of Kühlmann's statement to the French chargé, told Jules Cambon that he regarded Germany's action as "a perfectly legitimate one, in light of a reminder that in respect of Morocco German hands were perfectly free."[83]

Taillandier, when he addressed the Moroccan Notables on the necessity of accepting French assistance in reforming the country, spoke as if he were acting as the mandatory of Europe. This was later denied by Taillandier,[84] but the evidence tends to contradict his statement. *Figaro's* correspondent with the Taillandier mission, quoted him as saying in his speech before the Notables: "France has concluded agreements with the various interested European Powers and has, under sacrifices from her side, become the mandatory of these Powers."[85] *Le Maroc Français* quoted him in an inter-

[79] Bülow to Kühlmann (drafted by Holstein) Jan. 31; *ibid.*, XX, 248.

[80] Bülow to Kühlmann, Feb. 11; *ibid.*, XX, 251–53.

[81] Bülow to Kühlmann (drafted by Holstein), Feb. 15, 16; *ibid.*, XX, 254–55.

[82] De Chérisy to Delcassé, Feb. 11; *Affaires du Maroc, 1901–5*, p. 196; *G. P.*, XX, 230–31 note.

[83] Nicolson to Lansdowne, Feb. 12; *B. D.*, III, 59.

[84] Taillandier to Delcassé, April 9; *Affaires du Maroc*, p. 207.

[85] *Figaro*, April 5.

view with the Sultan's ministers: "I speak here not alone in the name of France, but in the name of civilization and the nations of Europe."[86] Whether he used the words "European mandate" may be a matter of doubt, but that this was the general impression left with the Sultan, his ministers, and the Notables, cannot be denied.[87]

The reform program presented by Taillandier at Fez aimed at the extension and consolidation of France's financial and military position in Morocco by the establishment of a state bank, appointment of French officers to existing Moorish garrisons, and creation of a new police force with a nucleus of Algerian natives and French officers.[88] Behind these simple and reasonable demands, however, were the ultimate ambitions of private interests with regard to France's future in the Sultan's empire. These were frankly stated by *Journal des Débats:*

It would be puerile on our part to say or have it said that we wish to go to Morocco only in the interest of all [the nations], that is to say in order to bring about order there so that the subjects of all the Powers may tranquilly go about their business. If we have abandoned our situation in Egypt, and if we expose ourselves, knowing that we do, to all the risks that can accompany our action in Morocco, it is because we have pretentions to acquire in this country a 'privileged situation,' which might be for us a compensation for our former position in Egypt. In the eyes of colonialists as well as of all Frenchmen who do not wish to work only for the good of humanity, Morocco ought to become somewhat of a counterpart of Tunis. One must admit that England understood it so. That is why Article IV of the Declaration of April 8, while allowing the régime of commercial liberty and the 'open door' to exist for thirty years in Morocco as in Egypt, anticipated that it could be brought to an end after this lapse of time.[89]

As French action at Fez proceeded, the German government assumed a stiffer attitude. On March 10, Von Kühl-

[86] *Le Maroc Français,* April 20.

[87] Vassel to Tattenbach, April 21; *G. P.,* XX, 339 f., and 255 note.

[88] *Affaires du Maroc,* pp. 140, 160–62, 177–83, 200.

[89] *Débats,* March 25.

mann sent a note to the Sultan based on a draft approved by the Wilhelmstrasse. It expressed a hope that rumors of a pending change in the status of Morocco were unfounded. Such a change, the note stated, would meet with German disapprobation.[90]

German officials next planned the Kaiser's visit to Tangier. This was a serious move and one not to be taken without consideration of international repercussions. England was the chief factor in the situation; much depended on her interpretation of the engagement to support the French Moroccan program. A general opinion among German officials, despite Metternich's warning, was that after England had obtained what she wanted in Egypt she would be lukewarm in according diplomatic support to France.[91] This opinion was founded on the dissatisfaction with French conduct expressed by a section of the English press; on hostility of the English colony in Tangier to French pretensions; and on the reports of Mr. Harris, Tangier correspondent of the London *Times*.

Harris returned in March from a vacation in England and imparted to Kühlmann the contents of a letter from Valentine Chirol. According to Chirol, France had made a great mistake by not negotiating with Germany, whose interests were of such importance. Commercial and economic guarantees and some slight territorial compensation would not, in Chirol's opinion, have been too great a price for German assent to the special position that France coveted in Morocco. It was not England's duty to pull French chestnuts out of the fire, hence her diplomatic support would be limited to local action, Her relations with other Powers, declared Chirol, could not be disturbed to repair Delcassé's blunders.[92]

The Kaiser's landing at Tangier, during his annual Mediterranean visit to shrive the Italians of their sins against the Triple Alliance, was a gesture designed to give emphasis to the Moroccan policy pursued by Bülow and Holstein. Edi-

[90] Bülow to Kühlmann, March 10; *G. P.*, XX, 260–61 and note.

[91] Mem. by Holstein, June 3, 1904; Bülow to Radolin, July 21, 1904; mem. by Kühlmann, Oct. 1, 1904. *Ibid.*, XX, 207–9, 211, 31–33.

[92] Kühlmann to Bülow, March 19; *ibid.*, XX, 261–62 and note.

tors of *Die Grosse Politik* note that the archives throw little light on the genesis of this action. Theodor Wolff says that the idea originated with Hornung, Tangier correspondent of *Kölnische Zeitung*.[93] The political value of the proposed action appealed to Holstein, who, according to Hammann, influenced Bülow to accept it.[94] The visit was announced simultaneously in the London *Times* and *Kölnische Zeitung* on March 19, and was confirmed by an official article in the *Norddeutsche* (March 20). The latter minimized political import of the step and stressed German territorial disinterestedness in Morocco.[95] When it appeared from press discussion that great political significance was attached to his proposed visit, the Kaiser wished to cancel it, but the article in *Norddeutsche* had cut off his retreat. Bülow appealed to the Kaiser's pride when he pointed out that if plans were altered the press would play it up as a diplomatic victory for Delcassé.[96] The rôle assigned to him was little to the Emperor's taste, and the heaviest pressure was necessary to hold him to the program.[97]

Theodor Wolff's assumption that the Kaiser landed at Tangier without instructions is erroneous.[98] In a long despatch, the chancellor prepared the Emperor for every eventuality which he thought might arise. He was advised as to his attitude toward the Sultan's representative, what to say in public and private, and what replies to make to the questions he might be asked. Under no circumstances was he to encourage the Moors to believe that Germany would give them military assistance in case of an open conflict with the French. Moreover, Bülow counseled his sovereign not to mention French action in Morocco—to do so would be a grave affront—and to say nothing to the French chargé

[93] Wolff, *Le Prélude*, pp. 173 f.

[94] Hammann, *World Policy*, p. 149.

[95] On the general subject of the Tangier visit see Fay, I, 183–87; Wolff, pp. 174–81; Anderson, ch. XI; Brandenburg, *From Bismarck to the World War*, pp. 220 ff.

[96] Bülow to the Kaiser, March 20; *G. P.*, XX, 264–65.

[97] *Ibid.*, XX, 262–87, *passim*.

[98] Wolff, p. 181.

d'affaires beyond a cool greeting.[99] When the Kaiser received these extensive directions, he turned to a member of his staff and petulantly remarked: "The foreign office treats me as if I were a secretary of legation! I know best what I have to say."[100]

Elaborate preparations for the Emperor's reception in Tangier were made by the European and native population. The Spanish, English, and Germans were highly enthusiastic as they sensed a check to French policy.[101] Theodor Schiemann, a guest on the Mediterranean cruise, noted that some of the Spaniards displayed placards inscribed: "Long live Kaiser Wilhelm! Long live the independence of Morocco! Long live Spain!"[102] The celebration almost took place without the principal; the Kaiser, even at the last moment, wished to avoid landing—but finally went ashore in a small boat through a heavy sea. Details of the reception had been arranged by Bülow, even to the provision of a "guaranteed gentle horse, which should be quietly exercised for some hours early in the morning by a trustworthy groom."[103]

Only in one respect did the Kaiser exceed his instructions furnished by the Wilhelmstrasse. When the French chargé d'affaires, Count Chérisy, was presented at the embassy reception, he gave to the Emperor Delcassé's greetings. His visit, the Kaiser explained, signified that Germany was determined to safeguard her commercial rights. Count Chérisy answered that this was in accord with French policy. The Emperor declared that he would come to a direct agreement

[99] Bülow to the Kaiser, March 26; *G. P.*, XX, 273–77.

[100] Paul von Schwabach, *Aus meinen Akten*, pp. 335–36.

[101] D. S. Morocco, vol. I, reports of the U. S. minister; Gummere to Hay, April 1; W. B. Harris, "The Morocco Crisis," *Blackwood's Magazine*, Aug., 1905, pp. 299–300; Edward Westermarck, *Memories of my Life* (London, 1929), pp. 213–14; report of the Belgian minister, March 24, *Belg, D.*, III, 41. The Kaiser told Sir Charles Hardinge that "he received the warmest possible reception from the British and Spanish Colonies . . . who welcomed him as their deliverer from French oppression." *B. D.*, III, 369.

[102] Theodor Schiemann, "Eine Fahrt ins Mittelmeer mit Kaiser Wilhelm," *Deutsche Monatsschrift*, June, 1905, p. 309.

[103] Bülow to Kühlmann, March 30; *G. P.*, XX, 284–85.

with the Sultan, the ruler of an independent state, in order to secure German claims to equal treatment; he hoped that this would be properly respected by France. "Count Chérisy paled, wished to reply, was prevented by a curt dismissal and retired with lowered head."[104]

Although the Kaiser remained ashore less than three hours,[105] the American minister reported that "there is no doubt that the Moors, high and low, are enormously pleased with the visit. They regard it as a check to the plans of the French Government and openly declare that the Emperor is sent by God to deliver them from the French."[106]

Official secrecy surrounded the Tangier visit. Fiction of a sightseeing tour was maintained until the Kaiser's remarks were published in the press. On March 24, Bülow addressed a memorandum to Richthofen, Mühlberg, and Holstein instructing them to give no satisfaction to diplomats asking about Tangier and Morocco. "Our attitude in this matter," he wrote, "is similar to that of the Sphinx, which, though surrounded by curious tourists, betrays nothing."[107] To give due emphasis to Germany's action, Von Flotow, chargé d'affaires in Paris, was instructed not to attend Delcassé's weekly diplomatic reception.[108]

A German press campaign designed to prepare the public at home and abroad for German action accompanied the Kaiser's "Lohengrin Voyage." The formula followed in numerous articles, many of them bearing signs of official in-

[104] Schoen to F. O., March 31; *ibid.*, XX, 286–87. Chérisy's account varies in detail. *B. D.*, III, 64. Holstein told Paul von Schwabach that the Kaiser's utterances were not in complete accord with his and Bülow's views and that when he read the report of the Emperor's speech it made him so vexed and ill that he had to go to bed. *Aus meinen Akten*, pp. 335–36. A comparison of the various versions of the Kaiser's remarks with Bülow's instructions reveals no great departure except in the case of his conversation with Chérisy.

[105] For the varying reports of the Kaiser's words to the Sultan's representative and the German colony, see Fay, I, 184; *Affaires du Maroc*, p. 205; *B. D.*, III, 62–64; *G. P.*, XX, 285–87; *Norddeutsche*, April 4; Mévil, *De la paix de Francfort*, pp. 210 ff.; Anderson, p. 193 ff.; Newton, *Lord Lansdowne*, p. 333.

[106] D. S. Morocco, I, No. 7; Gummere to Hay, April 1; Cf. *B. D.*, III, 60–61.

[107] Mem. by Bülow, March 24; *G. P.*, XX, 271.

[108] Bülow to Flotow (drafted by Holstein) March 28; *ibid.*, XX, 278.

spiration, ran somewhat as follows: Germany had never been notified, officially, of the Anglo-French convention, hence the French minister at Fez had no right to declare that he spoke for collective Europe; the French sought to monopolize Morocco by forcing their reform program on the Sultan, while Germany stood for the 'open door' and equality of opportunity for all nations.[109] The semi-official Paris *Temps* took exception to the statement that Germany had never been notified, officially, of the Moroccan accord. On March 21, it published an account of a casual conversation that had taken place more than a year before between Radolin and Delcassé on the general subject of the Anglo-French agreement. To this, *Temps* incorrectly attributed the character of a formal communication.[110] The *Norddeutsche* refuted the *Temps* article on March 22 and 26. Thus, an acrimonious debate was engendered between the two semi-official organs.[111] According to the Bavarian minister at Paris, the articles in *Temps* were directly inspired by the Quai d'Orsay.[112]

The German press campaign emphasized Article XVII of the Madrid Convention of 1880 as the basis of the 'open door' policy in Morocco, and followed, on the whole, directions given by Bülow to Hammann, chief of the press division. These were: to stress Germany's interests in Morocco; to direct all criticism, with due regard to French national feeling, at Delcassé's anti-German policy; and to avoid attacking the Entente Cordiale.[113]

[109] *Kölnische Zeitung*, Nos. 296, 311, 338, 339, March 21, 25, April 1 (two articles); *Berliner Neueste Nachrichten*, March 21, 31; *Kreuzzeitung*, March 22, 29; *Berliner Post*, March 28; *Norddeutsche*, March 23, 26; *Hamburger Nachrichten*, Nos. 222, 239, March 28, April 4; *Lokal Anzeiger*, April 2.

[110] Radolin to Bülow, March 23, 1904; Radolin to F. O., March 21, 1905; Radolin to Holstein, March 25, 1905; Radolin to Bülow, April 14, 1905. *G. P.*, XX, 5–7, 265, 266, 330.

[111] *Temps*, March 26, 27, and article by Tardieu, March 29, refuting the official German thesis. Earl Percy, parliamentary under-secretary, admitted in the House of Commons (April 5) that the declaration of April 8 had never been communicated officially to the German government. *B. D.*, III, 64.

[112] Bav. D., No. 76, VII, March 29, 1905.

[113] Instructions, *G. P.*, XX, 313; *Norddeutsche*, April 2, 5, articles approved by

German statesmen, however, completely miscalculated the effect of their Moroccan action on English public opinion. Bülow thought that by stressing the 'open door' and refraining from an attack on the Entente Cordiale, a recrudescence of the press war with England could be avoided.[114] Indeed, so anxious were officials in the Wilhelmstrasse to prevent such a war of opinions that a quasi-censorship of reports from German correspondents in London was discussed and approved, although apparently not enforced.[115] English journals almost unanimously disregarded the legitimate grounds on which Germany based her protest at French action, and declared that this was only a pretext designed to cover an attack on the new Anglo-French friendship. The *Daily Telegraph* (April 6) bellicosely declared that if the Kaiser's visit were meant as a challenge, "it is tolerably certain that France and England—perhaps with the assistance of other Mediterranean Powers—will not refuse. . . to take it up." The *Pall Mall Gazette* and the *Standard* loudly proclaimed the solidarity of the Entente, while *Daily Mail*, in the best tradition of yellow journalism, hurled insults at Germany and the Kaiser.[116] *Daily News* (April 6) thought that the German complaint should have been made when the agreement was announced. The *Westminster Gazette* (April 4) censured Germany for making a show of protecting the Sultan and thus perpetuating anarchy in Morocco.

Dissent from prevailing English press opinion appeared only in the ultra-Conservative *Morning Post* and the Liberal *Manchester Guardian*. The former declared that no Englishman would ever fight to put France in possession of Mo-

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the chancellor (*G. P.*, XX, 309–10); *Kölnische Zeitung*, No. 347, April 4, article approved by the F. O., and reproduced in *Norddeutsche* on April 5 (*G. P.*, XX, 309–10); *Kölnische Zeitung*, Nos. 365, 368, April 8, 9, in reply to *Temps; National-Zeitung* and *Berliner Post*, April 1, 2, echoing *Norddeutsche; Kreuzzeitung*, April 5, 6; *Lokal Anzeiger*, April 2, 9.

[114] Bülow to Metternich, March 23; *G. P.*, XX, 270.

[115] Mühlberg to Metternich, April 4; *ibid.*, XX, 603.

[116] *Pall Mall Gazette*, April 1; *Standard*, March 28; *Daily Mail*, March 31, April 1, and April 5, article entitled: "The Antics of an Emperor."

rocco (March 31, April 1). *Manchester Guardian* remarked that

> our blood refuses to boil at a rather wordy, vague menace to France's right to pick Morocco's bones. Of course there may be such things as right and wrong in the mutual relations of the expectant crows around a sick sheep. But moral enthusiasm seems a little out of place in their discussion (April 3).

With few exceptions, however, the English journals definitely embraced the French cause. English editors, in their campaign against German policy and in their support of M. Delcassé and his program, endeavored to be more French than the French themselves.[117] Bernstorff and Metternich could do nothing to stem the unfavorable current of newspaper opinion.[118] French statesmen, unaccustomed to such Francophil enthusiasm in London, suspected that the English wished to embroil them with their neighbors across the Vosges. Far from benefitting M. Delcassé, the hot campaign launched by the English in his support, was one of the factors contributing to his downfall.

[117] Metternich to Bülow, March 28, April 6; *G. P.*, XX, 601–2, 604.

[118] "With regard to influencing the press, unfortunately little can be accomplished in such disturbed times. After one has spoken to the journalists, one's ideas can be found in the next leading articles. But such influence lasts only twenty-four hours. Then the stream continues as of old and the single favorable editorial disappears without trace in the torrent. The journalists have just as little desire as the ministers to expose themselves to the attack of the Germanophobe ring. . . . Another question is whether it would be advisable to declare war directly against the *Times* as the protagonist of the anti-German circle. Since, however, in the course of the last few months it clearly appears that the *Times* knowingly spread false reports with the object of sowing dragon's teeth between England and Germany, on our side a complete boycott of this paper might be successfully carried out. With the help of the German telegraph agencies and foreign correspondents it might be possible to silence once and for all the *Times* and its reports in Germany. That would be more inconvenient for the 'Weltblatt' than all the *démentis*, which are only believed by those who have previously mistrusted the suspicions of the *Times*." Kaiser's notation: "very good, it shall be done." Bernstorff to Bülow, April 22, 1905; *G. P.*, XX 609–15.

Chapter V

DELCASSÉ'S RESIGNATION AND THE FRENCH PRESS

THE resignation, on June 6, 1905, of M. Delcassé, minister for foreign affairs, was due to the loss of political and public support, disloyalty of his colleagues, and pressure from Germany. Most writers have characterized it as a grave humiliation for France, forced upon her by direct German intervention.[1] On the other hand, Gaston Calmette, editor of *Figaro*, writing in 1911, called this interpretation "a legend" based upon an "immense error." "He [Delcassé] was only the victim of his errors and his defaults; but the pride that had obscured his judgment led him to tell after his fall that he had been sacrificed to Germany, whereas he was only sacrificed to the peace of France."[2] These opposite points of view are derived mainly from a consideration of foreign affairs that leaves out of account the internal political situation, the division within the cabinet, and the influence of the press.

Since 1903, Emile Combes had directed a ministry supported by the Left Bloc—a coalition of Socialists, Radicals, and Radical Republicans. The summer and winter of 1904 witnessed a concerted attack on the ministry by the groups of the Right—Nationalists, Clericals, and Monarchists. The rigor with which Combes enforced the Associations Law, the disclosures with regard to the government's espionage system in the army, the manifest neglect of military and naval de-

[1] *Temps*, Jan. 5, 1908; Joseph Galtier in *Temps*, March 15, 1922; A. Mévil, *De la paix de Francfort*, p. 286; Tardieu, *France and the Alliances*, p. 185; G. H. Stuart, *French Foreign Policy*, pp. 190–92; E. Bourgeois and G. Pagès, *Les origines et les responsabilités de la grande guerre*, p. 310; B. E. Schmitt, *England and Germany*, p. 227.

[2] *Figaro*, March 3, 1911.

fenses, gave Combes' opponents grounds for a vigorous attack.[3] General André, minister of war, was forced to resign in November, 1904, and moderate Republicans of the stamp of Ribot and Méline, who feared the radicalism of the Bloc, gradually withdrew their support. Combes resigned on January 16, 1905, and Maurice Rouvier was asked to form a new ministry. Representing high financial circles, M. Rouvier's government was reorganized on party lines further to the Right. The ministry, however, was not conservative enough to draw the support of the Clerical-Nationalist groups, nor radical enough to hold the support of parties which had composed the Bloc. Thus, Rouvier and his colleagues were in an unenviable position—subjected to a heavy cross-fire from extreme Right and Left.

After German intervention in the Moroccan question, this cross-fire was concentrated on M. Delcassé. The foreign minister was in a poor position to withstand the attacks for he was completely out of touch with political currents in the Chamber. Delcassé had held aloof from his colleagues and it was well known that friction had developed between him and Combes. This had arisen due to his disregard of the principle of collective ministerial responsibility and his assertion of entire independence in the conduct of foreign affairs.[4] He assumed the same attitude toward Rouvier, with dire results so far as his personal position was concerned.

Opposition forces were supplied with a powerful weapon when it became evident, after March 31, that Delcassé's policy of close understanding with England and 'pacific penetration' of Morocco was not such a success as the inspired press made it out to be. The Nationalists, from the beginning, opposed the Entente Cordiale; they could not forget

[3] In this bitter political struggle the Monarchist and Conservative press—*Figaro, Gaulois, Echo de Paris, Patrie, Presse, Eclair, Libre Parole* and *Autorité*—was pitted against the press of the Bloc—*Humanité, Petite République, Lanterne, Aurore,* and *Siècle.* The Paris correspondent of the London *Times* wrote on Dec. 3, 1904: "Neither side has shown itself particularly scrupulous as to the method of combat employed, and the struggle has reached a stage of such violence that any and every weapon is eagerly grasped to damage the enemy's cause."

[4] Monson to Lansdowne, Nov. 15, 1904; *B. D.*, III, 14.

Fashoda. Delcassé's conduct of relations with the Vatican had enraged the Clericals. Radical and Socialist groups, which had at first supported the policy of 'pacific penetration,' deserted the foreign minister when his program threatened to produce grave complications. Moreover, they did not share his zeal for the Russian alliance.

Patrie (April 6) stated the position of the Nationalists: "For thirty-four years we have refrained from a war against Germany for the recovery of Alsace-Lorraine. Does M. Delcassé wish to go to war for Morocco?" *Humanité* (April 6), the Socialist organ, censured his policy of *ententes* because "he always has the air, when he concludes an alliance or *entente*, of concluding it against someone." Jaurès regarded German action in Morocco as the natural result of the minister's attempt to interpret the Entente Cordiale as the achievement of German isolation.[5] Clemenceau censured Delcassé for abandoning French interests in Egypt and Newfoundland in return for "a free field in Morocco for hazardous adventures."[6] De Lanessan, political director of *Siècle*, accused the foreign minister of bad faith and discourtesy toward Germany. "Germany," he wrote, "defends her interests in Morocco as we defend our own; it is her right."[7] *Lanterne*, M. Combes' organ, criticized Delcassé's "Moroccan adventure."[8] Political journals of the Right and Left attacked him for failing to foresee and guard against the probable attitude of Germany. On the other hand, *Temps*, *Matin*, *Figaro*, *Echo de Paris*, *Débats*, and *République Française*,—Republican organs of various shades—supported the minister and his foreign policy.

While the Kaiser was parading in Tangier, Delcassé answered a Senate interpellation on the government's Moroccan policy and its relation to the German press campaign. The foreign minister declared that the French program menaced the interests of no Power; it aimed merely to restore

[5] *Humanité*, March 24, 1905.
[6] *Aurore*, March 25.
[7] *Siècle*, March 27, April 1, 3.
[8] *Lanterne*, March 28.

order in the Sultan's empire and to extend his authority in the interests of all nations having relations with Morocco. He did not mention Germany, and in commenting on his statement, *Humanité* (April 1) thought that perhaps he was unaware of the existence of that country. Clemenceau, in a sarcastic article, characterized the statement as "Une déclaration qui ne déclare rien."[9]

Delcassé's statement in the Senate, announcement of reciprocal Anglo-French fleet visits, and the news that Edward VII would meet Loubet as he passed through Paris on his way to Marseilles, provoked new press attacks. Millevoye, Nationalist leader in the Chamber, condemned the new manifestations of the Entente Cordiale as a policy of provocation. Referring to Anglo-German rivalry and the danger of taking sides, he declared: "In the present case we expose ourselves, without a serious motive, for the benefit of England. . . ."[10] Léon Daudet pointed out that Delcassé's *entente* with England, like all such contracts, had its risks as well as its advantages.[11] Desmoulins, a prominent journalist politician, regretted that France had given up so much in return for England's permission to give amicable advice to the Sultan.[12]

Radical and Socialist journals concentrated on the mistakes made by the foreign minister in the Moroccan situation. De Lanessan pointed out that the enthusiastic welcome given the Kaiser at Tangier was visible proof that grave mistakes had been committed at Fez or at the Quai d'Orsay.[13] Jaurès deplored the anti-German direction given to the Entente,[14] while *Lanterne* continued to complain bitterly of Delcassé's "hazardous adventure."[15] Clemenceau displayed his talent for biting sarcasm:

[9] *Aurore*, April 1. Delcassé's statement in *Journal Officiel, Débats parlem., Sénat*, March 31, pp. 539 f.

[10] *Patrie*, April 5.

[11] *Gaulois*, April 1.

[12] *Ibid.*, April 3.

[13] *Siècle*, April 3.

[14] *Humanité*, April 6.

[15] *Lanterne*, April 2.

I have never attempted to penetrate, pacifically or otherwise, the house of my neighbor in order to teach him to regulate his life and conduct his enterprises according to my ideas, but it seems to me that if the idea had occurred to me I should not have commenced by announcing to the world from the housetops that I was going to perform a pacific penetration on a new model.[16]

French policy in Morocco, Delcassé asserted in the Chamber on April 7, aimed only at augmenting the prosperity of that country, the safeguarding of all foreign interests, and the extension of the Sultan's authority. In contrast to his previous public statements, he said nothing of the "privileged position" to which France aspired. France, he concluded, was ready to dissipate all misunderstanding of their policy if any should still subsist.[17] *Matin* immediately published a Berlin despatch saying that great gloom prevailed in the Wilhelmstrasse as a result of this declaration.[18] *Temps* endorsed the minister's statement, but categorically rejected the idea that France should take the initiative in opening conversations with Germany. It judged this to be the only thing necessary to add to the foreign minister's statement.[19] *Figaro*, which now began to desert Delcassé, published a leader entitled "Il faut causer."[20] Clemenceau estimated that public opinion was almost unanimous in demanding that Delcassé repair his mistakes.[21]

When Germany gave no indication of approaching France, but on the contrary announced through the *Norddeutsche*, on April 13, that Von Tattenbach would soon leave Tangier for the Sultan's court at Fez, Delcassé was forced to take the initiative. At a dinner in the German embassy, the foreign minister approached Prince Radolin and repeated the assurances that he had made in the Chamber. He added that it had never occurred to him to notify, officially, the German

[16] *Aurore*, April 3.
[17] *J. O. Débats parlem., Chambre*, April 7, p. 1251.
[18] *Matin*, April 9.
[19] *Temps*, April 9.
[20] *Figaro*, April 7.
[21] *Aurore*, April 8; also *Humanité*, April 11; *Lanterne*, April 12.

government of the Anglo-French accord, as it had been immediately published in the newspapers. He offered to show Radolin a telegraphic despatch from Taillandier denying that he had ever claimed, as alleged, to act under a European mandate. Radolin received his statements without reply. He played the Sphinx according to instructions.[22]

The French foreign minister was now placed in an exceedingly uncomfortable position. Germany refused to respond to his approach, and insisted that she could only deal directly with the Sultan. In the Paris press it was thought that delay in instituting conversations was due to Delcassé's pride, which kept him from making advances. The newspaper campaign against him was intensified. *Matin*, a hitherto strong supporter, was unkind enough to say that "With a little tact, all that has happened could have been avoided, and it would not be necessary to work at undoing things, an operation always disagreeable."[23] The full force of Clemenceau's cutting sarcasm and ridicule was turned upon the unfortunate foreign minister.

> It is not in his personal efforts that I put my faith [wrote the Tiger]. The man who guaranteed the maintenance of peace to M. Rouvier the very morning the Russo-Japanese War broke out; the man who thought Germany was a 'Mediterranean Power' when we acquired Tunis, but that she had no interests in Morocco in 1904; the man who lost an entire week refusing to negotiate with Berlin only to change his mind when he found his portfolio at stake—that man might make, perhaps, an excellent undersecretary or minister of agriculture. He is not a minister for foreign affairs.[24]

De Lanessan, a power in Radical politics and journalism, published a series of penetrating articles in *Siècle*, which reviewed the Moroccan question during Delcassé's seven-year tenure of office. His major conclusion was that it should have been evident that an understanding with Berlin was necessary before France took one step toward Fez. "Although the

[22] Bülow to Radolin, April 3; Radolin to F. O., April 14. *G. P.* XX, 297, 328–30.
[23] *Matin*, April 18.
[24] *Aurore*, April 17.

German government may have declared for some time that they had no 'political interests' in Morocco," wrote De Lanessan, "we cannot suppose that they would be indifferent to what is taking place there."[25]

A general debate on the government's foreign policy was precipitated in the Chamber on April 19. Delcassé's enemies scored heavily on his mistakes. While the Right and Left vociferously applauded the attacks of Jaurès, Pressensé, Archdeacon, and Vaillant, the Center maintained a significant silence. All agreed that Delcassé should have negotiated with Germany as well as with England and Spain. Lucien Hubert, reporter for the committee that had approved the plan for 'pacific penetration,' put the blame squarely on the foreign minister when he read from his report which plainly stated that negotiations with all interested Powers should precede action in Morocco. Paul Deschanel, former president of the Chamber and a moderate Republican, also joined in the attack.[26]

At one point during Jaurès' speech, Delcassé interrupted:

There is not a government in the world, M. Jaurès, that can say that the minister for foreign affairs has ever in the past seven years, refused to respond to invitations that have been addressed to him.

The Socialist leader replied:

In the case of Morocco, it is not a question of your response to invitations that have been made to you. Since you took the initiative in a new policy tending to modify the *status quo* in regard not only to French and British interests but also those of all the interested Powers, since you took the initiative in this policy, you should have taken the initiative in negotiations and explanations.[27]

[25] *Siècle*, April 5, 15, 16, 17, 18.

[26] Participants and their party affiliations: Nationalists, Archdeacon, Boni de Castellane, De Ferronayes, Tournade, and Delafosse (the latter defended the government's policy). Socialists and Radicals, Jaurès, Pressensé, Vaillant, and Hubert. Moderate Republican, Paul Deschanel. *J. O. Débats parlem., Chambre*, April 19, pp. 1539–1559.

[27] *Ibid.*, p. 1513.

Delcassé made a weak defense, and declared that the delicate situation prohibited him from saying more. So acute did the situation become that Rouvier, fearing the overthrow of his cabinet, mounted the tribune in defense of the government and the foreign minister To cries of "You should have taken the initiative," Rouvier replied: "That refers to the past. Moreover the minister for foreign affairs has taken this initiative; we await the reply."[28]

Two days later, the foreign minister announced his intention to resign because of ill health. The reason given by some journals was the disagreement with his colleagues on the question of overtures to Germany. However, at the insistence of President Loubet and others, he remained at the Quay d'Orsay.[29]

Press comment on the debate of April 19 and the announcement of Delcassé's intention to resign was not reassuring to the foreign minister except in a few instances. When it was made known that he would retain his portfolio, *Echo de Paris* (April 23) declared that by remaining firm in the face of pressure from abroad, Berlin would doubtlessly understand that it was time to assume a more conciliatory attitude toward France. *Débats* (April 21, 23) admitted that Delcassé had made certain errors, but nothing of such a serious nature that he himself could not repair. *Temps* (April 21) thought that he might have sent a copy of the agreement of April 8 to all the interested Powers and thus have put the blame for the present situation on Berlin. In conclusion it stated that

> French diplomacy, which on numerous occasions has been known to conduct itself with honor and profit to the country, should reflect on a policy that, according to Talleyrand, . . . has need of as much firmness after the event as of foresight before. It appears in the present case that it may be lacking in both.

[28] *Ibid.*, p. 1550.

[29] *Siècle, République Française, Matin,* April 22; *Débats,* April 23. Through the Governor-General of Algiers, King Edward VII wired Delcassé, urging him not to resign. Newton, *Lord Lansdowne,* p. 342.

The Monarchist press—*Gaulois*, *Patrie*, and *Soleil*—expressed satisfaction with the success scored by their speakers in the Chamber.[30] *République Française* (April 20) and *Siècle* (April 22) found Rouvier's declarations reasonable, but they reserved their opinions on the foreign minister. *Lanterne* (April 23) declared that the only solution of the question was Delcassé's resignation. *Humanité* (April 22) regretting, perhaps, the debacle Jaurès had almost precipitated in the Chamber, spoke of "the resignation that comes too late, since the mistakes have been committed, or too soon, since M. Delcassé has not had time to repair them." Clemenceau turned his attention to the British press, which he accused of excusing the minister's errors and thus aggravating Franco-German difficulties.

> I am no more duped by this maneuver than that of the Marseillaise of the Tsar—paid for by us at a good price [he wrote]. We have no need to ask the advice of anyone on our foreign policy. France desires peace with everyone. She has enough to do to defend her own interests without exposing herself to active hatreds in the interest of others. . . . The foreign minister of France needs the confidence of the Chamber of Deputies, and not that of the House of Commons. (*Aurore*, April 20, 21).

It is evident from the debate of April 19 that Delcassé did not have the confidence of the Chamber. A survey of the political press discloses that few papers did not recognize his serious mistakes in conducting the Moroccan enterprise. On April 20, Clemenceau wrote: "Thanks to the intervention of the president of the council, M. Delcassé is still officially the minister for foreign affairs. But if M. Rouvier wishes to stay in power, he should begin immediately to look for a successor to M. Delcassé." (*Aurore*, April 20).

While the foreign minister was severely criticized in the Chamber and in the French press, the London journals loudly sang his praises. The rough treatment that he and his policy received in the debate on April 19 provoked unfavorable comment from the English editors, some of whom lectured the

[30] *Gaulois*, April 20, 23; *Patrie*, April 21, 23; *Soleil*, April 21.

deputies on their lack of patriotism. Delcassé's resignation, declared the English press, would have constituted a diplomatic victory for Germany.[31] This lesson in patriotism, as previously noted, awakened resentment and suspicion in Paris where England's attitude was attributed to hostility toward Germany rather than to enthusiasm for France. The danger in this course was pointed out by the *Manchester Guardian.*

> French Liberals see English newspapers using France as cover for attacking Germany; is it any wonder that they should have turned around on M. Delcassé and told him that this was his doing? . . . The Anglo-French Agreement . . . loses its whole moral prestige if it is used as an instrument for provoking Germany.[32]

Developments in the French political situation did not pass unobserved in Germany. The press refrained from personal attacks on the foreign minister. When news of Delcassé's intention to resign was received, it was not regarded by the press as a great victory for Germany, as some of the English journals alleged. In reply to French and English statements that German policy in the Moroccan question had been reversed after Russia's defeat at Mukden (March 2 to 9), it was pointed out that Taillandier had been advised of her attitude in November of the previous year. A further indication of Germany's position, it was stated, was the refusal to withdraw her consul from Fez during the December crisis. Moreover, the Comité du Maroc had been aware of Germany's position for some time.[33] Taking their cue from the Wilhelmstrasse, the journals maintained that if reforms were necessary they should be submitted to the signatories of the Madrid Convention of 1880, which had established an international principle for dealing with Morocco. Since France and England expressly bound themselves to uphold the Sultan's independence, it was suggested that they should welcome the further guarantee that would result from in-

[31] *Standard,* April 22; *Daily Telegraph,* April 22, 24; *Daily Chronicle,* April 22; *Daily News,* April 24; *Westminster Gazette,* April 22.

[32] *Manchester Guardian,* April 22. See also Hammann, *World Policy,* p. 155.

[33] *Kölnische Zeitung,* despatch from Tangier, No. 429, April 26.

ternational action. Toward England and English press polemics, the German papers maintained an attitude of complete reserve.[34]

Did Germany's Moroccan policy hide an ulterior motive? Did she seek to humiliate France by taking advantage of Russia's collapse after the battle of Mukden? Was her action an indirect blow at England and the newly created Entente Cordiale? What did she seek in Morocco—the protection of her legitimate interests, or territorial acquisition? The German documents clearly reveal that the foreign office was determined to act in the Moroccan question; this decision was reached long before the battle of Mukden, although the nature of the steps had not been determined.[35]

German statesmen did not admit their purpose to be the weakening of the Entente. For the direction of the press, Bülow wrote:

> We must not show resentment against the Anglo-French Entente as such, but against Delcassé's policy. We do not wish that, or in any case avow such a purpose. We only want to preserve our rights in Morocco.

Agan he recommended

> that nothing be said against the Anglo-French friendship as this would only make us out to be either jealous or afraid; and would strengthen them in their friendship. All criticism and all attacks should be directed, with due regard to French national feeling, against Delcassé's systematically anti-German and stupid policy.[36]

Outside Pan-German circles, no one seriously entertained the idea of territorial acquisitions. Bülow recognized that

[34] *Ibid.*, Nos. 415, 416, 425, 479, 500, April 21, 22, 25, May 8, 13; *Hamburger Nachrichten*, April 28, 29, May 2; *Lokal Anzeiger*, April 20, 28; *Norddeutsche*, April 21; *Kreuzzeitung*, April 12, 19, 26, May 10; *Berliner Post*, April 22, May 26.

[35] This is the point of view taken by G. P. Gooch, *Franco-German Relations, 1871–1914*, p. 43; G. Lowes Dickinson, *The International Anarchy, 1904–1914*, p. 125. R. J. Sontag has shown conclusively that German failure to take action in Morocco before March, 1905, was due to the conflicting policies of the Kaiser, Bülow, and Holstein. *A. H. R.*, Jan., 1928, pp. 278–301, *passim*.

[36] Mem. by Bülow, April 8; *G. P.*, XX, 313. Dickenson (*The International Anarchy*, p. 126) mistakenly attributes these notations to the Kaiser.

public opinion, which at the time was occupied with one colonial war in southwest Africa, would not favor a policy that might lead in the future to similar complications. Furthermore, the Kaiser had publicly disclaimed any but commercial interests in Morocco.[37] Disregard of her claim to be a World Power, danger to her interests in Morocco, desire for compensation, distrust of Anglo-French friendship, and fear of isolation—all these considerations doubtlessly influenced Germany in her Moroccan action.[38]

When Von Kühlmann was first instructed to encourage Moorish resistance to French proposals, it is evident that the Wilhelmstrasse had no well-thought-out plan of action. The idea of an international conference had not been accepted in Berlin when the Kaiser landed at Tangier. As early as March, one of the Sultan's ministers had suggested that representatives of the Powers at Tangier be consulted in regard to the new reforms.[39] This suggestion was not considered in Berlin until March 27.[40] Not until April 3 did Bülow wire Kühlmann that he regarded the holding of a conference as thoroughly practical and that Germany would render the Sultan diplomatic support in an appeal to the Powers.[41] But this raised a further question: On what grounds could they reasonably refuse to enter into direct negotiations if they were approached by Delcassé? In a memorandum, dated April 3, 1905, Holstein pointed out that the status of Morocco had been fixed by the Madrid Conference of 1880. The international principle thus established ought not to be violated by separate agreements. Hence, Germany should stand on her rights as a Power signatory to the convention and demand a new conference, rather than entertain French proposals for a separate understanding.[42]

[37] Bülow to Tattenbach, April 30; *ibid.*, XX, 352.

[38] Brandenburg, *From Bismarck to the World War*, pp. 229–31; Fay, I, 160, 168–69; Hammann, *World Policy*, pp. 149–52; Dickinson, pp. 124–27; Gooch, *History of Modern Europe*, pp. 350, 353.

[39] *G. P.*, XX, 293 note.

[40] Bülow to Kühlmann, March 27; *ibid.*, XX, 293.

[41] Bülow to Kühlmann, April 3; *ibid.*, XX, 295.

[42] Mem. by Holstein, April 3; *ibid.*, XX, 299.

Adopting Holstein's thesis, Bülow wired the Kaiser that the Madrid Conference was "the trump card in our hand."[43]

At the insistence of Bülow and Holstein, the entire prestige of the German Empire was engaged by the Kaiser's utterances at Tangier, without a definite plan in mind as to how the Moroccan question, once opened, should be settled. Not until three days later did the chancellor, on the arguments and precedents cited by Holstein, decide to appeal for an international conference on the basis of the Madrid Convention.

This decision called for a new orientation of the press. Up to this time, direct negotiations with Fez, without going through Paris, had been advocated through the newspapers. Now, according to Hammann, since the Sultan's government desired a congress, it must be made clear that Germany would go neither to Fez nor Paris, but to a conference. He recommended, since it could not be broached in the *Norddeutsche* because of its well-known official character, that papers further removed from the foreign office should remind the public of the Madrid Conference.[44]

Dissension between Hammann and Holstein over the direction of the press division complicated the situation in Berlin. Bülow was bombarded with memoranda. Holstein criticized Hammann's direction of the press bureau, while Hammann characterized Holstein's press notices, which he had refused to accept, as "Kriegsfanfare" and "papierne Kriegsdrohung."[45] The cross-currents noticeable in the Wilhelmstrasse were doubtlessly responsible for some of the vagaries and inconsistencies in German policy.

In the meantime, Von Tattenbach, who had accompanied the Kaiser from Lisbon to Tangier and was acting as minis-

[43] Bülow to the Kaiser, April 4; *ibid.*, XX, 301–2.

[44] Mem. by Hammann, April 3; *ibid.*, XX, 300–1.

[45] *Ibid.*, XX, 297–301. The editors of *Die Grosse Politik* question Hammann's statements (*Der Neue Kurs*, p. 104; *Zur Vorgeschichte des Weltkrieges*, p. 210; *Bilder*, p. 35) to the effect that Holstein proposed to use war-like threats against France. They cite Holstein's letter to the *Kölnische Zeitung*, in which he specifically states that the sensibilities of the French must be spared. Letter published in *Kölnische Zeitung*, April 1, 1922.

ter *ad interim*, reported that the visit had made a profound impression on the native population. To maintain the advantage which had resulted from the initial move, Von Tattenbach was appointed chief of a special mission to Fez. His formal object was to thank the Sultan for the Kaiser's reception in Tangier, but in reality to second him in his appeal for a conference.[46] Tattenbach reported on April 24 that the Sultan had agreed to hold everything in abeyance until he reached Fez.[47]

Great Britain countered Germany's move by sending Mr. Lowther to Fez. Before leaving Tangier, he declared that his mission was undertaken in agreement with the convention of April, 1904, in which England promised France diplomatic support in the execution of its terms.[48]

This was the first official indication that France would have the hearty support of Great Britain if she chose to refuse the German request for a conference. Bülow had accepted the plan, confident that at such a meeting Germany would have a majority on her side. Roosevelt, he thought, would support their demand for the 'open door,' and this would oblige England to maintain a reserved attitude. Austria, of course, would favor Germany, and probably Italy would do likewise—one Tunis had been enough for her. Russia would not be inclined to forward an Anglo-French agreement. The chancellor thought that the smaller states—Switzerland, Holland, and Belgium—would rally to support the principle of economic equality when they found themselves in good company.[49]

Bülow's optimistic views were not shared by German representatives in Paris. Von Flotow and Radolin wrote pessimistic reports on the attitude of the French and the un-

[46] Tattenbach to F. O., April 7; Bülow to Tattenbach, April 9; Bülow to the Kaiser, April 11; Bülow to Tattenbach, April 12; Tattenbach to F. O., April 13. *G. P.*, XX, 313–15, 315–16, 320–21, 322, 327–28.

[47] Tattenbach to F. O., April 24; *ibid.*, XX, 339.

[48] Tattenbach to F. O., April 27; *ibid.*, XX, 348. London *Times*, May 2.

[49] Bülow to Kühlmann, April 6; Bülow to the Kaiser, April 4. *Ibid.*, XX, 306–7, 301–2. Bülow cited articles in *Manchester Guardian* and *Morning Post* to justify his belief that there would be strong English sentiment for the 'open door.'

easiness among their diplomatic colleagues. After Delcassé's approach at the dinner held on April 13, Radolin wrote privately to Bülow, pointing out the uncertainties pertaining to the policy that they were now pursuing. In his opinion, the whole future of Franco-German relations depended on their action at this juncture. It is evident that he hoped Germany would answer Delcassé's signals and eventually come to a direct understanding with France.[50] Declassé, too, tried again to open the wire to Berlin through Luzzatti, the Italian minister of finance, but again the signal was disregarded.[51]

Holstein held out for a conference, meeting all arguments against his policy with the cry that "after what his Majesty said [at Tangier], we must carry on." A retreat, he declared, would be a second Olmütz, which would efface the memory of Fashoda. If they negotiated directly with Delcassé, he would only play with them while he intimidated the Moors and deceived the world.[52] M. Bihourd, French ambassador at Berlin, presented an *aide-mémoire*, repeating Delcassé's willingness to dissipate all misunderstandings; he was informed that a congress, and not direct negotiations, would afford the best solution of the question.[53]

Berlin's refusal to negotiate directly with Paris weakened Delcassé's position in the ministerial council as well as in the Chamber and press. It was generally rumored in political circles that Loubet had insisted that Delcassé be retained in the last two cabinets, against the wishes of Combes and Rouvier.[54] Delcassé had clashed with Combes in 1903 when the premier summarily dismissed M. Révoil, the governor-general of Algeria. Révoil had been minister to Morocco, and

[50] Flotow to F. O., April 3; Radolin to F. O., April 9; Radolin to Bülow, April 14. *Ibid.*, XX, 303–4, 316–17, 330–32.

[51] Monts to Bülow, May 2; Bülow to Monts, May 3. *Ibid.*, XX, 362, 363–64.

[52] Holstein maintained that the Kaiser's statements to De Chérisy were made on his own initiative. "From this explanation, made on his own initiative (*aus eigener Initiative*), the German policy is settled." Mem. by Holstein, April 4, and 24; *ibid.*, XX, 304–5, 339.

[53] Mem. by Mühlberg, April 19; *ibid.*, XX, 332.

[54] Bav. D., No. 15, II, Jan. 16, 1905.

his new appointment had been the signal for an active military policy on the Algerian boundary, a policy that Combes heartily condemned. At that time, Delcassé was thought to have inspired *Temps* to attack the premier.[55] As colleagues in the Combes cabinet, Rouvier and Delcassé had clashed over French policy toward the Bagdad Railroad.[56] When Rouvier came to power and the difficulty arose with Germany over Morocco, he clipped Delcassé's wings by insisting that the foreign minister keep him informed and consult the cabinet on all important points. Delcassé, Rouvier told Radolin, had such an unrestrainable spirit that he exceeded his authority. It had cost him his peace of mind to go to Delcassé's rescue in the Chamber during the debates on April 19.[57]

This dissension within the cabinet was not concealed from the public. M. Pressensé, former foreign editor of *Le Temps*, declared that it was well known in political circles that the initiative and control of the cabinet had been substituted for the isolated and irresponsible action of Delcassé.[58] *Siècle* called attention to "the two very distinct currents prevailing in the cabinet; the one quite calm, directed by the president of the council, the other more agitated, which undoubtedly comes from the Quai d'Orsay."[59] Clemenceau perceived the two opposing forces in the cabinet and asked when they would choose a new foreign minister.[60] On May 6, *Figaro*, credited with being close to Rouvier, announced that as a result of further disagreement between Delcassé and his chief, the foreign minister was about to resign.[61] Although it

[55] *G. P.*, XVIII, 806. Letters exchanged between Etienne and Combes, *Quest. dipl. et col.*, June 1, 1903, pp. 701–11.

[56] Mévil, *De la paix de Francfort*, p. 252.

[57] Radolin to Bülow, April 30; *G. P.*, XX, 360–61. According to Eckardstein (*Die Isolierung Deutschlands*, p. 106) Delcassé's colleagues charged that "il met tout dans sa poche, il nous ne montre rien et il vient au Conseil avec des faits accomplis."

[58] *Humanité*, April 30.

[59] *Siècle*, May 4.

[60] *Aurore*, May 25.

[61] Gaston Calmette, the editor, was on friendly terms with Rouvier. Delcassé he thought, was as willing as Holstein to let matters proceed to a complete break. Eckardstein, *Isolierung*, p. 101.

was denied in *Matin* and *Temps*, other papers took up the rumor and some interpreted it as a public reprimand inspired by Rouvier.[62]

Less discussion of the Moroccan question took place in the press from May 1 to June 1. Germany was playing for time until Von Tattenbach reached Fez. Behind the scenes, however, there was intense activity.

Rouvier, representing the interests of financial circles, undertook to repair the broken wire to Berlin and end the tension that was having an adverse effect on the securities market. He assured Radolin that it was his desire to restore amicable relations with Germany. A confidant of Rouvier informed the German ambassador that the premier did not approve of Delcassé's policy and that he would not be averse to letting him fall if occasion arose.[63] As a substitute for a conference, Rouvier suggested that the signatories of the Madrid Convention be circularized.[64] He received no encouragement along this line so suggested the conclusion of a general Franco-German agreement that would include a settlement of Morocco as one of its subjects.[65] Bülow, however, maintained that they could not enter into a separate agreement with France, for it would infringe the rights of other signatories to the Madrid Convention.[66]

Rouvier guessed correctly that Holstein held the key to the situation. Accordingly, one of his confidential agents, Guillaume Betzold, appeared in Berlin, and through Paul von Schwabach arranged for an interview with the senior councillor in the foreign office. It appears that Betzold intimated that Rouvier was ready to oust Delcassé if he were assured that Berlin would then enter into direct negotiations on Morocco.[67] The interview with Holstein took place on

[62] *Humanité, Echo de Paris, Matin,* and *Gaulois,* May 7; *Aurore,* May 8.

[63] Radolin to F. O., April 27; *G. P.*, XX, 344–45.

[64] Radolin to F. O., April 28; *ibid.*, XX, 348–49.

[65] Radolin to Bülow, April 30 and May 1; *ibid.*, XX, 360–61, 355–57.

[66] Bülow to Radolin, May 4; *ibid.*, XX, 364–67.

[67] *Ibid.*, XX, 357 note; *Berliner Tageblatt,* March 29, 1922. Paul von Schwabach (*Aus meinen Akten,* pp. 290–93) writes: "Am 1 Mai, 1905, fand eine Unterhaltung zwischen Herrn Betzold und mir statt, in welcher er mir ergänzend mitteilte, dass

May 2. He expressed the mistrust with which he had always regarded Delcassé's policy, adding that it "was not openly hostile, but always intriguing." A solution to the present difficulty, he thought, lay in slower action in Morocco and removal (*Beiseitigung*) of Delcassé. Betzold, in turn, explained that Rouvier did not trust his foreign minister, and that in all probability he would soon be succeeded by M. Bourgeois.[68]

At the request of Rouvier, Baron Eckardstein sought an interview with Bülow when the latter was at Karlsruhe to meet the Kaiser on his return from the Mediterranean. Eckardstein informed the chancellor, at their meeting on May 5, that Rouvier and Etienne agreed it would be dangerous at the moment to drop Delcassé; that German press attacks would strengthen him with the patriots; and that it was only a question of time until he would go out of power. He warned Bülow that King Edward had spoken in a very anti-German tone in Paris, and that it was generally believed that England would go beyond the limits of her formal agreement to support France. Bülow declared his disinterestedness in French politics, and forwarded a full report of the conversation to Holstein.[69] Holstein's psychology resolved the simplest actions of opponents into diabolical plots. Hence, in his opinion, Eckardstein was acting under Delcassé's orders; the French foreign minister sought to limit momentarily Germany's freedom of action while he pushed his policy in Morocco.[70] Eckardstein, unable to discover any tendency toward accommodation, returned to Paris.

M. Rouvier offenbar geneigt wäre, seinen Auswärtigen Minister auszuschiffen, dass er aber dazu nur dann bereit sein könnte, wenn Hoffnung vorhanden wäre, nachher mit der Deutschen Regierung in Aussicht versprechenderweise zu verhandeln." See also letters of May 3 and 4 from Betzold to Eckardstein. *Isolierung*, pp. 200–6.

[68] Mem. by Holstein, May 2; *G. P.*, XX, 357–59. It is interesting to note, as an indication of Holstein's influence, that the main points stressed in this private conversation were embodied in a long despatch, signed by Bülow, and sent to Paris for Radolin's direction two days later. Bülow to Radolin, May 4; *ibid.*, XX, 364–67.

[69] Bülow to F. O., May 5 and 6; *ibid.*, XX, 368–69, 370. Eckardstein, *Isolierung*, pp. 100–14.

[70] Holstein to Bülow, May 7; *ibid.*, XX, 370–71.

During the remainder of May, Rouvier encouraged Radolin, through secret channels, to think that Delcassé would soon be relieved of his portfolio; the ambassador insisted that before an understanding could be effected they must have full confidence in the direction of French policy.[71] Rouvier replied on one occasion: "Je vous comprends bien, laissez moi faire."[72] German statesmen continued to profess indifference to internal events in France, and Rouvier avoided definite commitments or direct action against Delcassé; nevertheless, both parties eagerly awaited the moment when, without a dangerous reaction, he might be overthrown.

While Delcassé found little support in the ministry, in the Chamber, or in the press, and while his policy was manifestly out of harmony with French public opinion, the English government did not hesitate to give him encouragement and support Doubtlessly, Germany's restless seeking throughout the world for coaling stations caused Lansdowne to fear that she aimed to seize a port on the Atlantic coast of Morocco. He feared, too, that the French might be induced to make concessions that would be inconvenient for Great Britain. Obviously, it was to England's interest to stiffen the backs of the French; but given the existing international situation and the weakness of the cabinet's position at home, Lansdowne had no desire to become too seriously engaged. Hence, he proceeded with great caution.

On instructions from the foreign secretary and without French solicitation, Bertie, the English ambassador, left an *aide-mémoire* with Delcassé on April 25, in which it was stated that the British government regarded Germany's attitude as "most unreasonable." It said further that since it was not unlikely that Germany might ask for a port on the Moroccan coast, they would join France in strongly opposing such a demand. The British government asked to be given full opportunity to confer with the French in regard to

[71] Radolin to Bülow, May 8, 13, 16, 22; *ibid.*, XX, 374–76, 376–77, 378–79' 384–85.

[72] Radolin to Bülow, May 16; *ibid.*, XX, 378–79.

necessary steps if the question were raised.[73] Delcassé apparently was not greatly alarmed at German intentions in this direction, but assurance of support was altogether agreeable to him and in line with his policy.[74]

Again on May 17, Lansdowne, in a conversation with Cambon, observed that

> our two Governments should continue to treat one another with the most absolute confidence, should keep one another fully informed of everything which came to their knowledge, and should, so far as possible, discuss in advance any contingencies by which they might in the course of events find themselves confronted.[75]

Cambon communicated Lansdowne's statement to Delcassé, but it appears that the foreign minister received a slightly different impression than intended by the British foreign secretary. Cambon, writing to Lansdowne, later, referred to him as having said that in case of unjustifiable acts of aggression, Great Britain would be ready to concert with France on measures to be taken.[76] Lansdowne sensed the error in interpretation of his remarks. He then repeated in almost identical language his original statement, making it a point to avoid the commitment in case of "unprovoked aggression," foreseen by Cambon, and stated that "full and confidential discussion" should precede any apprehended complications.[77]

Cambon interpreted, or wished to interpret, the foreign secretary's statement as an assurance of support in case of German aggression. It is evident from Lansdowne's second note that he did not intend to go that far. We do not know if Cambon informed Delcassé of Lansdowne's correction.

[73] *B. D.*, III, 72–74.

[74] Bertie to Lansdowne, April 25; *ibid.*, III, 74–75. On April 28, the British minister at Tangier wired that "it is not thought probable here that German Min[iste]r will make any demand for a Port while at Fez." *Ibid.*, III, 69.

[75] Lansdowne to Bertie, May 17; *ibid.*, III, 76.

[76] ". . . si les circonstances l'exigeaient, si par exemple nous avions des raisons sérieuses de croire à une aggression injustifiée de la part d'une certaine puissance, le Gouvernement britannique serait tout prêt à se concerter avec le gouvernement français sur les mesures à prendre." Cambon to Lansdowne, May 24; *ibid.*, III, 77.

[77] Lansdowne to Cambon, May 25; *ibid.*, III, 77–78.

However that may be, from statements made later by the French foreign minister it is certain that he felt assured of British support in case of a clash with Germany over Morocco. Lansdowne's statements were undoubtedly the basis of the recurrent rumor, after June 6, that England had offered France an offensive and defensive alliance.

Delcassé felt assured of English backing and pressed negotiations with Morocco through the French minister at Fez. When the Moorish government suggested that certain reservations with regard to French police reform should be guaranteed by the Powers, Delcassé instructed Taillandier to reply: "You shall categorically declare to Ben Sliman [the Sultan's minister] that there can be no intermediary Power between the French government and the Moroccan government, . . . France alone borders on Morocco."[78] Von Tattenbach arrived at Fez on May 11, and the French minister, under instructions from Delcassé, informed him that France would consider it prejudicial to her interests if the proposed reforms were brought before a conference; that no Power had the right to intervene in Morocco; and that they proposed to keep a sharp watch on events and reserve the handling of affairs as circumstances warranted.[79]

Berlin regarded these manifestations of French diplomacy as contrary to Rouvier's implied agreement not to force matters in Morocco. The Wilhelmstrasse undertook a bold step to check Delcassé's policy, which was characterized by Bülow as "stormy and brutal."[80] Radolin was informed on May 31 that Von Miquel, the secretary of legation, was returning to Paris to point out once more to Rouvier that Delcassé's policy constituted a grave danger to Franco-German relations. Von Miquel, it was explained, could express this distrust of the foreign minister with a frankness, which for reasons of etiquette would be difficult for the ambassador.[81]

Von Miquel, when he stated the case to Rouvier, alleged

[78] Delcassé to Taillandier, May 3; *Affaires du Maroc, 1901–5*, p. 217.
[79] Tattenbach to F. O., May 17; *G. P.*, XX, 380.
[80] Bülow to Radolin, May 22; *ibid.*, XX, 382–83.
[81] Bülow to Radolin, May 30; *ibid.*, XX, 388–90.

that within the last seven years Germany had made various advances with a view to the improvement of Franco-German relations; Delcassé had not met these in a friendly or sincere manner. The German representative cited as instances the Portuguese colonies affair, the evacuation of Shanghai, the Bagdad Railroad, the Haiti incident, and the Moroccan question.[82] Delcassé's credit, he continued, was gone in Germany; Berlin no longer had confidence in him and there was little hope for a change in the present situation without a new orientation of French policy. Rouvier, in reply, spoke vaguely of a general agreement to include Morocco and the Bagdad Railroad. In conclusion, he stated that he could not promise the resignation of the foreign minister. "Je ne puis faire tomber M. Delcassé sur un froncement de sourcils de l'Allemagne. On me le reprocherait toujours, toujours!"[83]

A crisis was reached on June 1 when the Sultan rejected French reform proposals and appealed to the Powers for a conference. Delcassé's Moroccan policy collapsed like a house of cards. The forces in the Chamber and cabinet now united behind Rouvier to overthrow the foreign minister. At this time, King Alfonso of Spain was paying a state visit to Loubet. Jean Dupuy, owner of *Petit Parisien*, asked Radolin to prevent German press attacks on Delcassé until after the visiting monarch left Paris. Then, the question of Franco-German relations would be brought before the cabinet and if necessary before the Chamber where it was certain that a majority would support Rouvier.[84]

Monday, June 5, was a day of excitement and tension in French political circles. Rouvier had sensed thinly veiled threats in Von Miquel's attitude and communication. More-

[82] See *G. P.*, XIV, 266, for the German interpretation of Delcassé's policy with regard to the Portuguese colonies; *ibid.*, XVI, 464–66 and XVIII, 804, for the German grievance over the evacuation of Shanghai; their interpretation of French policy toward the Bagdad Railroad and the Haiti affair was given by Von Miquel; *ibid.*, XX, 393–99.

[83] Mem. by Von Miquel, May 30 and 31; *ibid.*, XX, 393–97, 397–99.

[84] Radolin to F. O., June 3; *ibid.*, XX, 400–3. Rouvier desired to know if Germany would be inclined to pursue a policy of accommodation if Bourgeois succeeded Delcassé.

over, on instructions from Bülow, Radolin informed him that Germany could not remain indifferent if Delcasse's policy of "intimidation and violence" were continued in Morocco.[85] The premier's concern at these communications spread to the Chamber. Small groups gathered in the corridors and dispersed to form new groups and repeat the same rumors. A rumor in one group reappeared in another as an established fact. Rouvier was there and conferred at length with Jaurès, Ribot, Bourgeois, and other political leaders. He looked very grave. Everyone knew that the Kaiser had telegraphed congratulations to King Alfonso on his escape from an anarchist bomb, which had been thrown at the presidential carriage during a state procession. President Loubet was not included. General de Lacroix, the French representative at the German Crown Prince's wedding, had not been given a seat at the first table of honor. Did Von Flotow attend Delcasse's diplomatic reception at the Quai d'Orsay? Yes! But he arrived late. On top of these reports came the news of a frontier incident. The deputies were appalled at the idea of war.[86]

Rouvier and Delcassé conferred with the president. The premier explained that the Moroccan policy had led the government into a blind alley; the time for a decision had come. Delcassé interrupted, saying that they should bring the Sultan to his senses by sending cruisers to Morocco. When Rouvier exclaimed, "that would mean war with Germany," Delcassé is reported to have said: "Don't you believe that; it is all bluff." Rouvier then declared that the matter must be brought before the cabinet; if the majority agreed with Delcassé, he would resign.[87]

The decisive ministerial council was held the following morning. At 11 o'clock, Loubet, followed by Rouvier and Delcassé, entered the council chamber where the other minis-

[85] Bülow to Radolin, June 1; Radolin to Bülow, June 11. *Ibid.*, XX, 392–93, 407–9.

[86] Flotow to Bülow, June 11; *ibid.*, XX, 406. *Figaro*, June 6; *Petite République*, June 6; Theodor Wolff's despatch to *Berliner Tageblatt*, June 6.

[87] Radolin to Bülow, June 11; *ibid.*, XX, 407–9.

ters had been waiting since 10 o'clock. The foreign minister proposed that France, Great Britain, and Spain send identical notes to the Sultan declining the conference.[88] Germany, he declared, was only bluffing and would not go beyond diplomatic support of the Sultan. Moreover, they could count on England to support them, for she had made overtures with a view to common action. He read the text of the last note, which, without entering into details, clearly stated the English offer of support. It was to the interest of France to conclude this accord. Rouvier then outlined his position: Germany was advised of the negotiations being carried on with England, and if they resulted in a concrete agreement France was in danger of immediate invasion without a declaration of war. From information in his possession he could say that Germany was not bluffing and that the most serious consequences might result if they pursued Delcassé's policy. Rouvier urged that they enter into negotiations relative to the conference in order to avoid the grave consequences of a refusal which might provoke German aggression. The country would not support a war over Morocco; he could not accept a a policy that risked such a conflict. As Rouvier concluded, the situation became intense. Each minister in turn was asked for his opinion. Without a single exception they rallied to the support of the premier. Delcassé said that he would resign and Rouvier accepted his statement. The premier was charged temporarily with the conduct of foreign affairs. At 12:45 o'clock, the meeting was adjourned.[89]

Rouvier's statement that Germany knew of the conversations with England and would consider the acceptance of the offer of joint action a cause for war, is without foundation. Lansdowne's suggestion that the two governments treat one another with the utmost confidence grew to an English offer of alliance by the time it reached the German chargé d'af-

[88] Bertie to Lansdowne, June 8; *B. D.*, III, 91.

[89] *Temps*, March 19, 1922; mem. by the minister of justice, Chaumié, drawn up immediately after the council meeting. Also, *G. P.*, XX, 407–9; *Matin*, October 7, 1905; *Dépêche de Toulouse*, Oct. 14, 1905; and *Figaro*, March 24, 1922, publishing a letter from Delcassé.

faires. This, however, was on June 7, and it was the first information to reach the Germans of the discussion at the council meeting.[90] As Mendelssohn-Bartoldy points out, it is possible that Rouvier, in order to isolate Delcassé and to win the support of his colleagues, played on their strong desire for peace by intimating that Germany knew of their conversations with England and would make of their satisfactory conclusion a *casus belli*.[91]

The exact character of the support that Lansdowne offered Delcassé has given rise to a vast amount of literature.[92] Lansdowne's commitment is now revealed by the *British Documents*. They clearly show that Delcassé exaggerated his consultative proposal.[93] It is quite possible, as Professor Fay suggests, that "Perhaps he was deliberately overstating its character, in order to persuade his hesitating colleagues to stand firm against Germany."[94]

When the open breach came between Rouvier and Delcassé, the Paris press followed Rouvier's lead. The morning papers on June 6 repudiated Delcassé and demanded that he give up his portfolio.[95] General satisfaction at the news of his resignation was expressed by the organs of all parties. Among the fifteen leading papers published on June 7, thirteen, including the hitherto staunch *Temps* and *Matin*, condemned

[90] Flotow to Bülow (two telegrams) June 7; *G. P.*, XX, 623–24, 625. The information came from Bunau-Varilla, owner of *Matin*. Rouvier through a confidential agent informed Flotow that the rumor was unfounded.

[91] A Mendelssohn-Bartholdy, "Alte Diplomatie: der Sturz Delcassés," *Wissen und Leben*, Feb. 1, 1925, pp. 142 ff. Delcassé, in a letter to *Figaro*, March 24, 1922, insinuated that Rouvier betrayed their conversations with England to Berlin.

[92] Cited by Fay, I, 193–201 notes. To these should be added: Mendelssohn-Bartholdy, *loc. cit.;* H. David, "Noch einmal: Alte Diplomatie und der Sturz Delcassés," *Wissen und Leben*, April 20, 1925; Mévil, *De la paix de Francfort*, chs. IV, V; Wolff, *Le Prélude*, pp. 206–8; Erich Brandenburg, "Zur englischen Politik während der Marokkokrise von 1905," *Europäische Gespräche*, Jan., 1927; Anderson, *The First Moroccan Crisis*, pp. 208–11, 226–29, 335 ff.

[93] *B. D.*, III, 72–78. Anderson suggests that perhaps Delcassé was misled by the similarity between Lansdowne's utterances and the vague formula of the Franco-Russian political accord of 1891. *The First Moroccan Crisis*, p. 229.

[94] Fay, I, 199.

[95] *Temps, Figaro, République Française, Eclair, Gaulois, Lanterne, Aurore, Petite République, Rappel.*

Delcassé and his policy out of hand. Only *Débats* and *Echo de Paris* reserved their opinions. The press, in general, estimated that the minister had pursued a personal policy without regard to the principle of collective ministerial responsibility; he had attempted to treat Germany as a Power isolated by his astute diplomacy; his Moroccan policy had been badly conceived and grave mistakes had been made in carrying it out; and, blinded by his own egotism and desire for a personal triumph, he had pursued a bellicose policy that endangered the security of France.[96] Beneath the press comment ran a strong current of opinion favorable to Germany, and opposed to a closer understanding with England.[97]

Delcassé's resignation was not regarded as a national humiliation imposed upon France by Germany, but as the natural result of his own blind and mistaken policy. The first interpretation was propagated by Delcassé's political supporters,[98] and assailed as a myth at various times thereafter,[99] but universally accepted and absorbed into history during the heat of the World War.

The sense of contemporary French opinion, which regarded the event as a contest between Rouvier and Delcassé, was caught by *Figaro's* cartoonist. The scene is the French Kitchen of State. A burly cook, M. Rouvier, has just replaced

[96] *Temps, Matin, République Française, Figaro, Siècle, Liberté, Aurore, Action, Humanité, Lanterne, Petite République, Gaulois, Eclair.* Delcassé's resignation was marked by a strengthening of the securities market. On June 3 the three per cent. *rentes* closed at 99.65. When Rouvier took over the direction of foreign affairs and peace was assured, they advanced to 99.85. *Petit Journal* and *Figaro*, financial reports, June 7.

[97] Flotow to Bülow, June 7; *G. P.*, XX, 406–7, 625. Mem. by Von Hugo, military *attaché*, June 18; *ibid.*, XX, 446–48. France, stated Jean Dupuy, could not afford to antagonize Germany for "les beaux yeux de l'Angleterre, qui nous dupera, comme elle a dupé tout le monde." Radolin to F. O., June 3; *ibid.*, XX, 400–1.

[98] Stéphane Lauzanne in the *Matin* 'revelations' of Oct., 1905; André Mévil in *Echo de Paris*, Oct., 1905; and Mévil, *De la paix de Francfort. . . .* Delcassé assured Bertie that his fall resulted from German intrigue and that a great deal of money had been spent to accomplish it. Bertie to Lansdowne, June 10, 1905; *B. D.*, III, 78. Barrère, French ambassador at Rome, more correctly attributed it to the jealousy of politicians in the Chamber. Egerton to Lansdowne, June 13, 1905; *B. D.*, III, 95.

[99] Gaston Calmette reviewed the history of this legend in *Figaro*, March 3, 1911.

the diminutive Delcassé. The latter, still in his white cap and apron, and his suit case—bearing a huge label "To London" —in his hand, turns at the door to look back at his successor who is deftly flipping the Moroccan pancake high in the air. "I would give a pretty penny," Delcassé remarks, "if it would come down and hit him on the nose."[100]

Across the Rhine, news of Delcassé's retirement was treated almost unanimously as an internal political event which did not concern Germany.[101] The press generally refrained from playing it up as a diplomatic victory. Although the Kaiser made Bülow a Prince on June 6, the papers did not relate this to his triumph over Delcassé. The distinction was attributed to the successful commercial treaties which the chancellor had concluded, to his handling of the Socialists in the Prussian Landtag, or as part of the general distribution of honors on the occasion of the Crown Prince's wedding.[102]

No adequate conception of French distrust and disapproval of M. Delcassé's policy, as reflected in the press from March to June, was conveyed by English newspaper correspondents to the reading public at home. Such criticism was ignored or explained on the basis of partisan politics. On the other hand, isolated articles praising Delcassé were reported at length and represented as the universal opinion in France. The net result of this 'angling' of the news was that the British public received an entirely false impression of the forces and currents responsible for Delcassé's resignation.

[100] *Figaro*, June 17.

[101] On June 6, Bülow wrote for the direction of the press: "I request that every means be used to prevent the Paris reports of Delcassé's impending resignation being commented on by our press until the event occurs. It can still miscarry. As long as Delcassé is minister for foreign affairs he must not be praised, and still less criticized. French ministerial crises are always their own affairs and do not concern us. This should be impressed not only on our journalists, but also on the French correspondents." *G. P.*, XX, 403.

[102] *Berliner Post*, June 6, 7; *Lokal Anzeiger*, June 6; *Berliner Neueste Nachrichten*, June 6, 7; *Kölnische Zeitung*, Nos. 591, 592, 594, June 6, 7; *Hamburger Nachrichten*, No. 394, June 6; *Berliner Tageblatt*, June 6; *Vossische Zeitung*, June 6, declared that the Crown Prince's wedding was only the occasion for the distinction and not the cause. *Norddeutsche* did not announce Delcassé's retirement until June 8.

English editors were united in expressing regret at his retirement, but there was a wide divergence of views as to its causes and significance. *Pall Mall Gazette*, *Morning Post*, and *Daily Mail* attributed it to Russia's collapse in the Far East, which had given Germany opportunity to intervene in French internal affairs.[103] *Daily News* (June 7) seized the occasion to draw attention to the restless ambitions of German policy that everywhere threatened the *status quo*. Two days later, however, it observed that "both the Paris and Berlin papers have throughout this crisis preserved a perfectly calm and good tempered note. We commend the example to some of our English contemporaries." The *Daily Chronicle* (June 7) saw in Delcassé's resignation "a sign of the profound devotion of the French Republic to peace and its aversion from any course involving risk or adventure." *Westminster Gazette* (June 7) noted that the irresponsible hostility to Germany and the hearty support accorded Delcassé had awakened the suspicion in France that England wished to shove her into a war with Germany. *Saturday Review* (June 10) caustically remarked:

> The indecent joy with which it [Delcassé's fall] has been hailed in France both by politicians and newspapers, whose apparent ambition a few weeks ago was to rival one another in singing the Minister's praises, is not calculated to increase our admiration for the politicians of the Third Republic . . . .

The Tory *Standard* (June 7) declared that it was well understood on both sides that the Moroccan dispute would not end in war. It was not averse to a compromise equable between France and Germany that would give the latter a sphere of influence in southern Morocco. *Daily Telegraph* assumed that one reason for Delcassé's retirement was opposition from certain groups in the Chamber which were incensed that he should have stretched the rules of neutrality in favor of Russia to such an extent as to justify a note of remonstrance from Japan. The editorial sounded an official note when it stated that England would stand shoulder to

[103] *Pall Mall Gazette*, and *Daily Mail*, June 7; *Morning Post*, June 9.

shoulder with France in Morocco. "Our Government," it said,

> will abide loyally in spirit as well as in letter by all the obligations, stated or implied, in the Convention. It is not the duty of the Imperial Government to suggest—less still to dictate—to France what course she should pursue in view of recent incidents. Whatever policy she adopts, so long as it is consistent with our mutual obligations, will be supported heartily and without qualifications by His Majesty's advisers.[104]

Pressure from Germany alone does not account for the French foreign minister's retirement. Owing to the internal political situation, his position was greatly weakened before Germany's Moroccan action began. Opposition spread from the Clerical-Monarchist group to the Combes-Jaurès *bloc* after the Kaiser's landing at Tangier. His enemies scored heavily on his policy in the Chamber on April 19, and he was saved only through the intervention of Rouvier. One after another of his colleagues, including Rouvier and Etienne, deserted him. It was reported that at the end even Loubet approved his resignation.[105] Most important of all perhaps was Delcassé's loss of the confidence of colonial and financial groups interested in Morocco. In this connection, Etienne's defection is significant.[106] The party journals, too, following the political currents in the Chamber, withdrew their support. The Sultan's rejection of Delcassé's reform program and fear that he would resort to force in carrying out his policy, crystallized opposition in the press. Even *Temps*,

[104] *Daily Telegraph*, June 7. Although British statesmen aver that it was not customary to inspire the press, this editorial should be compared with the views of the government as revealed in *B. D.*, III, 89–97, *passim*. On the continent at this time the *Daily Telegraph* was regarded as the mouthpiece of the Balfour government. Sir Almeric Fitzroy notes in his diary, Nov. 19, 1905: "I met Ivan Müller, who now controls 'The Daily Telegraph' and is therefore in closer confidence with the Prime Minister than any but the inner ring of the Cabinet." Fitzroy, *Memoirs*, I, 268.

[105] Radolin to Bülow, June 11; *G. P.*, XX, 407–9.

[106] Cf. articles by Robert de Caix, spokesman for these interests, in *Quest. dipl. et col.*, May 1, 1905, pp. 529–39; June 16, pp. 729–35; and articles in the *Bulletin* for April, May, and June.

semi-official organ of the Quai d'Orsay, followed M. Rouvier.[107]

It is, moreover, well known that Delcassé insisted on conducting foreign affairs without consulting his chief or his associates; he resented interference on their part. The English ambassador correctly interpreted the situation when he wrote:

> Delcassé would have fallen even if Germany had not been menacing, but he might not have fallen so soon. His elimination from the Cabinet was in great part due to his treatment of his colleagues. He did not keep them fully informed of what he did and proposed to do. With Combes he could do as he liked in foreign affairs, as he always had Loubet with him. With Rouvier it was different. . . . Several of his *chers collègues* disliked him and it ended by his being set aside.[108]

Viewed from this angle, the ousting of the foreign minister was, as *Temps* (June 8) pointed out, an instance in which "the government, in its full liberty of decision, put an end to a ministerial situation that had become paradoxical."

Germany, it is true, worked for his dismissal. However, her policy throughout was synchronized with the actions of Delcassé's associates, who did not hesitate to connive at his removal. Through personal agents, Rouvier, on several occasions, let Berlin understand that he did not approve of Delcassé's policy, that the cabinet was divided, and that he would be willing to drop the foreign minister if a suitable occasion arose.

This occasion was, in general, created by Germany's intervention in the Moroccan question, but Delcassé's retirement was forced by his colleagues, supported by the Chamber and French public opinion. In the last analysis, his fall was due to his own lack of foresight and mistakes in statesmanship. Two lines of action were possible in solving the Moroccan question favorably for France: first, a complete understanding with Germany before taking a step toward Fez; second, forceful

[107] *Temps*, editorials June 2, 4, 6.

[108] Bertie to Lansdowne, June 15; Newton, *Lord Lansdowne*, pp. 341 f.

action immediately after April 8, 1904, so that Germany would have been faced with a *fait accompli*. 'Pacific penetration' was in itself an admission of weakness and a compromise that was bound to fail. Thus, as *Temps* (June 4) pointed out: "The question not having been completely regulated in Europe by negotiation, nor in Africa by rapid action, we are faced for the time being with the *status quo* in Morocco and an untenable situation in Europe."

Chapter VI

HENCKEL VON DONNERSMARCK AND THE GAULOIS INTERVIEW

MANY writers have attributed the resignation of M. Delcassé to the direct intervention of Germany acting through the person of Prince Henckel von Donnersmarck, who, it is alleged, was charged with a mission to warn M. Rouvier of the danger that threatened Franco-German relations if Delcassé were continued in power at the foreign office. This explanation, or the emphasis placed upon this as a cause of the foreign minister's fall, is based upon a communication appearing in *Gaulois* (a Monarchist organ) on June 17, 1905, eleven days after Delcassé's resignation. The article purported to reproduce the statements made by the German 'agent' in the presence of M. Rouvier and some of his colleagues in the ministry. It has been, in part, frequently quoted. M. Bourgeois has this to say of the incident:

In order to vanquish the resistance of this 'enraged Anglophil' [M. Delcassé] William despatched an emissary to Paris. This was Prince Henckel von Donnersmarck, who, when resident in France toward the end of the Empire, had realized a marriage with a rich adventuress. He had since conserved his good relations in the political world at Paris. The plan that the agent of William II, former agent of Bismarck, developed in Parisian circles was exposed, in the month of June, 1905, in the *Gaulois*. It is the exact commentary of the explanation furnished, some months later, by Count Witte:

Bourgeois then quotes:[1]

It is for you to decide if you are satisfied to serve the interests of England, after having envisaged the perils to which a verbal al-

[1] E. Bourgeois and G. Pagès, *Les origines et les responsabilités de la grande guerre*, p. 310. Bourgeois uses the quotation from Gaulois in an exceedingly ambiguous way, tending to give the impression that the words are Count Witte's.

liance exposes you, and which you are inclined to transform into a written alliance. . . .

We have learned that the principal object of the Entente Cordiale was the isolation of Germany, preceding and preparing for a coming aggression.

Is this the policy of France, or ought we to consider it as the personal conception of M. Delcassé? If you think that your minister for foreign affairs, has engaged the country in an adventurous course, acknowledge it by parting with him and above all by *giving a new orientation to your foreign policy.*

G. P. Gooch gives a somewhat different version, but conveys much the same impression when he writes that "Prince Henckel von Donnersmarck visited Paris, saw the Premier and some of his colleagues, and explained his mission in an interview with the *Gaulois*":

You do not seem to suspect the gravity of the events which are in preparation, and I have crossed the frontier to enlighten you. The Emperor and the people are irritated to see the repulse of their efforts for relations of courtesy and a policy of isolating Germany. Is this the policy of France, or the personal conception of Delcassé? If you think that your Foreign Minister has engaged your country in a too adventurous a path, show it by separating yourselves from him, and above all by giving your foreign policy a new orientation. The Emperor does not wish for war, but if you are beaten you will be bled white.[2]

Many writers, in addition to the two just cited, have based their charges of German complicity in a plot to overthrow Delcassé upon two assumptions: first, that Von Donnersmarck was an agent of the German government; and second, that the *Gaulois* article was an authentic statement of the views of the German Emperor or his ministers.[3]

[2] G. P. Gooch, *History of Modern Europe, 1878–1919*, p. 356. The article was not the result of an interview with *Gaulois* as Gooch states, but a communication signed "Un Renseigné," who professed to give the exact words used by Donnersmarck on the occasion of his meeting with Rouvier.

[3] H. David, "Noch einmal: alte Diplomatie und der Sturz Delcassés," *Wissen und Leben*, April 20, 1925, pp. 439–50. André Tardieu (*France and the Alliances*, pp. 183–85), G. H. Stuart (*French Foreign Policy*, p. 185), A. Mévil (*De la paix de Francfort à la conférence d'Algésiras*, pp. 276–79), and G. P. Gooch (cited above)

It should be pointed out, first, that there was nothing unusual in Von Donnersmarck's presence in Paris in April and May, 1905. His journey lacked entirely the character of a special mission. He had married a wealthy French woman, and, like other members of high European society, he was a frequent visitor to Paris as well as to London and Vienna. Furthermore, large financial interests brought him to Paris once or twice each year.[4]

If he was an agent of the German government or even a personal representative of the Kaiser or Bülow, as is generally alleged, it seems strange that he was not at least mentioned in the diplomatic correspondence of the period. On this point the editors of *Die Grosse Politik* note that only once, and that in the German ambassador's report of the *Gaulois* article, does the Prince's name occur in any of the documents in the foreign office archives.[5] This fact is the more striking when one considers that other individuals unofficially connected with the events of the spring of 1905 —Baron Eckardstein, Guillaume Betzold, Paul von Schwabach, Armand Lévy, M. Léon, and Baron Nathan Rothschild—are mentioned frequently in the German diplomatic correspondence. It may of course be argued that Bülow or the Kaiser wished to keep such an important mission secret even from the foreign office. It is altogether unlikely, however, that they would have taken such a serious step without the coöperation and knowledge of the Wilhelmstrasse and the embassy in Paris.

It is an established fact that Von Donnersmarck met Rouvier in Paris, but what actually took place is not clear. The occasion was a luncheon, which was also attended by M. Etienne, minister of interior, and one or two mutual friends.[6]

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quote from this article without indicating that important omissions and changes in the text have been made. Tardieu quotes at greater length than the other writers, although he too has made important changes and omissions. The article in question fills three columns on the front page of a large newspaper.

[4] *Petite République*, June 18, 1905.

[5] *G. P.*, XX, 390 note.

[6] *Journal Officiel, Débats parlem., Sénat*, April 6, 1911, p. 371.

Although Baron Eckardstein refers to Von Donnersmarck's communication, made to the president of the council at the request of the German chancellor, it appears that M. Rouvier was not convinced he was speaking in all matters for the Kaiser and Count Bülow.[7] Some years later Rouvier declared that nothing of an official or semi-official nature had passed between them.[8] Along this same line it might well be pointed out that although one writer speaks of "several interviews with the President of the Council,"[9] there is no evidence to show that they ever met more than once.[10]

Because of conflicting statements and lack of conclusive evidence it is impossible to do more than approximate the date on which the luncheon took place. A. Mévil, although he offers no proof for his statement, fixes it at the same time as King Alfonso's visit to Paris; that is, between May 30 and June 4, or the week preceding Delcassé's resignation.[11] Gerault-Richard, an influential politician and editor of *Petite République*, writing in his paper on June 18, declared that the meeting took place about three weeks before. This would be on or about May 28. On the other hand, according to Eckardstein, the meeting occurred much earlier. He was with Rouvier on May 4, and the French statesman referred at that time to a long conversation with Von Donnersmarck which had occurred just recently (*ganz kürzlich*).[12] Moreover, on June 6, Prince Donnersmarck, while viewing with

[7] Baron Eckardstein (*Die Isolierung Deutschlands*, p. 104) quotes Rouvier as follows: "He sought the interview with me apparently at the direct request of Count Bülow. The Prince explained to me that there were only two possibilities: either a Franco-German alliance or war. Naturally I do not know whether this represented the views of the Kaiser and Count Bülow, or whether Prince Donnersmarck was only expressing his own opinion."

[8] *Journal Officiel*, cited above note 6.

[9] A. Mévil, *De la paix de Francfort*, p. 274.

[10] Rouvier, according to Eckardstein, referred to "eine längere Aussprache." *Die Isolierung Deutschlands*, p. 104. Donnersmarck spoke of only one interview and not several. *Ibid.*, p. 128. Rouvier stated specifically that he had met the Prince only once. *Journal Officiel*, cited above note 6.

[11] Mévil, p. 273.

[12] Eckardstein, p. 103. The next day Eckardstein interviewed Bülow at Karlsruhe. *G. P.*, XX, 368–69.

Eckardstein the Crown Prince's wedding procession in Berlin, referred to to his conversation with Rouvier some weeks before (*vor einigen Wochen*).[13] Altogether, the evidence points to a much earlier date than has heretofore been presumed, a fact of considerable significance inasmuch as it leaves an entire month between the interview with the French statesmen and Delcassé's retirement.

It appears that Eckardstein received the impression that Von Donnersmarck thought he was speaking to Rouvier at the request of the German chancellor (*auf Bitten des Reichkanzlers*).[14] But it is certain that he had no instructions; that the foreign office was not informed of his action; and that he was not coöperating in any way with the German embassy in Paris. During the luncheon with Rouvier, Etienne, and others, he undoubtedly imparted to them the impressions that he had received in Berlin, leaving some doubt in the minds of his listeners as to whether he was speaking for Bülow, or only expressing his own opinion. If Von Donnersmarck had the shadow of a commission, it was probably based upon a casual conversation with Bülow which he interpreted as a mandate.

If we turn now to the communication in *Gaulois*, signed by "Un Renseigné," certain things appear which from the very outset mark it as apocryphal. First, the article was not an interview with the Prince by a member of the *Gaulois* staff, as many writers have assumed. On the contrary, it professed to give the actual language that Von Donnersmarck used in warning the president of the council and his associates against the policy pursued by Delcassé. Moreover, it should be pointed out that the article has been challenged more than once. Gerault-Richard declared the day after its appearance that nothing of an official or semi-official character had passed between the two men, and quite correctly pointed out certain inconsistencies on the basis of which he challenged the authenticity of the communication.[15] In his report to the

[13] Eckardstein, p. 127.

[14] *Ibid.*, p. 128.

[15] "This conversation lacked entirely the character attributed to it by our con-

foreign office, the German ambassador treated it as fictitious.[16] Rouvier himself referred to it as "des dires qui ont paru dans des journaux, mais qui constituerent une fable."[17]

Secondly, the circumstances under which the article appeared are of a nature to arouse suspicion. Following Delcassé's resignation, the journals of the Monarchist and Nationalist press played up the danger of an immediate German invasion, and to discredit the republican régime they emphasized the government's laxness in maintaining the national defenses. They drew attention to the disorganization of the army and marine, to the attitude of the Socialists toward war, and to the general unpreparedness of the country in case of possible aggression.[18] The Radical and Socialist organs—*Humanité*, *Radical*, *Aurore*, and *Petite République*—replied to the attack by charging the Right with a deliberate attempt to excite national feeling and to raise unfounded apprehensions concerning the security of the country.[19]

In the midst of this battle, on June 17, *Gaulois* published the now famous article. If it were intended to stimulate patriotic feeling and produce a reaction favorable to the fallen minister it fell short of its purpose, for it was scarcely noticed by the important news journals. The article was taken for what it really was, namely, a polemical attack upon the republican régime.

There is another incident closely connected with this phase of the question that points to the apocryphal character of the article and to political motives for its inspiration. On June 9, three days after Delcassé's retirement, the same paper in an inconspicuous note remarked that Henckel von Donnersmarck had been charged with making known "to his friends, who are close to the ministry, the danger to the peace

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frere and it did not touch on incidents of ministerial order, the starting-point of which it preceded." *Petite République*, June 18, 1905.

[16] *G. P.*, XX, 390.

[17] *Journal Officiel*, cited above note 6.

[18] *Patrie*, June 11, 16, 17, 18, 22, 23; *Gaulois*, June 17, 20, 21.

[19] *Humanité*, June 11; *Petite République*, June 10, 11, 18; *Aurore* and *Radical*, June 18.

of Europe which might result from persistence in the policy attributed to M. Delcassé. . . . He departed after having succeeded in the task which he had undertaken." Why did not *Gaulois* publish Von Donnersmarck's communication to the members of the government at that time? Did the editor or "Un Renseigné" have any more information on June 17 as to what Von Donnersmarck said to Rouvier than they had on June 9? It seems unlikely that they would have withheld such a good 'story' for over a week. Bülow once remarked that "the actions of diplomats and politicians are governed by circumstances." The three-column front page article in *Gaulois* has all the earmarks of a clever fabrication designed to meet certain demands of political warfare which did not exist the week before.

A careful analysis of the article shows that the words attributed to the German 'envoy' were the opinions and rumors current in Paris from June 6 to 17. Among other things Von Donnersmarck is quoted as saying to Rouvier:

> It is for you to decide if it pleases you to serve English interests after having envisaged the dangers to which you expose yourselves by a verbal *entente*, which you are disposed to transform into a written alliance. . . . In a war against Germany, you might be victorious, for in tragic hours France has always found within herself extraordinary resources; but if you are defeated, as is probable, the peace will be signed at Paris.
>
> Do you hope that England, loyal to the end to the friendship that unites you, will make common cause with you and create a diversion on the German coast from which you might profit? That may be. Consider all possibilities: she bombards our ports, she destroys our fleet, she ruins our colonies. With your millions we shall repair all the damages which she may do to us. She may be secure from attack; but if we occupy your territory she will be powerless to dislodge us.

Here we have a clear cut statement of the well-known 'hostage theory' which found general acceptance with a group in Germany, when, after Delcassé's resignation, it was rumored that he had been engaged in concluding an offensive and defensive alliance with England. Professor Schiemann,

doubtlessly inspired by Holstein, was the first to express publicly this view of the consequences of an Anglo-French alliance. But it followed on, and was formulated in response to, the report that the French foreign minister at the time of his resignation had been actively engaged in promoting an anti-German coalition. On June 7, Schiemann wrote in *Kreuzzeitung*:

> The situation to be sure is, that France since her accord with England has been an instrument of British policy, and that if she should continue to allow herself to be used as an instrument against us, nothing else remains but to draw from such conclusions—with unreserved emphasis and complete exertion of all our powers—all the resulting consequences, while there is still time.

On June 14, his thesis was developed still further:

> Delcassé deluded himself in thinking that an Anglo-German war would menace only Germany. If such a war should break out it would be against France that we would wage our campaign, because we would attribute the origin of the conflict to her. On this point there is no difference of opinion in Germany.

The *Kölnische Volkszeitung* (not to be confused with *Kölnische Zeitung*) declared, on June 16, that "France must serve us as a hostage for the good conduct of her foreign office."

These opinions expressed by German journalists were given full publicity in the daily press of Paris. *Figaro* (June 15) reproduced Schiemann's article of the preceding day, while the highly threatening tone of the *Kölnische Volkszeitung* and *Kreuzzeitung* brought forth a vigorous protest from French writers, and particularly from Clemenceau.[20] So far as the alleged Von Donnersmarck interview is concerned, the significant fact is that the question of Anglo-French coöperation, based upon the rumored secret agreement which Delcassé was accused of negotiating, was discussed in the continental press between June 7 and 17. Rumors were rife in both countries. The reaction to these in Germany, as expressed in articles by Schiemann and others, bears a distinct

[20] *Aurore*, June 18; *Echo de Paris*, June 21, 22. For the general effect of the 'hostage theory' on opinion in France, see Wolff, *Le Prélude*, p. 205.

resemblance to the complete statement of the 'hostage theory' attributed to Von Donnersmarck. The suspicion cannot be avoided that the author of the *Gaulois* article conveniently assumed that Prince Henckel would be likely to share the opinions of Professor Schiemann and the group represented by *Kreuzzeitung*. Moreover, on the basis of chronology it is evident that Von Donnersmarck's interview with Rouvier took place some weeks before Delcassé's retirement, whereas, it was this very event that occasioned public discussion of the 'hostage theory.'

When "Un Renseigné" attributes to the Prince a statement concerning "a verbal *entente* which you are disposed to transform into a written alliance," he clearly alludes to a situation that arose some time after Donnersmarck's conversation with Rouvier. In the ministerial conference held on June 6, Delcassé referred to English offers of coöperation, but the rumor that circulated in political circles and in editorial rooms of the French press was to the effect that England had offered to conclude a defensive and offensive alliance.[21] Delcassé and his apologist, A. Mévil, have asserted that the English offer, whatever its nature, was known in Berlin shortly after its reception in Paris, and both intimate that Rouvier was responsible for Berlin's knowledge of the English proposals.[22] The president of the council, too, according to report, stated in the meeting of the ministers that the conversations with England were known in Berlin and the acceptance of the English proposals would undoubtedly be met with military action.[23] Whatever the explanation of Rouvier's statement, it can be definitely stated that Berlin had no information bearing on the proposed English 'alliance' until June 7, when Von Flotow forwarded the story as it came to him through a member of the staff of *Matin*.[24] Manifestly, the *Gaulois* attributes to Von Donnersmarck knowledge of

[21] Flotow to Bülow, June 7, 1905; *G. P.*, XX, 623–25.

[22] Delcassé's letter reproduced in *Figaro*, March 24, 1922; Mévil, pp. 280–83.

[23] Mem. by M. Chaumié, minister of justice in the Rouvier cabinet, published in *Temps*, March 19, 1922.

[24] Flotow to Bülow, June 7, 1905; *G. P.*, XX, 623–25.

conversations that were quite unknown to the directors of German policy until the day after Delcassé's retirement. Indeed, it is doubtful if these conversations were known to any member of the French government except M. Delcassé at the time when Prince Donnersmarck talked to Rouvier. In such matters Delcassé always preferred to play a lone hand.

Of even more significance are the grievances that Germany was supposed to hold against M. Delcassé. Donnersmarck is quoted by *Gaulois* as saying:

> What we cannot understand is, that while always affecting pacific sentiments with regard to us and a reserve which we were resolved to respect, he has adopted toward us a system of vexatious pin-pricks which, sooner or later, are bound to exhaust our patience and wound our susceptibilities.

As specific instances he is credited with citing, first, that Delcassé refused an invitation to meet the Kaiser; second, that Prince Henry of Prussia was asked, for the sake of public order, to refuse an invitation to an exhibition staged by the automobile club in Paris; third, that the Crown Prince, when he wished to meet his fiancée at Cannes, was requested not to enter French territory; fourth, that Delcassé refused to meet overtures concerning a proposed railroad in Central Africa; and fifth, that by operating through English counsel, the foreign minister attempted to turn one of Germany's allies against her. As a matter of fact, these grievances were for the most part idle Paris gossip that had appeared in the press from time to time.[25]

More important from the standpoint of this investigation is the certainty that directors of German policy never mentioned any of these petty accusations when summing up their charges against Delcassé. On the contrary, the Wilhelmstrasse in charging him with bad faith cited incidents of an entirely different character. They appear as early as October

[25] "The complaints of the German Emperor against M. Delcassé, voiced by the *Gaulois*, are of a quasi-public notoriety, since they deal with facts known to a great many people. . . ." *Petite République*, June 18, 1905.

23, 1902,[26] and the list is somewhat augmented in a long memorandum by Holstein in April, 1903.[27] In the spring of 1905, the same 'bill of particulars' was revised and brought up to date. According to officials of the German foreign office, the incidents in which Delcassé had shown a manifest lack of courtesy and consideration were the Portuguese colonies affair, the evacuation of Shanghai, the Bagdad Railroad, the proposed Franco-German coöperation during the Haitian revolution, and finally, the present Moroccan situation.[28] Not a single one of these charges appears in the article published in *Gaulois*. On the other hand, the supposed injustices which it does cite are not recorded in the several memoranda and despatches on this subject preserved in the foreign office archives in Berlin. It is quite unlikely that the Kaiser, Von Bülow, or the foreign office would have sent anyone on an official or semi-official mission so ignorant of the facts involved as Von Donnersmarck would appear to have been from the statements attributed to him by *Gaulois*.

The reference to the French army, which Donnersmarck is said to have made, strengthens the impression that the *Gaulois* article was inspired by the Nationalists for political reasons:

> The Emperor respects your army, the high value of which he is far from underestimating. He is, however, more keenly aware perhaps than even you yourselves of the causes that may weaken it and of the germs of dissolution with which it is infected.

This resembles the language of the Nationalists, who were violently attacking the Radical and Socialist régime. Their chief reproach during the June crisis was that the Left, under the leadership of the former premier, M. Combes, had allowed the Socialists to spread their pacifistic doctrines throughout the army; that the defenses had been weakened by neglect; and that the morale and patriotism of the mili-

[26] *G. P.*, XVIII, 799–800.

[27] *Ibid.*, XVIII, 802–5.

[28] Mem. by Von Miquel, secretary of legation, May 30, 1905; *ibid.*, XX, 393–97.

tary forces had been undermined and destroyed.[29] The strikes at Brest and Toulon, the threatened strike among the reservists, and the state of unpreparedness in the army and marine were not secret from the rest of Europe by any means, but their relation to a possible international conflict became a major issue and a point of attack only with the crisis following Delcassé's retirement. This fact, together with the appearance of the article in a Monarchist organ such as *Gaulois*, makes the authenticity of the communication still more doubtful.

The final reason for questioning even the semi-official nature of Von Donnersmarck's 'mission' as well as the genuineness of the newspaper article, appears in the fact that a regular member of the diplomatic corps was formally instructed by Bülow to point out to Rouvier the danger that threatened Franco-German relations if Delcassé were allowed to pursue his former policy. Von Miquel, secretary of the German embassy at Paris, was charged with this task.[30] It was he who recited to the president of the council the instances in which Germany had made advances to France, only to be met with what they considered to be evasions and insincerities on the part of M. Delcassé.[31] But his statement of the case, not only in its general tone but in the facts presented and in the demands made, differs entirely from that accredited by "Un Renseigné" to Prince Henckel von Donnersmarck. A comparison of the representations made by the two 'agents' to Rouvier immediately marks the *Gaulois* communication as apocryphal.

On the basis, therefore, of internal criticism of the article and its relation to the domestic political situation, it must be concluded that it was the product of a lively imagination playing around the rumors current in Paris on and after June 6. It contains nothing but political gossip while it avoids each of the real issues.

[29] *Eclair*, June 15; *Presse*, June 16; *Gaulois*, June 20, 21, 25; *Patrie*, June 11, 16, 17, 18, 22, 23. *Temps*, on June 18, administered a sharp rebuke to the alarmists.

[30] Bülow to Radolin, May 30, 1905; *G. P.*, XX, 389.

[31] Mem. by Von Miquel, May 30, 31, 1905; *ibid.*, XX, 393–97, 397–99.

The evidence is not conclusive on the exact capacity, if any, in which Von Donnersmarck was acting, but there is none to show that he was at any time acting at the specific request of the German government. As to the comminatory language he was supposed to have used in Rouvier's presence, it is only necessary to point out that either *Gaulois* or "Un Renseigné" had a political axe to grind; that chronologically it was impossible for Von Donnersmarck to have made certain statements contained in the article; that the charges against M. Delcassé were not the grievances harbored in Berlin; that it bears a close resemblance to Professor Shiemann's articles and the theories expounded in the German press in reply to the rumors of an Anglo-French alliance, following Delcassé's resignation; and finally, that the communication reproduced nothing but the gossip that had gone the rounds of the political salons, the clubs, and the editorial rooms of the Paris newspapers since June 6.

Thus it is evident that the two assumptions involved in the acceptance of the Gaulois report—the official or semi-official character of Von Donnersmarck's action and the authenticity of the communication—are doubtful or incorrect. While this in the last analysis may not shift essentially the responsibility for Delcassé's retirement, it does invalidate the premises upon which many writers have hitherto based their conclusions.

The importance of the *Gaulois* 'revelation' lies in the fact that it has been so generally accepted and widely quoted in the writings of publicists and historians.[32] Originating as a journalistic fabrication, it passed into history and played an important rôle in shaping public opinion on the perplexing question of Franco-German relations.

[32] Professor Sidney B. Fay was the first authoritative historian to reject it. See Fay, *Origins*, I, 187 note, and his reference to this chapter which he read in manuscript.

Chapter VII

THE CONFERENCE AGREEMENT OF JULY 8 AND ITS SEQUEL—BREST, BJÖRKÖ, PORTSMOUTH

"YOU will find in me the greatest spirit of accommodation," declared Rouvier to the German ambassador's confidant after Delcassé's resignation. "My entire past guarantees that I seek an understanding and a *rapprochement.* But there are two parties to a marriage; it is a question whether Germany will contribute to it by making my position easier." On the margin of this communication the Kaiser noted: "Good; all that we desired." "Yes; it shall be done."[1] In political and newspaper circles it was freely predicted that the morrow of Delcassé's retirement would see the restoration of normal Franco-German relations and a speedy settlement of the vexing Moroccan question. The *Berliner Tageblatt* ran its Paris telegrams under the head: "Der Neue Kurs in Frankreich."[2]

Rouvier, too, doubtlessly believed that Germany would now show a greater spirit of conciliation in the Moroccan question. In fact, he had been encouraged in this belief by the German ambassador. On June 5, however, even as the news came that Delcassé would undoubtedly retire on the following day, officials in the Wilhelmstrasse were engaged in drafting an acceptance of the Sultan's invitation to a conference. The note, basing Germany's reasons for acceptance

[1] Radolin to Bülow, June 11; *G. P.*, XX, 407–9.

[2] *Berliner Tageblatt,* June 6, and Theodor Wolff's report from Paris, June 9; *Berliner Neueste Nachrichten,* Paris report, June 9; *Hamburger Nachrichten,* No. 397, June 7; *République Française,* June 10, quoting De Lanessan; Jaurès in *Humanité,* June 7. A writer in *Berliner Post* (June 18) stated that Delcassé's retirement "shows that France more and more turns from the old policy of revanche, which found in Delcassé a clever and dangerous representative. . . ."

upon the Madrid Conference, was communicated on June 6 to all the signatories of that convention.[3]

Rouvier's reaction was far from favorable, and he informed Von Flotow and Radolin that he hoped it would be possible to settle the question without a conference, thus saving France from humiliation. Through unofficial channels, he returned to an earlier proposal to settle the question by a general agreement that might include the Bagdad Railroad and mutual interests in the Far East. The German representatives, on instructions from Berlin, replied that they had advised the Sultan to call a conference; they had accepted his invitation; and they could not now leave him in the lurch and reverse their position before the other Powers. "In case France should refuse to take part in a conference," declared Radolin to Rouvier, "we stand behind him [the Sultan] with our whole power to guarantee his independence and the preservation of the *status quo*."[4]

Other Powers, in their attitude toward the holding of a conference, were no more encouraging than France. Lansdowne, after consultation with Cambon, wired his agent in Morocco on June 5 that England would not participate.[5] Delcassé's resignation and German acceptance of the Sultan's invitation caused Lansdowne to change, momentarily, his position. English statesmen were unquestionably disappointed at the yielding attitude of the French. On June 8, Balfour wrote to King Edward: "If . . . Germany is really desirous of obtaining a port on the coast of Morocco, and if such a proceeding be a menace to our interests, it must be to other means than French assistance that we must look for our protection."[6] Landsdowne informed Metternich that under the circumstances England would reserve her opinion on the conference question until the views of the new French foreign

[3] Bülow to Flotow, June 5, 6; *G. P.*, XX, 413–15, 404–5.

[4] Flotow to F. O., June 7, 9; Radolin to F. O., June 11. *Ibid.*, XX, 420, 425, 430. Wolff, *Le Prélude*, pp. 190–94.

[5] Lansdowne to Bertie, June 5; Lansdowne to Lowther, June 5. *B. D.*, III, 89.

[6] Sir Sidney Lee, *King Edward VII*, II, 344. Lansdowne wrote: "The fall of Delcassé is disgusting and has sent the *entente* down any number of points in the market." Newton, *Lord Lansdowne*, p. 341.

minister became known. In closing the conversation, Metternich remarked that the French would probably accept the German solution "if you do not stiffen their backs for them."[7]

Special importance was attached to the reaction of the United States because of her comparatively disinterested position *vis à vis* the Moroccan interests of France and Germany. Berlin statesmen, from the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese war, had sought to establish a firm basis for German-American coöperation in the Far East. Roosevelt took the initiative and received credit for obtaining agreement from the Powers to support the neutrality of China and to preserve her administrative entity on the outbreak of the war, but the proposal originated with Germany.[8] Likewise, it was at Germany's suggestion that Roosevelt invited the Powers, in January, 1905, to affirm their territorial disinterestedness in the Chinese Empire.[9] When the Moroccan question arose, Bülow sought to extend American coöperation on behalf of the 'open door' to the Sultan's dominions. Similarity of the two cases was pointed out to Roosevelt, and Sternburg was instructed to link up the Moroccan situation with the Far East.[10]

German statesmen feared that France and England might act as mediators between Russia and Japan when peace negotiations were opened, and that out of such mediation might emerge a quadruple alliance of France, Russia, Japan, and England, with their differences dispelled by the liquidation and partition of China.[11] Germany, therefore, preferred

[7] Lansdowne to Lascelles, June 8; *B. D.*, III, 92–93. Metternich to F. O., June 6, 9; *G. P.*, XX, 416–17, 422–24.

[8] *G. P.*, XIX, 98–111, *passim;* A. L. P. Dennis, *Adventures in American Diplomacy*, pp. 363 ff.

[9] *Ibid.*, XIX, 551–64. Sternburg to Roosevelt, Jan. 12, 1905; Roosevelt Papers. Dennis, p. 392; Anderson, *The First Moroccan Crisis*, pp. 160, 178; Tyler Dennett, Roosevelt and the Russo-Japanese War, pp. 77 ff.

[10] Bülow to Sternburg, April 3, May 10; Sternburg to F. O., May 3. *Ibid.*, XIX, 592–96, XX, 620–22, 622–23. Cf. Adolf Hasenclever, "Theodore Roosevelt und die Marokkokrisis von 1904–1906," *Archiv für P. u. G., Heft* 2/3 (1928), pp. 195–96, 202; Anderson, pp. 184 f.

[11] Sternburg to Roosevelt, Feb. 9, 22, and May 19, 1905; Roosevelt Papers; Dennis, pp. 490 f.

to second Roosevelt's mediation to bring the two belligerents together without the necessity of 'brokers.' Support of the German government, as well as the Kaiser's personal influence with the Czar, was promised to Roosevelt on May 16 and renewed on June 3 after the battle of Tsushima.[12] Henceforth, until October, 1905, the Far Eastern situation, as it affected Germany, Russia, and America, was closely related to the Moroccan question. In return for support of Roosevelt's efforts as peacemaker in the Orient, German statesmen felt that he should uphold their point of view in Morocco. Close association of these two questions explains Roosevelt's motive for taking a hand in the Franco-German dispute.[13]

German appeals for support in opposing French Moroccan action, in March 1905,[14] occasioned the following communication from Roosevelt to the American minister at Tangier:

> Of course I am anxious that you should keep on the most friendly terms with the French, but I should be obliged if you would also be careful to keep in touch with the German Minister, telling him that I have requested you to do so. I should like you to work with him so far as you can do so without causing friction with France. Of course I hope you will get on well with the English and all other representatives of foreign governments.[15]

This communication indicates the limits beyond which Roosevelt's support of German policy was never extended.

When Von Sternburg delivered the circular note of June 5, he stated Germany's reasons for accepting the Sultan's invitation and urged that the United States do likewise. The President avoided a direct answer, declaring that public

[12] Bülow to Sternburg, May 16, June 3; *G. P.*, XIX, 600–2, 607. For evidence of German support and coöperation see *ibid.*, XIX, 419–26, 608–30; Dennis, ch. XIV.

[13] Hasenclever, *Archiv für P. u. G., Heft* 2/3 (1928), p. 205.

[14] Memoranda seeking to associate the United States with Germany's opposition to the French in Morocco were handed by Sternburg to Roosevelt on March 6 and 7; and to the secretary of state, urging support of the conference idea on May 29 and 31. D. S., Notes. Germany. vol. 34; Dennis, pp. 513–17.

[15] Roosevelt to Gummere, March 31. Again on April 20 the President wired Loomis: ". . . tell our Minister to Morocco not to commit us in any way but to be friendly with both French and Germans." Roosevelt Papers, letterbook, No. 25.

opinion would be unfavorable to American participation in a conference.[16] On the other hand, Roosevelt informed the English government that he had told Von Sternburg, "he did not see how the United States could take part in any Conference as to Morocco unless France acquiesced."[17] After further communications from Berlin, the President agreed to use his influence with France to accept the conference as the best method of avoiding a serious conflict.[18]

German statesmen were soon disillusioned if they counted on Italy and Austria, as members of the Triple Alliance, to stand with Germany. Italy, obligated to both France and Germany, was forced to steer a tortuous course. An Italian refusal, declared Bülow, would make of the Triple Alliance a *reductio ad absurdum*. Despite the almost threatening tone of the German ambassador, it was not until June 21 that Rome reluctantly stated that if the other Powers participated Italy would also take part.[19] Austria did not temporize; she agreed that from a legal point of view Germany's position was incontestable. Count Goluchowski, however, refused to comply with the German ambassador's pressing request to accept immediately and unconditionally the Sultan's invitation. He feared that it might turn out to be a "rump conference."[20] As the attitude of each Power became known it was increasingly evident that no conference would convene until France first signified her willingness to participate.

In diplomatic and press circles, the conference question was frequently regarded as secondary to a new orientation of French policy. It was freely predicted that Rouvier's advent would mark a decline in the Entente Cordiale and a movement toward Germany. As already noted, Rouvier had expressed a desire to bring about better relations with the

[16] Sternburg to F. O., June 8; *G. P.*, XX, 421.

[17] Lansdowne to Durand, June 7; *B. D.*, III, 91.

[18] Bülow to Sternburg, June 9; Sternburg to F. O., June 12. *G. P.*, XX, 421–22 note, 433–34. The close connection between Morocco and the Far East was again impressed upon the President. Bülow to Sternburg, June 10; *ibid.*, XX, 626–28.

[19] Monts to F. O., June 6, 9; Monts to Bülow, June 12, 21. *Ibid.*, XX, 415–16, 424–25, 435–38, 454–55. *B. D.*, III, 94–95.

[20] Wedel to F. O., June 6; *ibid.*, XX, 417–18.

eastern neighbor; but his first act on taking over the portfolio for foreign affairs had been to call the London *Times* correspondent and inform him that France's policy "with regard to the Anglo-French understanding would remain exactly the same."[21] Landsdowne, in a conversation with Whitelaw Reid, showed some uneasiness at Rouvier's unfamiliarity with foreign affairs, "but [he] said Cambon here had all the strings in his hands."[22] Barrère, the French ambassador at Rome, likewise assured his British colleague

> that the leaders of French diplomacy, the two Cambons, Jusserand and himself, were firmly united in sympathy for the policy of their late Chief and considered that there was no call for alarm; the French position was a sound one in harmony with England and others.[23]

There is considerable other evidence to indicate, in the last analysis, that career diplomats and foreign office officials, and not Rouvier, directed French policy in the weeks following June 6.[24] While they gave way on the form, they maintained the substance of Delcassé's foreign policy.

Direct conversations between Rouvier and Radolin were resumed on June 11, after the latter's return from Berlin where he had attended the Crown Prince's wedding. The premier's opposition to a conference was met with a proposal that if he would formally accept the Sultan's invitation Germany would then enter into negotiations relative to the conference program. This should not contain anything prejudicial to France's future in Morocco.[25] Rouvier, however, desired more concrete assurances, and further conversations failed to bring the two parties closer to an agreement.[26]

Grave apprehension was aroused in France when contrary to predictions no agreement on the Moroccan question was

[21] Bertie to Lansdowne, June 6; *B. D.*, III, 90.

[22] Reid to Roosevelt, June 17; Roosevelt Papers.

[23] Egerton to Lansdowne, June 13; *B. D.*, III, 95.

[24] *Ibid.*, III, 96, 118–19; *G. P.*, XX, 457–59, 483–85, 492–94.

[25] Bülow to Radolin, June 12; *G. P.*, XX, 431–33.

[26] Radolin to F. O., June 14; Bülow to Radolin, June 16; Radolin to F. O., June 18. *Ibid.*, XX, 438–39, 439–41, 446.

announced. On June 8, Von Flotow noted a general tone of fear and panic in one of Paris' most brilliant political salons.[27] This was communicated to the public by the press and assumed proportions of a genuine war scare.

It is interesting to determine, so far as possible, the causes of this disturbance of the public mind, for it was a common phenomena of pre-war social psychology. In high circles the uncompromising demeanor of German diplomats was well known, and this knowledge was soon reflected in the daily press. The official attitude, then, was the starting point. An important contributing factor was the series of articles by Professor Schiemann in *Kreuzzeitung*. In these he analyzed Delcassé's policy as a clever English plot to provoke war with Germany. To counteract this he propounded the 'hostage theory.' This was, in effect, that if war came between England and Germany, France would be the loser; they would wage war against her to recover for all the damage done by England to Germany's merchant marine, colonies, and coastal cities.[28] The 'hostage theory,' which Hammann says originated with Holstein, awakened a deep feeling of resentment and defiance in France.[29]

The French press contributed not a little to public apprehension. Schiemann's views were widely quoted, and alarmist articles announcing the imminence of an Anglo-German war crowded the Nationalist papers.[30] Acceptance or rejection of the conference, it was said, was the test as to whether France could be counted on the side of England or of Germany.[31] In part, this interpretation of German policy was

[27] Flotow to Bülow, June 8; *ibid.*, XX, 429.

[28] *Kreuzzeitung*, June 7, 14, 21, 28.

[29] Hammann, *World Policy*, pp. 156–57; Wolff, *Le Prélude*, pp. 204–6. Eckardstein (*Lebenserinnerungen*, II, 174) says that at this time Schiemann was the only German journalist with whom Holstein maintained close relations.

[30] *Figaro*, June 15, and *Siècle*, June 22, quoting Schiemann; *Patrie*, June 11, 16, 18, 23; *Presse*, June 16; *Eclair*, June 15; *Intransigeant*, June 17, 18; *Echo de Paris*, June 9, 21, and a fiery article by the Nationalist deputy, Jules Delafosse, on June 23. For the effect of 'Schiemannism' on Jaurès, see Eckardstein, *Isolierung*, pp. 146–47.

[31] Alexandre Ular in *Aurore*, June 16; Jules Delafosse, in *Echo de Paris*, June 23; Millevoye in *Patrie*, June 27; *Lanterne*, June 13.

inspired by the alleged statements attributed by *Gaulois* to Henckel von Donnersmarck, to an article in *Echo de Paris* (June 21) purporting to give the views of a leading member of the Reichstag, and to an interview with Theodor Schiemann appearing in *Temps* (June 21). All demanded nothing less than a reversal of Delcassé's general policy and an understanding with Germany.

Anglo-German hostility necessitated a decision. With Germany or with England? There was entire lack of unanimity among the political journalists who debated this purely hypothetical question. Jules Delafosse, leader of one wing of the Nationalists, declared that if Delcassé had an English offer of alliance in his portfolio, he should have accepted without delay.[32] Millevoye, representing a different shade of opinion in the same party, wrote an article entitled "Neither the one nor the other." "Between France and Germany," he declared, "the abyss is Alsace-Lorraine; between France and England it is history."[33] *Lanterne* (June 13), a radical organ, advocated friendship with England, but not a friendship directed against Germany. Jaurès and De Lanessan maintained that in the face of growing Anglo-German antagonism it was France's duty to play the mediator without taking sides with either contestant.[34]

Another factor tending to increase popular apprehension was the uncertainty manifested in French journals as to England's policy. Not knowing that her refusal to consider a conference had been originally inspired by a communication from Delcassé before he retired, it appeared to observers that the British were forcing France willy-nilly into a conflict with Germany. This view was unfortunately confirmed by the uncompromising tone of some foremost English journals. *Temps*, *Gaulois*, *Siècle*, and *Figaro*—leading organs of different shades of opinion—asked the same question: Will England facilitate a settlement of the dispute, or will she by resistance and obstruction complicate and block a pacific

[32] *Echo de Paris*, June 23.

[33] *Patrie*, June 27.

[34] *Humanité*, June 17; *Siècle*, June 20.

solution?[35] The proper direction was given to the French press through an obviously inspired telegram from London, in which it was stated that Great Britain had first rejected the conference at Delcassé's request, but that now if the French government viewed the question differently England would follow their lead.[36]

The war scare reached its height on June 23, when it was reported that the French reply to Germany's circular despatch of June 5 was regarded in Berlin as disappointing and unsatisfactory. Rumors of more serious complications produced a panic on the Bourse, and the market was weak and nervous for several days.[37] Public equanimity was restored by June 28. On that day Theodor Wolff reported to *Berliner Tageblatt* (July 1):

> Those who lived here through the agitation of the last weeks have seen that nothing embittered the French public so much as the refusal at first of the German government to undertake discussions with France before the conference. . . . It will be a good while before the reaction from this ill-feeling disappears and the *rapprochement*, which appeared to have been advanced by Delcassé's retirement, again makes any progress.

Agitation and uneasiness in Paris presented a sharp contrast to the calm that prevailed in German political and press circles. A special correspondent, sent by *Figaro* to Berlin at the height of the war scare, wrote:

> I have never seen Berlin more placid, more calm and more indifferent to politics. . . . I made a tour of the restaurants and cafés: people were not even reading the papers. Not a conversation on Morocco or France. . . . Profound calm reigned in the editorial rooms of the press. . . . The Emperor has been in Kiel for three days for the regatta! The Reichstag is adjourned. Berlin is almost empty. . . . People ignore completely that rumors of war are circulating in France. (June 25).

It is true that German papers took little notice of the war

[35] *Temps, Gaulois,* June 18; *Siècle, Figaro,* June 20.

[36] Quoted among others in *Matin* and *Siècle,* June 20.

[37] *Figaro,* June 23; *Gaulois,* June 24; Paris report in *Kreuzzeitung,* June 24.

scare over Morocco, unless, like the *Berliner Post*, they flatly denied that the German public seriously contemplated such an eventuality.[38]

While the sensational Paris press proclaimed the imminence of the German invasion, diplomats and statesmen sought a solution of the difficulties raised by Germany's insistence on a conference and France's reluctance to accept without a preliminary agreement on the program. Why did German statesmen maintain so tenaciously their position? Bülow did not think that a conference, if it met, would have any positive results so far as Morocco was concerned.[39] Both he and Holstein regarded it as a question of form—as a means to release Germany from the obligations incurred toward the Sultan. Rouvier was assured that Germany would not propose any measures prejudicial to France's future in Morocco; but when he wished to discuss Germany's attitude toward specific reforms to be placed on the conference agenda, he met with a clear refusal. Tenderly solicitious of the Sultan's feelings and sovereignty, Bülow maintained that he could not discuss directly with France, to the exclusion of the Sultan, the reforms to be inaugurated. Moreover, since Germany based her position on the Madrid Convention, bilateral conversations would be an infringement on the rights of the other Powers. Once France had accepted and the conference convened, Germany would be released from her obligations to the Sultan and the other signatory Powers. Then, too, such reforms as were prescribed by the conference would probably not be more successful than similar efforts in Turkey. Thus a new situation would be created in which Germany would not be hampered by previous obligations. Having to consult only her own interests, in which an understanding with France was more important than Morocco, there would be little difficulty in satisfying French desires in that region.[40]

It has already been noted that President Roosevelt prom-

[38] *Berliner Post*, June 16, 23, 26. Also report of *Figaro's* correspondent, July 7, reproducing an alleged official disavowal of Schiemann.

[39] Bülow to Radolin, May 4; *G. P.*, XX, 364–67.

[40] *Ibid.*, XX, 431–33, 459–61, 470–71, 476–79, 490–91, 495–96, 497–98, 502–3.

ised Speck von Sternburg to recommend to France that she accept the conference. On June 17, the German ambassador reported that the President, in a long conversation with Jusserand, had strongly urged this course of action to avoid the danger of a conflict.[41]

Rouvier, on June 21, handed to Radolin a formal reply to the German circular note of June 5 relative to Germany's acceptance of the Sultan's invitation. The note defended French action in Morocco in much the same terms formerly employed by Delcassé; it stressed the French desire for a direct agreement with Germany in preference to a conference; and concluded by stating that before France could accept the invitation, she must be informed of the questions that would come before the Powers, and the solutions that Germany would propose. In light of the German position—first acceptance and then negotiations—the note was virtually a rejection of the conference. The kernel of the communication was contained in one sentence: "The government of the Republic is greatly impressed with this double consideration, that the conference would be dangerous if it is not preceded by an understanding, and useless if it followed such an agreement."[42]

The note was an unpleasant surprise to German diplomats, as Rouvier's yielding attitude had led them to believe that he would meet their demands. Radolin thought that the note smacked of Delcassé,[43] while Bülow, to hold the Kaiser in line with his plans, explained to him that Rouvier had adopted the former foreign minister's program. If Germany accepted the premier's proposals it would amount to a virtual justification of Delcassé's policy and would pave the way for his return as leader of a new ministry.[44] The unsatisfactory nature of the note was attributed to the influence over Rouvier of Delcassé's followers in the foreign office and diplomatic ser-

[41] Sternburg to F. O., June 17; *ibid.*, XX, 442–43.

[42] Rouvier to Radolin, June 21; *Affaires du Maroc*, pp. 235–38. *B. D.*, III, 98–100.

[43] Radolin to F. O., June 22; *G. P.*, XX, 457–59.

[44] Bülow to the Kaiser, June 22; *ibid.*, XX, 455–57.

vice. Radolin and Bülow believed that these men intended to shove the former foreign minister's Moroccan program under M. Rouvier "like a cuckoo's egg," thinking that due to inexperience in foreign and colonial affairs he would not understand their game. Actual drafting of the note was thought to be the work of either Révoil, who had been the expert in Moroccan affairs under Delcassé, or George Louis, the political director in the Quai d'Orsay.[45] Throughout the whole course of negotiations the Germans believed that the British were placing difficulties in the way of French acceptance of the conference.[46]

In the gravest terms Radolin spoke to Rouvier, and Bülow to Bihourd, of the danger entailed by the French position; it meant the *status quo* in Morocco, with Germany obligated to support the Sultan.[47] The official German reply to the French note was communicated to Rouvier and Bihourd on June 27. It restated Germany's former position—first acceptance and then negotiations. Bülow, who transmitted a copy of the note to the French ambassador, again warned him that the situation was full of danger if France did not drop her objections.[48]

Roosevelt, in the meantime, had been informed by the French government that they had acted on his recommendation, and had accepted a conference as the best means to clear up the situation. On June 24, the President sent a flattering

[45] Radolin to F. O., June 22; Bülow to Radolin, June 23; Bülow to the Kaiser, June 25. *Ibid.*, XX, 457–59, 461–63, 467–69. According to Jean Dupuy, Rouvier had been completely taken in by foreign office officials, who were charged with drafting the note; Paul Cambon was the leader of the opposition to the conference and chief editor of the note. Radolin to Bülow, June 26; Radolin to F. O., June 30. *Ibid.*, XX, 483 84, 493-94. Cambon hurried to Paris on June 17, when Rouvier showed signs of yielding, and remained until the French reply was drafted, returning to London on June 20. *B. D.*, III, 96–97.

[46] *G. P.*, XX, 441–92, *passim.*

[47] Mem. by Bülow, June 23; Radolin to F. O., June 22. *Ibid.*, XX, 459–61, 457–59.

[48] Bülow to Radolin, June 25; Bülow to the Kaiser, June 26; Radolin to F. O., June 27. *Ibid.*, XX, 470 -71, 476–79, 485–86. The German note, dated June 24, was communicated to the signatories of the Madrid Convention. In English translation, *B. D.*, III, 103–5.

letter to the Kaiser, congratulating him on "a diplomatic triumph of the first magnitude."[49] Bülow immediately wrote to the Kaiser at Kiel that the "crafty Rouvier" had deceived Roosevelt, because the French conditions amounted to a virtual rejection of the conference. He suggested the wording of a reply, which would explain to the President that the French wished to ignore the Sultan and enter into direct negotiations with Germany over the future of Morocco. Bülow's draft of the proposed communication continued:

> I believe I could get all kinds of advantages if I were to agree. However, I cannot do that for I have declared to the Sultan that I regarded him as an independent sovereign, and he, trusting my word, rejected Delcassé's proposals. I cannot now drop the Sultan because France smiles at me. Would Theodore Roosevelt, if he had made a promise to a poor nigger, break his word? I believe that on this point we think alike and will understand one another.[50]

Before a definitive answer was framed, however, another communication from Roosevelt to the Kaiser arrived. "The French Government," he declared," have now done just what at His Majesty's request I urged should be done. Now in turn I most earnestly and with all respect urge that his Majesty show himself satisfied and accept this yielding to his wishes by France." The President attempted to play upon the Kaiser's vanity to influence him to accept the French conditions as a great triumph for his diplomacy.[51] When Sternburg explained the exact state of the negotiations to Roosevelt, the President said, "I would consider it politically correct, as well as a great diplomatic triumph, if Germany were to accept at once the French offer on a conference."[52] Roosevelt conferred with Jusserand, who stated that Ger-

[49] Sternburg to F. O., June 24, 25; *ibid.*, XX, 466–67, 473–75. J. B. Bishop, *Theodore Roosevelt and His Time*, I, 482.

[50] Bülow to the Kaiser, June 25; *ibid.*, XX, 467–69.

[51] Kaiser's notation: "Not yet! a little bit 'previous' this letter!!" Sternburg to F. O., June 25; *ibid.*, XX, 473–75. Bishop, I, 483–85; Royal Cortissoz, *The Life of Whitelaw Reid*, II, 330.

[52] Sternburg to F. O., June 26; *ibid.*, XX, 479. On the same day Sternburg left a long memorandum with the President, stating Germany's reasons for not accepting the French conditions. D. S., Notes. Germany. vol. 34.

many made conditions which his government could not accept. The President then proposed to both parties the following formula: "Let France and Germany go into the conference without any program or agreement; but to discuss all questions in regard to Morocco; save of course where either is in honor bound by a previous agreement with another power."[53]

This ended Roosevelt's connection with the preliminary negotiations. It has frequently been asserted that due to the President's influence the Powers agreed to a conference, and that he suggested the basis for the program that was subsequently drawn up.[54] Roosevelt himself wrote to Henry Cabot Lodge: "I suggested the final terms by which they came together. . . . I consider it rather extraordinary that my suggestions should apparently have gratefully been received by both sides as well as acted on."[55] In fact, Roosevelt overestimated the importance of his mediation.[56] His pressure, first in Paris, then in Berlin, did not modify the French position as stated in the note of June 21, or the German standpoint as reiterated in the reply of June 25. Nor, as it will be seen later, did Roosevelt's formula furnish the basis upon which France and Germany finally came together. His connection with the negotiations ended on June 27, whereas the final accord was not reached until July 8. Both Bülow and Rouvier thanked him profusely as though each considered that the American President had stood entirely on his side.[57]

[53] Sternburg to F. O., June 27; *ibid.*, XX, 480–81. Bishop, I, 485. This formula if accepted by Germany would have left intact French agreements with England and Spain, including the secret articles providing for eventual partition of Morocco. In general for Roosevelt's action in this crisis see Bishop, I, 467 ff.; Anderson, ch. XI, *passim;* Dennis, pp. 485–96.

[54] Fay, *Origins*, I, 189; Dennis, pp. 494 f.; Gooch, *History of Modern Europe*, p. 360; Dickinson, *The International Anarchy*, p. 135.

[55] Roosevelt to Lodge, July 11; *Roosevelt-Lodge Correspondence*, II, 166–67.

[56] Roosevelt's communications to the Kaiser of June 25, 26, and 27, were withheld by Bülow until after June 27. Bülow to Sternburg, June 27; *G. P.*, XX, 481–82.

[57] Bülow to Sternburg, June 26, 27; *ibid.*, XX, 475–76, 481–82. Bishop, I, 481, 486–87, 488; Dennis, p. 496; *Roosevelt-Lodge Correspondence*, II, 166 f. Hasenclever (*Archiv für P. u. G., Heft* 2/3 (1928), pp. 208–10) sharply criticizes Roosevelt's action, which he thinks was calculated to serve French interests while the President

Both allowed him to think that his influence had been decisive. This unseemly deception was inspired by the desire to keep on the best of terms with the forceful head of the American government, with a view to his support in the future. Small wonder that Roosevelt should have considered the fulsome praise of both parties as "rather extraordinary."

Roosevelt's sympathies in the Moroccan dispute were frankly with France, as is later revealed in a letter to Mr. Choate:

> The Morocco Conference bids fair to be very important, and many delicate matters will come up, for while I want to stand by France, I want at the same time to strive to keep on fairly good terms with Germany. We have no interest in the matter, save the interest of trying to keep matters on an even keel in Europe.[58]

The principle on which Roosevelt acted in the June crisis was explained to Whitelaw Reid, the American ambassador at London. The President referred to Professor Schiemann, "whoever he may be," who had written an article commenting on Roosevelt's intervention at Germany's request:

> In all these matters where I am asked to interfere between two foreign nations all I can do is this. If there is a chance to prevent trouble by preventing simple misunderstanding, or by myself taking the first step or making some suggestion about it when it has become a matter of punctilio with the two parties in interest that neither of them should take the first step, then I am entirely willing and glad to see if I can be of any value in preventing the misunderstanding from becoming acute to the danger point. If, however, there is a genuine conflict of interest which has made each party resolute to carry its point even at the cost of war there is no use of my interfering, and I do not try and never shall try in such case unless I am myself willing in the last resort to back up my action

tried to blind the Germans by flattering the Kaiser. Moreover, ". . . it was really not due to Roosevelt's efforts but to Bülow and especially Radolin that a better and particularly valuable result of the protracted and difficult negotiations was achieved for Germany, in the mutual declaration of July 8, 1905."

[58] Roosevelt to Choate, Aug. 19, 1905; Roosevelt Papers, letterbook, No. 27. To Henry White, American ambassador at Rome, Roosevelt wrote that his sympathies were with France, although he tried to view the question objectively. Roosevelt to White, Aug. 23, 1905; *ibid.*, letterbook No. 27.

by force. I have a horror of the individual who bluffs and, when his bluff is called, does not fight, and have always acted upon the cardinal principle of the Western man in the good old days when I first struck the cattle country—'Never draw unless you mean to shoot.'[59]

Conversations continued after Bülow and Rouvier failed to come to an agreement on the basis of the Roosevelt formula. According to the German chancellor, "Rouvier circled the real point of the question like a cat around a bowl of hot milk." (*Rouvier geht um den Kernpunkt der Frage herum wie die Katze um den heissen Brei.*)[60] Finally the French foreign minister suggested that Germany's objections to preliminary discussions on the conference program might be dropped if the Sultan were associated with the negotiations. This would avoid the injury to his sovereignty involved in direct Franco-German *pourparlers*.[61] Bülow then made a counter proposal that was gradually broadened and finally accepted as the basis of an agreement.[62] Between June 28 and July 8, when identical declarations were exchanged, numerous points of difference arose, but were overcome. Throughout the course of these negotiations Jean Dupuy, owner of *Petit Parisien*, acted as mediator and channel of communication between Rouvier and Radolin. He deserves much credit for the part he played in bringing about the preliminary accord.[63]

A note stating the conditions on which France agreed to enter the conference was handed to Radolin by Rouvier on July 8. It noted that the French government was convinced Germany would not pursue any policy at the conference contrary to France's legitimate interests or her rights derived from treaties; that the independence of the Sultan, integrity

[59] Roosevelt to Reid, Aug. 3, 1905; *ibid.*, letterbook, No. 27.

[60] Bülow to the Kaiser, June 24; *G. P.*, XX, 464–65.

[61] Radolin to F. O., June 27 (sent June 28); *ibid.*, XX, 485–86.

[62] Bülow to Radolin, June 28; *ibid.*, XX, 487–88, and 488–518, *passim.* Anderson, pp. 252 ff.

[63] Dupuy's services are recorded in *G. P.*, XX, 472, 479, 483–84, 492–94, 506–8, 512. Lansdowne was informed of the course of negotiations (*B. D.*, III, 97–112, *passim.*), but did not work against an agreement as Dupuy reported to Radolin. *G. P.*, XX, 491–94.

of his empire, and the principle of equality should be respected; that police and financial reforms should be inaugurated for a short period by international agreement; and that France's special interest in the maintenance of order in Morocco should be recognized. In view of these conditions, confirmed by a similar German note, France agreed to accept the Sultan's invitation. A joint declaration embodied an agreement to withdraw simultaneously the French and German missions from Fez as soon as the conference assembled, and to present a common program to the Sultan for submission to the congress.[64]

An official *communiqué*, released on July 9, informed the public that an agreement had been reached. Jean Dupuy's familiarity with the points under discussion had been reflected in articles in *Petit Parisien* which summarized the main aspects of the settlement.[65] In general, the French press received the news of an accord without enthusiasm, without violent criticism, and without regrets. Journals of the Left regarded the solution—to quote *Lanterne*—as "une victoire de l'esprit pacifique et du bon sens."[66] Clemenceau and De Lanessan congratulated Rouvier on the settlement that he had effected.[67] The Monarchist organs, *Patrie* and *Gaulois*, deplored the weak foreign policy of the republican government.[68] André Mévil, writing in *Echo de Paris*, declared that despite Germany's "brutal intervention" the *entente* with England remained intact.[69] *Temps* firmly rejected the idea that the agreement implied in any way a determination to shift the basis of French foreign policy; it did not mean the abandonment of English friendship, but on the contrary it signified the development of that political principle.[70] A significant attitude of reserve toward Germany was maintained

[64] *Ibid.*, XX, 514–15; *B. D.*, III, 115–16.
[65] *Petit Parisien*, July 3, 8, 9.
[66] *Lanterne*, *Humanité*, *Petite République*, July 11.
[67] *Aurore* and *Siècle*, July 11.
[68] *Gaulois* and *Patrie*, July 11.
[69] *Echo de Paris*, July 11.
[70] *Temps*, July 10.

by the majority of papers. Only *Petit Parisien* had a kind word for the German negotiators, Bülow and Radolin.[71]

General satisfaction with the agreement was expressed by the German press without undue emphasis on the apparent victory scored by German diplomacy. Some journals praised Prince Bülow's 'skilful' handling of the situation[72]; others saw in the accord a setback for England, who, they maintained, would not be pleased that the matter was settled peacefully between France and Germany.[73] Practically all refrained from any utterance that might have given offense to the French. The situation, as they viewed it, had become more clear and "the political barometer—after the storm—promises fine weather."[74]

Berliner Tageblatt, however, dissented from the general opinion. It prophesied that the accord would prove to be "a whole Pandora's box of obscurities and ambiguities."[75] Theodor Wolff, in a long article in the same paper, scored German statesmen for not coming to an agreement immediately after June 6; they might have thus avoided the painful impression produced upon French public opinion. Was it necessary, he asked, to give occasion for *Figaro* to speak of Germany as "a silent sulky Sphinx"? "The exceedingly sharp tone, struck in the first moments [after June 6] did not facilitate or hasten the agreement; it only gave rise to unfounded suspicions and caused the French diplomats to scent 'behind every hindrance still a new hindrance.'"[76]

During the June negotiations certain English journals found it difficult to conceal their disapproval of the course pursued by French diplomacy. On June 9 the *Pall Mall Gazette* declared:

[71] *Petit Parisien*, July 10.

[72] *Lokal Anzeiger*, July 10, also looked forward to further peaceful coöperation between the two countries.

[73] *Berliner Neueste Nachrichten*, July 11; *Berliner Post*, July 22; *Hamburger Nachrichten*, No. 482, July 12.

[74] Schiemann in *Kreuzzeitung*, July 12; *Frankfurter Zeitung*, No. 190, July 11. *Kölnische Zeitung*, No. 712, July 10, in an official tone, declared that Germany wished to work hand in hand with France at the conference.

[75] *Berliner Tageblatt*, July 13. [76] *Ibid.*, July 13.

Inasmuch as England, Spain, Italy, and the United States have hitherto opposed the notion of a conference, we fail to see why France should modify her position. Why should Berlin be permitted to dictate to the Powers concerned? . . . if England stands firm in her general support of France, Berlin may yet find that there is more grit in the Entente Cordiale than appears to be realized in the Wilhelmstrasse.

The same organ, on June 23, thought that Germany wanted to bring France under her influence, but was "running her head full tilt against the stone wall of Anglo-French solidarity." It later asserted that "The defense of their own possessions against the Mailed Fist must be the bed-rock principle of the friendship between England and France." (June 28). The *Daily Mail* disavowed any desire to play the *tertius gaudens* between France and Germany, but "A strong France is vital to England and Europe, and any deliberate aggression directed against France would be a blow struck against the British Empire and would be taken as such in this country." (June 23). A London *Times* editorial encouraged France to reject the conference since most of the Powers were not favorable to that solution. It pointed out that British policy determined the attitude of the United States, for "they have declined to take part in the conference unless we assent to do so, and as we certainly shall not assent, their attitude is settled." (June 16). When the agreement of July 8 was announced, the *Times* commented on it with some asperity: "It can hardly be denied that France has made to the German standpoint concessions which a few months ago very few Frenchmen would have wished to see made to a Power whose actual and material interests in Morocco are scarcely proportionate to the ambitions it has recently disclosed." (July 11).

Throughout the course of Franco-German negotiations the Liberal press—*Daily Chronicle, Westminster Gazette, Manchester Guardian*—and the Tory *Standard* expressed hopes of a friendly agreement.[77] The *Standard* sounded the general

[77] *Daily Chronicle,* June 19, 23, 24; *Westminster Gazette,* June 24, July 6; *Manchester Guardian,* July 5; *Standard,* July 1.

tone of editorial opinion for these journals when the accord of July 8 was announced:

> It would not become Englishmen to criticize the arrangement which has been arrived at by the statesmen of the Republic. . . . So long as France refused to enter the conference, we refused to enter it. As she has consented to attend, it is not for us to abstain. When we go into it, we shall go in as friends of France and supporters of her policy.[78]

"The prestige of success belongs to the imponderabilities of politics," wrote Bülow on one occasion.[79] For Germany the acceptance of the conference signified a diplomatic victory over France and England, but it was won at the cost of a serious crisis. The threatening demeanor of German representatives during the negotiations awakened deep resentment in France; Rouvier was disillusioned with regard to coöperation with Germany; and a notable tendency to lean upon England developed—against which there had been a marked reaction around June 6.[80]

After Delcassé's fall the noticeable coolness of the French press for the understanding with Great Britain raised apprehensions in England lest it lose all value in the eyes of the French public. Acceptance of a conference by the Powers at Germany's demand, marked a still further decline in prestige for the Entente. The brusqueness of German policy, however, tended to counteract this drift, while reciprocal Anglo-French fleet visits and enthusiastic journalists pumped new life into the Entente Cordiale.

From July 12 to 17, the English Channel fleet visited Brest. British press comments, evoked by the festivities, were much warmer and more significant than those appearing in the French journals. *Daily Mail* (July 11) demanded nothing less than a transformation of the Entente into an alliance against Germany. The *Standard* declared that "the enor-

[78] *Standard*, July 8; similar views expressed by *Morning Post* and *Manchester Guardian*, July 11.

[79] *G. P.*, XIX, 601.

[80] Lister to Lansdowne, June 28; Lansdowne to Bertie, July 12. *B. D.*, III, 107–8, 118–19. *Journal des Débats*, June 22, 24, 25, 28.

mous preponderance of sea-power that would be produced by a junction of the British and French navies is a risk that the most restless enemy would not venture to face." (July 17). In a bellicose tone, *Daily Telegraph* warned Germany that in case of an unprovoked attack on either England or France, "the very force of circumstances, and not the dictates of diplomacy, would automatically reproduce the scene of Brest on a grander scale, with less pleasant objects, and in different spheres." (July 15). The *Manchester Guardian* thought that while "We may talk of an alliance, an intercourse so intimate . . . makes in reality a firmer basis of friendship than the mere marriage of interests which led to the formal alliance between the Republic and Russian autocracy." (July 12).

With one exception, nothing of approximate warmth or import appeared in the French press on the fraternization at Brest. On July 12, however, *Gaulois* published an alleged interview with M. Delcassé. He was quoted as saying that a nation's policy depended on interests rather than sentiment; that France's commercial interests bound her to England rather than to Germany, who bought practically nothing from her; that in case of war with Germany, England's fleet would combine with the French to destroy her commerce, navy, and seaports; and that the Entente Cordiale was calculated to bridge the gap between England and Russia—thus creating a new three-Power alignment. Such, he declared, was the real significance of the fraternization of French and English sailors at Brest.

If the article was intended to stimulate the expression of similar views in the French press it fell far short of its purpose. A prophet is without honor in his own land. That may account for the fact that the alleged interview provoked more discussion abroad than at home.

It was spread through England by Reuter's Agency; it was widely quoted but editorially ignored. Grave doubts as to its authenticity were expressed by the Paris correspondents of the *Morning Post* and *Standard*. Both asserted that the interview could not have taken place as M. Delcassé was not then

in Paris.[81] This may also account for the fact that he did not repudiate it. "Still, however apocryphal the interview may be," wrote the *Standard's* correspondent, "its writer, who, I understand, is a prominent Nationalist Deputy,[82] has very cleverly put into it a good deal that M. Delcassé might have said if he had spoken all that was in his mind."

In Germany more discussion was provoked by the alleged Delcassé interview than by the visit of the English fleet to Brest. It was generally accepted as full proof of the charges hitherto made—that the former foreign minister had labored to organize a coalition against Germany. His Moroccan policy, it was stated, was the action designed to draw the net about her; this had only been prevented by energetic action of German statesmen. In view of Delcassé's utterances, Germany's policy was fully justified.[83] *Frankfurter Zeitung*, in contrast to the general tendency of German press comment, asserted its disbelief in the authenticity of the alleged interview. That England would join any coalition in order to annihilate Germany was quite unlikely, it declared. Passing to the general subject of Anglo-German friction, it stated:

> A quarrel with England could, if it were vigorously fanned, end in the frightful tragedy of war. Must it come to that? We do not think so, and it must not come to that. It is true that we are not always regarded with friendliness in the English press and in the utterances of English parliamentarians; hence one must be careful to judge every individual case quietly and reasonably. . . . The greatest enemy of the nations is their prejudices, and it cannot be denied that in England more erroneous opinions exist about Germany than exist in this country about England. To dispel these is above all the duty of the press.[84]

When the French fleet paid its return visit to Portsmouth during the second week in August the officers and men were

[81] *Morning Post* and *Standard*, July 13.

[82] Possibly, Jules Delafosse.

[83] *Kölnische Zeitung*, No. 729, July 14; *Kreuzzeitung*, July 19; *Lokal Anzeiger*, July 12; *Hamburger Nachrichten*, No. 493, July 15; *Berliner Neueste Nachrichten*, July 15; *Deutsche Revue*, Aug., 1905, pp. 212–17; Schiemann in *Deutsche Monatsschrift*, Aug., 1905, p. 684.

[84] *Frankfurter Zeitung*, No. 193, July 14.

accorded an enthusiastic reception by all classes in the nation. The papers devoted many columns to news and editorial comment on the marked significance of the event. There was scarcely an editorial writer who did not deduce from the demonstration the solidarity of Anglo-French interests, the necessity for maintaining that solidarity, and the preservation of the balance of power through the Entente Cordiale.[85] Metternich reported the visit in a private letter to Bülow:

> The King and English policy stand now as before under the sign of the *rapprochement* to France. Everything else is here subordinated to this point of view. The *rapprochement* has made incontestable progress. . . . King Edward distributed to the members of his company, in memory of the visit of the fleet, breast pins bearing the emblems of the Union Jack and the French Tricolor.[86]

French journals, for the most part, refrained from editorial inferences as to the real significance of the visit and the policy that had prompted it. They contented themselves with descriptions of the festivities and even in this respect they were cold as compared with the English press.[87] Among the journals that commented editorially on the event, *Temps* significantly emphasized the pacific character of the Entente, which, it stated, in no way menaced Germany.[88] Clemenceau declared he was in accord with Jaurès when the latter said: "The Anglo-French accord is dangerous and fatal if it contains a hidden point against Germany." Indeed, continued Clemenceau, "there is no 'hidden point' against Germany. There is a *point turned* toward Germany in the same manner as the guns on our frontier."[89]

Figaro's cartoonist used the occasion to make a sly thrust

[85] *Manchester Guardian*, Aug. 9; *Morning Post*, Aug. 7; *Daily Mail*, Aug. 6, 7, 8, 9, 14; *Standard*, Aug. 10. Also *Westminster Gazette* (Aug. 8, 12), and *Daily News* (Aug. 9), although they emphatically denied that the Entente Cordiale was directed against Germany.

[86] Metternich to Bülow, Aug. 14; *G. P.*, XX, 659.

[87] *Petit Parisien*, Aug. 8; *Figaro*, Aug. 8–11; *Matin*, Aug. 8 and subsequent issues.

[88] *Temps*, Aug. 15.

[89] *Aurore*, Aug. 11.

at the German Emperor. A scene entitled "On the Edge of the Festivities" shows a British Jack Tar and a French *matelot* seated in a small boat, while numerous empty flasks and bottles float in the water nearby. As each raises his glass to the health of the other, William II, who stands on the dock dressed in a German sailor's uniform, remarks: "What you need now, my friends, is a good interpreter!"[90]

If the German papers did not ignore the Franco-British demonstrations, they sought to diminish their significance. *Norddeutsche*, while it reported the festivities, refrained from editorial comment.[91] Schiemann confidently declared that since the reciprocal visits were arranged by Delcassé, who had been repudiated by his countrymen, they lacked entirely the significance they might otherwise have had.[92] *Kölnische Zeitung* emphasized French coolness toward the fleet visits as compared to the warmth with which they were chronicled in the British press.[93] *Frankfurter Zeitung* shrewdly remarked that France's popularity in England was built upon German unpopularity. While their friendship was apparently platonic, concluded the Frankfort daily, under certain circumstances it might constitute a real danger for Germany.[94] The Anglophobe *Berliner Neueste Nachrichten* thought that England was not satisfied with a mere *entente*, but wished to make of the neighboring republic a European Japan.[95] Despite the lack of enthusiasm exhibited by the French press, and which was exaggerated in Germany, the *Berliner Tageblatt* noted that feeling for the Entente Cordiale in France had become several degrees warmer, due principally to England's loyal policy during the conference negotiations.[96]

[90] *Figaro*, Aug. 14.

[91] *Norddeutsche*, Aug. 10–13.

[92] *Kreuzzeitung*, Aug. 16. They were announced immediately after the Kaiser's landing at Tangier. The *British Documents* throw no light on their origin.

[93] *Kölnische Zeitung*, No. 834, Aug. 11.

[94] *Frankfurter Zeitung*, No. 225, Aug. 15.

[95] *Berliner Neueste Nachrichten*, Aug. 14.

[96] *Berliner Tageblatt*, Aug. 7. Metternich to Bülow, July 22; *G. P.*, XX, 646–48. "So far as it is possible to judge from here, it appears that the first fright of the French has disappeared and that a definite current toward friendship for England has set in."

German observers in London and Paris sensed that the Anglo-French *rapprochement* was becoming increasingly popular. Indirectly this popularity was reënforced toward the end of July by two events upon which the European press focused public attention. The first of these was the meeting of the Kaiser and Czar at Björkö; second, the announcement that a British squadron would hold autumn maneuvers in the Baltic. The latter provoked a bitter Anglo-German press controversy, while the imperial rendezvous occasioned considerable uneasiness in France. Public friction with Germany entailed a warmer feeling for France in England. Likewise, French affection for England was encouraged by German flirtations with Russia. Similar reactions produced by events in the following years achieved almost the status of a compensatory law governing the relations of the Powers.

Rumors of a meeting between Emperor William and Czar Nicholas circulated in Berlin for two days before July 24, when they were corroborated. A majority of the German journals, in absence of information as to what took place at the meeting, confined themselves to platitudes about the friendly relations which had been confirmed and strengthened between the two great neighboring empires. An ill-concealed sense of satisfaction was shown at the uneasiness manifested in France, while there was lively irritation at the romances and inventions of certain English journals.[97]

Announcement of the meeting came as a complete and unpleasant surprise in Paris.[98] Champions of the Franco-Russian Alliance hastened to announce that it in no way signified a diminution in the value of that agreement; that it did not imply a new and permanent departure in Russian policy; and

[97] *Berliner Post*, July 24; *Frankfurter Zeitung*, Nos. 204, 205, July 25, 26; *Kölnische Zeitung*, Nos. 778, 780, July 27, 28; *Hamburger Nachrichten*, Nos. 516, 520, 530, July 25, 26, 30; *Berliner Neueste Nachrichten*, July 27; *Lokal Anzeiger*, July 30; weekly review, *Norddeutsche*, July 30.

[98] *Belg. D.*, III, 57 ff. Paris correspondent of the *Manchester Guardian* (July 27) wrote: "It cannot be denied that grave uneasiness prevails, as in well-informed quarters it is thought that this meeting has been brought about expressly by the German Emperor as a counterblast to the Anglo-French *entente*, and to emphasize his recent diplomatic triumph over the Morocco Conference."

that the Russian government had advised the Quai d'Orsay that the meeting would take place.[99] Emphatic and frequent repetition of these views betrayed the concern and apprehension felt in Paris. Radical and Socialist organs were less concerned with the public rehabilitation of the Franco-Russian Alliance. They therefore limited themselves to speculation on the gratuitous advice the Kaiser would be likely to give the Czar concerning the growing revolution and the peace negotiations with Japan.[100]

From the English editors came the most fantastic and contradictory suppositions concerning the meeting. It was suggested that the Kaiser advised the Czar to continue the war with Japan; that he advised him to end the war; that William counseled Nicholas to make no concessions to the liberal movement; that he encouraged him to institute reforms; that the Kaiser sought the Czar's support for a German candidate for the throne of Norway; and that the Kaiser, as sales agent, urged Nicholas to place his orders with Kiel shipyards for rebuilding the Russian navy.[101] These journalistic efforts to penetrate the veil of secrecy surrounding the imperial reunion in Finnish waters were noted and unfavorably commented on in the German press. Certain quarters attributed the English attitude to chagrin that their dream of forming a new triple alliance with Russia and France was now dispelled.[102]

Political journalists on both sides of the North Sea were still bickering over this subject when a far more serious outburst occurred. It may be that government circles in England learned of the conversations between the Northern Powers to make the Baltic a closed sea. It was suddenly announced through Reuter's Agency, on July 29, that the

[99] *Petit Parisien*, July 26; *Figaro*, July 25, 29; *République Française*, July 26; *Temps*, July 25, 27; *Echo de Paris*, July 25, 26, 28.

[100] *Humanité*, July 25; *Radical*, July 26; *Petite République*, July 25; *Aurore*, July 25; *Intransigeant*, June 26.

[101] *Daily News*, July 23, 27; *Daily Chronicle*, July 23; *Manchester Guardian*, July 25, 26; *Standard*, July 25. *Temps*, July 27, commenting on newspaper speculations, said: "On ne parle jamais si facilement que des choses que l'on ignore."

[102] *Hamburger Nachrichten*, No. 530, July 30; *Frankfurter Zeitung*, No. 205, July 26.

British fleet would hold open maneuvers in the Baltic. Although planned by the Admiralty some months before, the German and Russian governments had not been notified in advance; hence the announcement was erroneously interpreted in the press as a counter-demonstration to the Björkö meeting. Three Anglophobe journals, in the best tradition of the Boer War period, aggressively assailed this latest English naval demonstration against Germany. *Reichsbote* would have immediately closed the Baltic to all foreign ships of war; *Deutsche Tageszeitung* declared that without Germany's consent no British fleet should cruise in those waters; the *Staatsburgerzeitung* cried out that if Germany suffered in silence this new manifestation of British insolence, she would become the laughingstock of the world.[103] As Metternich explained to King Edward, the opinions of these three dailies might have passed unnoticed in Germany if within forty-eight hours the English press had not raised a great cry over the obscure articles. The German press replied in like manner and a bitter newspaper war was engendered.[104]

Extreme language was used by the *Morning Post* in an editorial commenting on the opinions of the *Reichsbote* and *Deutsche Tageszeitung:*

> They represent, we imagine, the courage and political instinct of young Germany, of the school of German statesmen who suffer from water on the brain. If they really represent Germany and want to have a fight with this country the sooner they have it the better. . . . If the German nation agrees with the *Reichsbote* and *Deutsche Tageszeitung*, and must have a war with England about something or about nothing we can only say the sooner the better.[105]

The radical *Daily News*, however, was severely critical of the government's action in choosing Baltic waters at that particular time as a scene for naval maneuvers. It disapproved still more of the Conservative press campaign:

> We are not among the ministerial newspapers which, in season

[103] Quoted in *Frankfurter Zeitung*, No. 210, July 31.

[104] Metternich to Bülow, Aug. 14; *G. P.*, XX, 653–54.

[105] *Morning Post*, July 29. The *Standard*, July 31, was firm, but less provocative.

and out of season, foment ill-feeling against foreign Powers. . . . Russia used to be the favorite villain; then came France; and finally the rôle has been fixed on Germany. The *Times* and the press rabble that take their cues from its columns have persistently twisted every deed by Germany, however innocent, into evidence of a secret and deadly design against the Anglo-Saxon race. This long process of insinuation has prepared the way for the present tension, and upon the heads of the publicists concerned would be the gravest of moral responsibilities in the event of a catastrophe. (August 2).

Kölnische Zeitung, in an obviously inspired article, rebuked the German alarmists, declaring that there was no cause to regard the English maneuvers as a demonstration against Germany; if the British squadron stopped at a German port during its cruise in the Baltic it would receive a friendly and courteous welcome.[106]

The following considerations must have weighed with German officials in forming their opinion of England's intent: first, Great Britain had no coaling station in the Baltic; second, no English fleet had held maneuvers in this sea since the Crimean War; third, the Russian Baltic fleet had been destroyed in the Far East. What navy, then, besides the German could they have been practising to meet? Despite the semi-official statement in *Kölnische Zeitung*, high official circles regarded the abrupt announcement of the British Admiralty as a demonstration against Germany. It awakened the gravest concern, and the general apprehension was only gradually dispelled.[107] However, when the British squadron visited Swinemünde at the end of August, the English officers and men received a courteous if not hearty reception from the populace and the press.[108]

[106] *Kölnische Zeitung*, No. 787, July 30; *Belg. D.*, I, supp., 15–17.

[107] Kaiser to Bülow, July 30; Mühlberg to the Kaiser, Aug. 4. *G. P.*, XIX, 478–79, XX, 649–51. Helmuth von Moltke, soon to become chief of staff, was oppressed with the imminence of war with England. "And in reality there is absolutely no reason for it, no vital interests of either of the two states is injured or threatened, and when it comes to blows no one will know why it has gone so far." *Erinnerungen, Briefe und Dokumente*, pp. 330–31. See also Anderson, pp. 292 ff.

[108] *Hamburger Nachrichten*, Nos. 601, 606, 607, Aug. 26, 29; *Frankfurter Zeitung*, No. 239, Aug. 29; *Berliner Tageblatt*, Sept. 1; *Berliner Neueste Nachrichten*, Aug. 29.

Late in July, 1905, German statesmen had just cause to regard with considerable satisfaction the results of their diplomacy during the previous year. After the conclusion of the Anglo-French agreement in April, 1904, and after the Franco-Italian friendship demonstration in the same month, German isolation was announced in many quarters as a well-accomplished fact. Within the short space of a year the situation was apparently reversed. By energetic action in the Moroccan affair France had been constrained to nullify, to a certain extent, the engagements with Great Britain; to many Frenchmen it appeared that English friendship was dearly purchased if it involved the active hostility of Germany. Then, too, a *rapprochement* with Russia, France's ally, had been effected and had culminated in the well-known Björkö treaty. Moreover, the Kaiser had established a basis of co-operation with Roosevelt in the Far East, and was seconding the President's efforts to mediate between Japan and Russia. With Delcassé now out of office, the danger of an Anglo-Russian understanding through the good offices of France seemed indeed remote. But each successive move in the game played by Berlin had fanned still higher the flames of Anglo-German hostility. In both countries, every incident was interpreted by the press as a premeditated demonstration; each succeeding act was regarded as a counter-demonstration. Obviously the game was pregnant with danger. But the Emperor and his advisers thought that with the conclusion of the Björkö treaty Germany was saved from encirclement.[109] Edward VII, 'the isolater,' had himself been isolated.

Three threads of the diplomatic web remained as yet un-

Münchener Allgemeine Zeitung, No. 400, Sept. 1, quoted at length the conciliatory remarks of *Manchester Guardian*, *Daily Graphic*, *Daily Chronicle*, *Standard*, and *Times*.

[109] Kaiser to Bülow, July 25; Bülow to Holstein, July 20; Holstein to Bülow, July 26; mem. by Holstein, July 28. *G. P.*, XIX, 458–65, 436, 468–70, 476. In his memorandum Holstein wrote: "Als positiver Nutzen des abgeänderten Vertrages bleibt nur das übrig, dass Russland dem Viererbunde nicht füglich mehr beitreten kann. Der Kreis um Deutschland kann sich nicht mehr schliessen." Fay, *Origins*, I, 190–91; R. J. Sontag, "German Foreign Policy, 1904–1906," *A. H. R.*, Jan., 1928, p. 190.

spun. First, the Björkö agreement did not come into force until the conclusion of peace in the Orient; second, under its terms Russia was obliged to solicit French adherence to the pact; and third, despite the Kaiser's opinion, the Moroccan question was far from a definitive settlement. We turn now to a consideration of the signal rôle played by the press in these questions.

Chapter VIII

PRESS "REVELATIONS" AND THE COLLAPSE OF GERMAN POLICY, SEPTEMBER–OCTOBER, 1905

SOON after the signature of the accord of July 8, negotiations were undertaken between Paris and Berlin to formulate a reform program for submission to the Sultan and the forthcoming conference. It was well understood by all who hoped for the peaceful development of Morocco through the restoration of order, that two reforms were of vital importance: first, the establishment of a well-trained army or police force; and second, reorganization of the government's finances in such a manner as to insure the regular payment of the troops. It was also recognized that, given a free hand, the Power entrusted to carry out these measures would unquestionably become master of Morocco. Indeed, army reform and the creation of a state bank constituted the chief points in the program that Delcassé proposed and that the Sultan rejected. If France were entrusted with the initiation and supervision of these improvements by an international conference, without too many restrictions, her Moroccan dream might yet be realized. In drafting the program, then, nothing should be incorporated that could prevent her asking for a general mandate to administer the plans approved by the conference. Germany's attitude in this question was of primary importance.

In that quarter, however, there was no apparent inclination to make great concessions. Berlin was inveighing against Révoil, Moroccan expert in the Quai d'Orsay, and urging Rouvier to purge his secretariat of Delcassé's followers.[1] Tattenbach, who had triumphed over the French and English

[1] Richthofen to Radolin, July 10; Holstein to Radolin (private telegram), July 10; Radolin to F. O., July 14. *G. P.*, XX, 521, 523, 527.

representatives at Fez, urged an advanced policy in Morocco. He hoped that Germany would secure the mandate for the organization of police on the west coast from Rabat southward, leaving to France the Mediterranean coast and the Algerian frontier zone.[2] Bülow favored such a plan, but thought it would be difficult to get the conference to confer this mandate on Germany.[3]

Tentative French proposals on the conference agenda were forthcoming on July 20, when Rouvier handed Radolin a note suggesting organization of a police force and financial reform as the bases of the program.[4] The draft of a complete plan was then formulated, approved by Lord Lansdowne, and was communicated to the German ambassador on August 2. As the chief subjects to be brought before the conference it suggested the organization of police in certain coast towns and districts not already covered by existing Franco-Moorish agreements; repression of smuggling of arms by sea; establishment of a state bank; agreement of the Maghzen not to alienate any of the public services in favor of private interests; and the award of contracts for public works without distinction as to nationality.[5]

It was not until August 24 that the German reply was despatched to Paris. The major objection to Rouvier's proposals centered around the French reservation concerning the control and organization of police in the frontier zone from consideration by the conference. Policing of the border district had long been regulated by direct agreement between France and Morocco.[6] It was maintained in Berlin, however, that this question should not be excluded from consideration, but that France should seek a mandate for the border district. As police organization was the all-important question, minor

[2] *Ibid.*, XX, 525–26 note.

[3] Bülow to Tattenbach, July 11; *ibid.*, XX, 524.

[4] Radolin to F. O., July 20; *ibid.*, XX, 528. *Affaires du Maroc, 1901–5*, pp. 253–54.

[5] Cambon to Lansdowne, July 20; Lansdowne to De Manneville, July 21. *B.D.*, III, 121, 122. Radolin to F. O., Aug. 2; *G. P.*, XX, 532–33. *Affaires du Maroc*, pp. 256–60.

[6] *Affaires du Maroc*, pp. 15–18, 33–44, 46–47.

concessions such as the place of meeting were withheld until it should be regulated.[7]

France replied on August 30, maintaining that she would hold her former position with regard to the reservation of her Algerian frontier zone.[8] Nearly two months had passed since the two Powers had agreed to a conference, yet Germany showed little inclination to speed up negotiations. Bülow was at his summer home in Norderney; Secretary of State Von Richthofen and Under-Secretary Von Mühlberg were on leave; Count Pourtalès, who was unfamiliar with the Moroccan question, was in charge of the foreign office. Kriege, the legal expert, and Holstein were in charge of the negotiations. By September, due to the spirit of legal formalism in which they conducted the conversations, a complete deadlock existed.[9]

Prolonging of the negotiations does not seem to have been other than premeditated so far as Holstein was concerned. His policy of delay was actuated by considerations arising out of the Kaiser's meeting with the Czar at Björkö.

Holstein had questioned the advisability of reopening the subject of a defensive alliance with the Czar.[10] But the Kaiser took the initiative, the chancellor concurred, and Holstein recommended each step and each argument. Bülow in turn adopted these and passed them on to the Emperor. The telegraphic exchanges between Bülow and Holstein clearly demonstrate the chancellor's complete dependence on Holstein's counsel.[11]

Franco-German relations, peace negotiations between

[7] Mühlberg to Tattenbach, Aug. 6; Bülow to Radolin, Aug. 22 (sent Aug. 24). *G. P.*, XX, 538–40, 544–48. *Affaires du Maroc*, pp. 283–86.

[8] Radolin to F. O., Aug. 31; *ibid.*, XX, 553–54. *Affaires du Maroc*, pp. 290–93.

[9] Mem. by Kriege (undated, but probably Sept. 3); *ibid.*, XX, 554–57.

[10] Holstein to Bülow, July 21; *ibid.*, XIX, 436–38.

[11] Bülow to Holstein, July 20; *ibid.*, XIX, 437. "And above all telegraph me what you would advise me to propose to His Majesty when I forward the treaty to him. I believe that your fertile inventive genius will enable you to pick up the threads of the unfinished web that may bring forth something of value to us." Also Holstein to Bülow, July 22, 23, 24; Bülow to Holstein, July 22, 24. *Ibid.*, XIX, 441–42, 445–46, 448–50, 441, 447–48.

Russia and Japan, and the Moroccan situation were closely interrelated by the treaty which the two monarchs signed at Björkö on July 24. Article III provided that the defensive agreement should come into force on the conclusion of peace between Russia and Japan; and Article IV provided that after coming into force the Czar should take the necessary steps to associate France as a third party in the agreement.[12] Foreign office officials thought that the treaty's value had been greatly diminished by the change introduced into the text by the Kaiser.[13] Holstein wrote Bülow that Germany must now exert her influence to bring about peace. "Conclusion of peace as soon as possible, delay the Moroccan conference as long as possible," wrote Holstein. "In autumn Tangier has a charming climate."[14] Bülow agreed with Holstein that the Moroccan question should not be pushed; moreover, the possibility of allowing France a free hand in Morocco should be reserved against the time when she should decide as to adherence to the Russo-German understanding.[15]

In the meantime, the Moroccan situation had been rendered more complicated and difficult by Von Tattenbach's activity in Fez. In direct violation of the spirit if not the letter of the accord of July 8, and contrary to instructions, he encouraged the Sultan to conclude a pending contract with a German firm for the construction of a mole and warehouse at

[12] *G. P.*, XIX, 465. The dramatic circumstances under which the treaty was signed have been described many times. Cf. Fay, *Origins*, I, 171–75; Sontag, *A. H. R.*, Jan., 1928, pp. 293–94; Wolff, *Le Prélude*, pp. 228–29; Anderson, *The First Moroccan Crisis*, pp. 281 ff.; Brandenburg, *From Bismarck to the World War*, pp. 233–36; a charming non-political account of the meeting is given by Helmuth von Moltke, *Erinnerungen*, pp. 325–30.

[13] Bülow to Holstein, July 26; mem. by Holstein, July 28; Bülow to the Kaiser, July 28; Bülow to F. O., Aug. 2; Mühlberg to Bülow, Aug. 10. *G. P.*, XIX, 467–68, 476, 476–77, 481, 494. Also discussions relative to a possible change in Article I; *ibid.*, XIX, 483–500, *passim*. On Aug. 14, Holstein advised that the idea be dropped: "Setzen Sie [Bülow] darum Ihre ganze Autorität daran, um jeden Änderungsantrag, ja überhaupt jede Besprechung des Vertrages zu verhindern." Holstein to Bülow, Aug. 14; *ibid.*, XIX, 501.

[14] Holstein to Bülow, July 26; *ibid.*, XIX, 468–70.

[15] Bülow to F. O., July 31; *ibid.*, XX, 531–32. On the negotiations following between Berlin and St. Petersburg relative to the treaty see Anderson, pp. 294 ff.

Tangier, and facilitated negotiations between the Sultan's financial agent and a German consortium for a loan of ten million marks.[16] It appears that the Kaiser had expressed a hope to German representatives in Morocco that the contract for harbor works would be granted to a German firm.[17] The loan, or the advance on the next loan, as the legal light Von Kriege termed it, had not been arranged when the French got wind of the negotiations. These favors indicated the Sultan's willingness to pay the Germans with valuable concessions for their support against France. This was a question involving francs and marks and not abstract policy or prestige. The French had beaten the bush, but it looked as if the bird would fly to another gunner.

Rouvier protested vigorously on several occasions against Von Tattenbach's actions.[18] Von Mühlberg addressed a stiff note to the zealous official, reminding him that his instructions had called for a reserved attitude toward concessions offered by the Sultan.[19] The German agent, however, was defended by his government with hair-splitting legal arguments.[20]

Tattenbach's questionable conduct provoked greater anger against Germany in the French press than any other incident during the Moroccan crisis. Resentment and indignation at German policy was not confined to a section of the press, but was generally manifested in the organs of all parties. *Temps*, commenting on Tattenbach's activity, said:

If matters continue to develop in the direction they now seem to be taking, his disavowal ought to be a necessity. . . . We ac-

[16] *Ibid.*, XX, 529–30, 535–36, 542–43.

[17] Holstein to Radolin, Aug. 18; *ibid.*, XX, 540–42. Holstein was not sympathetic toward the Tangier concession, but thought that the claim of the French bank consortium to an option on all Moroccan loans was "*contra bonos mores.*"

[18] Radolin to F. O., July 30, Aug. 2; mem. by Pourtalès, Aug. 23; Radolin to Bülow, Aug. 29. *Ibid.*, XX, 529–31, 533 543–44, 551–56. *Affaires du Maroc*, pp. 254–56, 260–65, 266–67, 272–75.

[19] Mühlberg to Tattenbach, Aug. 3; *ibid.*, XX, 535–36.

[20] It was argued, for instance, that the ten million marks constituted only a credit advance against the next loan contracted by the Sultan, and was not itself a loan. Pourtalès to Radolin, Aug. 19; mem. by Kriege (undated, but probably Sept. 3). *Ibid.*, XX, 542–43, 554–57.

cepted the conference, and instead of awaiting its reunion the German minister, with a sort of voracity and in a double-faced manner, attempts to prevent a collective solution by individual action. It is an unacceptable method. (August 2).

Two sharp articles, entitled "The Zeal of Herr von Tattenbach" and "Herr von Tattenbach Continues," followed in the same journal (August 3, 11). An anonymous writer, "W.X.Y.Z." published two articles in *Figaro* (July 31, August 4) in which he warned Germany that although France had made one concession after another the limit had been reached. *Echo de Paris* (August 17, 19, 23) loudly denounced the duplicity of the German government and the conduct of its representative. Even Jaurès severely criticized the latest development in German policy.[21] The general opinion in France was tersely stated by *Temps:* "Some months ago the German papers vied with one another in proclaiming: 'We do not wish France to make a Tunis of Morocco.' It is now our turn to say, as a Power bordering on Morocco: 'We do not wish Germany to make Morocco a second Turkey.' "[22]

Maurice Ordinaire, writing in *République Française*, pointed out the relation of this incident to a new current noticeable in French opinion.

> It produced a veritable stupefication in France [he wrote]. The violation of the engagements implicitly contained in the accord was flagrant. . . . Can the acquisition of a few millions by some business men offset the moral damage suffered by German policy in continuing this game? Her object appeared to be, in the beginning, to turn France's friendship away from England. Perhaps she might have succeeded if the proper procedure had been employed. More than one Frenchman was inclined to redress somewhat the balance —which in their opinion was inclined too sharply toward England —in favor of Germany. After two months of negotiations one could not find a person supporting this view. . . . The national spirit, which in certain circles seemed dead, is aroused, and silences all differences. (August 28.)

German correspondents in Paris noted the change in the

[21] *Humanité*, Sept. 2.

[22] *Temps*, Aug. 2. See also *B. D.*, III, 126, 128–30.

French press and the sharp and bitter tone now employed against Germany.[23] Holstein's policy of procrastination and Von Tattenbach's activity on behalf of German concession hunters occasioned a complete change in French press opinion during July and August—a significant fact not fully appreciated in Berlin.

The widespread resentment manifested in France moved Bülow to take unusual steps to break the deadlock existing over the negotiations. At his personal request, Dr. Friedrich Rosen, a conciliatory and methodical diplomat, a man of unquestionable integrity, and an expert in oriental affairs, went to Paris to arrange through direct conversations the outstanding points in the conference program.[24] Dr. Rosen, on his return from a special mission to Abyssinia, had been appointed minister to Morocco, but had passed the summer in Germany before taking over the post at Tangier. Holstein had been very uncommunicative; Rosen had not been allowed to study the despatches, and when Bülow asked him to take the negotiations out of Holstein's hands, he was not acquainted with details of the conversations. Kriege accompanied him to Paris, but the lawyer's brief, which the legal expert and Holstein had drawn up on the pending questions, was entirely abandoned by Dr. Rosen.[25]

His mission was well received in the Paris press, which praised him highly in contrast to Count Tattenbach, whom he was to succeed in Morocco.[26] The German representative and M. Révoil, who conducted the negotiations for the Quai d'Orsay, mutually agreed neither to make independent communications to the press nor to use it as a weapon.[27]

[23] *Berliner Tageblatt*, July 29, and a long article by Theodor Wolff, on Aug. 2, entitled "Die Gefahren der Marokko-Affäre." *Berliner Post*, July 30; *Berliner Neueste Nachrichten*, Aug. 10, 12.

[24] Bülow to Radolin, Sept. 4; *G. P.*, XX, 557.

[25] Rosen to Bülow, Sept. 8, giving his views on the pending questions; *ibid.*, XX, 559–62.

[26] *Temps*, Sept. 6; *Figaro*, *Matin*, and *Débats*, Sept. 8. A personal interview with Tardieu appeared in *Temps*, Sept. 8. For Rosen's account of his conversation with Tardieu, who promised conciliatory articles, see *G. P.*, XX, 562.

[27] *Figaro*, Sept. 16; interview with Dr. Rosen in *Débats*, Sept. 20; *Norddeutsche*, Sept. 17.

Four questions were to be discussed and settled: first, organization of the police in the frontier zone; second, the place where the conference should be held; third, the German contract for harbor works at Tangier; and fourth, the loan of ten million marks to the Sultan. Rosen was empowered to concede the exclusion of the frontier zone from the scope of the conference, and contrary to Germany's former position, he was authorized to accept a meeting place other than Tangier. He was to uphold the loan, which as yet had not been completed, and the contract for harbor works.[28]

Révoil proved to be a difficult person with whom to negotiate, and Rosen soon received the impression that his program aimed at the entire exclusion of the international principle in carrying out Moroccan reforms. It was Jean Dupuy who finally suggested the basis for a compromise on all questions except the most important, namely, police organization. Here Rosen withheld the concession that he was empowered to make, and sought to secure a promise from Rouvier that France would not ask the conference for an exclusive police mandate in western Morocco. Such a promise Rouvier refused to make.[29]

As the days passed and no agreement was announced, the Paris press renewed the attack on German diplomacy, charging that Berlin pursued a wilful and deliberate policy of obstruction.[30] Radolin called at the Quai d'Orsay and protested at the tone of the semi-official press; it endangered the success of negotiations.[31] Through joint efforts of Radolin, Dupuy, and Rosen, the press was quieted and conversations continued.[32]

[28] Richthofen to Radolin, Sept. 10; *G. P.*, XX, 564–66.

[29] Rosen to Bülow, Sept. 16; Rosen to F. O., Sept. 21. *Ibid.*, XX, 568–70, 577.

[30] *Temps*, Sept. 18; *Débats*, Sept. 21; Ernest Judet in *Eclair*, Sept. 18; Clemenceau in *Aurore*, Sept. 21, 25; *Matin*, Sept. 19, 20, 22, 23.

[31] Bülow to F. O., transmitting a telegram from Radolin, Sept. 19; *G. P.*, XX, 572–73.

[32] Rosen to Bülow, Sept. 20; *ibid.*, XX, 574–75. A quieting statement by Rosen appeared in *Débats* on Sept. 20, and Tardieu had a conciliatory article in *Temps* of the same date. Rosen protested to Rouvier against an article in *Débats* (Sept. 20), which could only have been written, he said, as a result of a flagrant indiscretion on the part of the Quai d'Orsay. Rosen to F. O., Sept. 21; *ibid.*, XX, 577.

Rouvier consistently refused to give a written statement binding France not to seek an exclusive mandate for the policing of western Morocco. For, as Paul Cambon righteously explained to Lansdowne, France had no desire to anticipate the decisions of the conference.[33] In fact, the French had already anticipated its conclusions by negotiating a secret agreement with Spain, on September 1. The two Powers agreed on the division of Moroccan ports for the organization of police, on the suppression of the smuggling of arms, and on the state bank and other mutual economic and financial interests.[34] Lansdowne, it seems, encouraged the initiation of conversations that resulted in this agreement[35] and heartily approved the final accord,[36] which, to say the least, reduced the Algeciras Conference to a hollow farce.

Count Witte, who stopped in Paris on his return from the Portsmouth conference, convinced Radolin that because of the unfavorable reaction it would produce on French public opinion, Rouvier could not give the written statement desired by Germany. However, the Russian plenipotentiary gave Radolin to understand that Rouvier had verbally agreed not to seek a mandate outside the frontier zone.[37] In a subsequent conversation with the French premier, both Rosen and Radolin received the same impression, but the declaration read by the French minister to the German representatives had the effect of releasing him from such a commitment. The first sentence of this statement read: "Outside of the formula that shall be signed by the two Governments, I intend to have no engagement on any

[33] Lansdowne to Bertie, Sept. 27; *B. D.*, III, 140–42.

[34] Cambon to Lansdowne, Sept. 6; *ibid.*, III, 136–38. The organization of police on the Algerian frontier was left the exclusive affair of France; at Rabat and Casablanca the police force was to be organized and officered by the French, at Tetuan and Laraiche by the Spanish; at Tangier forces were to be organized and officered jointly by French and Spanish with a French commander; Safi, Mazagan and Mogador were not mentioned in this agreement as they fell entirely within the French sphere as delimited by the secret agreement of October 3, 1904.

[35] *B. D.*, III, 131, No. 173, ed. note (1).

[36] Lansdowne to Cambon, Sept. 9; *ibid.*, III, 138.

[37] Rosen to Bülow, Sept. 23; Radolin to Bülow, Sept. 23. *G. P.*, XX, 579–82, 582–83.

point."[38] This subject later gave rise to a misunderstanding when Rouvier maintained that he had not made such a promise.[39]

On September 26, an accord was reached on all questions, and after two days spent on drafting, the agreement was signed on the 28th.[40] Count Witte's intervention with the Kaiser, whom he visited at Rominten on September 27, had no effect on the conclusion of negotiations in Paris.[41] The program agreed on was almost identical with the original French proposals. Policing of the border zone and suppression of contraband in the same district were excluded from consideration by the conference; the police and contraband in the rest of Morocco were left for its consideration; creation of a state bank, the creation of new revenues, non-alienation of public services, and open tenders for all public works, were also placed upon the agenda. Outside of the program the two parties agreed to divide the ten million mark loan between French and German bankers, but the German contract for harbor works at Tangier was upheld.[42] The agreement was based, however, upon a fundamental misinterpretation. Bülow thought that Franco-German differences over Morocco

[38] Rosen to F. O., Sept. 25; Radolin to F. O., Sept 25. *Ibid.*, XX, 584–85, 585. *Affaires du Maroc*, p. 305.

[39] See Radolin's statement, Feb. 8, 1906; *ibid.*, XXI, 152. Rouvier's statement to Sir Charles Hardinge, Jan. 16, 1906; *B. D.*, III, 226–27. Tardieu's explanation of the circumstances is not in accord with the German documents. (*La Conférence*, p. 45, note.)

[40] Bülow to Radolin, Sept. 26; *G. P.*, XX, 685–86. Tardieu's assertion (*La Conférence*, p. 77) that Rouvier in a fit of anger frightened Rosen into signing is fantastical. Instructions to close came from Berlin; Radolin and not Rosen signed the document. Moreover, it was signed on September 28 and not on the 27th, as Tardieu states.

[41] The Kaiser's telegram, sent at Witte's suggestion, reached Bülow at Baden-Baden and was forwarded to the foreign office the evening of Sept. 27. No new instructions, however, were sent to Paris. Kaiser to Bülow, Sept. 27; *ibid.*, XIX, 508–11. See Dr. Rosen's statement in *G. P.*, XXXX, 167–68. Count Witte (*Memoirs*, pp. 416–17, 421) states he suggested to Rouvier and the Kaiser that they settle their difficulties by calling an international conference and that they acted on his advice. In fact, before Witte left Portsmouth all the Powers, including Russia, had accepted the Sultan's invitation to a congress.

[42] *G. P.*, XX, 592; *Affaires du Maroc*, pp. 306–10; *B. D.*, III, 143–44.

had been entirely removed, making it possible for the two Powers to coöperate rather than oppose one another at the conference.[43] In reality, the all-important question of police organization and administration—a settlement of which would have made the conference a prefunctory meeting to register publicly the decisions of the two parties—was no nearer a definitive solution after September 28 than it had been after July 8. It was only temporarily obscured by a failure to comprehend the real import of Rouvier's verbal declaration.

Dr. Rosen's mission to Paris ended amidst mutual expressions of friendship and good will. The German plenipotentiary was received by President Loubet and the presidential box at the Opera was placed at his disposal. Bülow, in return for the great services rendered by Jean Dupuy in the Moroccan negotiations, granted a personal interview to an editor of *Petit Parisien* on October 2. André Tardieu, who claimed similar treatment, was received by the chancellor at Baden-Baden on October 3.[44]

The European press recognized, from the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese war, that the relations of the Great Powers had been thrown into a state of flux out of which would come a new grouping. The first indication of the lines along which the new alignment would occur was the French *rapprochement* to England and Italy. This led many writers to forecast a grouping of the three Liberal western European states. Such a hypothesis was strengthened by the evident drawing together, during the war, of Russia and Germany at the cost of the Franco-Russian Alliance. Not a few German writers and publicists envisaged the break-up of the Dual Alliance and re-creation of the old Three Emperors League. On the other hand, a popular view in France was that after the conclusion of war in the Far East, French mediation would bring about an understanding between Russia and England. Des-

[43] Bülow to Radolin, Sept. 26; *G. P.*, XX, 585–86.

[44] Rosen to F. O., Sept. 29; Rosen to Bülow, Oct. 2; Bülow to Rosen, Sept. 30. *Ibid.*, XX, 593–94, 596, 594–95.

pite the alliance with Japan, this possibility was not lost sight of in England during the war, and undoubtedly did much to mitigate English antagonism toward Russia.

After conclusion of peace at Portsmouth and the subsequent announcement on September 26 of the renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, the possibility of an Anglo-Russian understanding again became the subject of editorial discussion in the British press.[45] In Russia, too, news of the extension of the alliance, which emphasized equally with the protocols of Portsmouth that her preponderance in the Orient was at an end, evoked press articles advocating an understanding with England. The English ambassador, however, wrote to Lansdowne that great importance should not be attributed to newspaper articles, which the French ambassador informed him had been directly inspired by his embassy.[46] At the same time, articles appeared in the Paris press minimizing the anti-Russian character of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance and warmly advocating an understanding.[47]

The opposite tendency prevailed in the German press. The renewal and extension of the alliance between the two island Powers was regarded as a particularly offensive Asiatic Monroe Doctrine aimed directly against German and Russian interests in the Far East. It was regarded by many, however, as an advantage in that it put an end to the danger of an Anglo-Russian *entente*.[48] When the falsity of this conclusion was demonstrated by the discussions already noted in the English and Russian journals, considerable uneasiness was evidenced in German press comment.[49]

[45] *Manchester Guardian*, Oct. 5, 11; *Westminster Gazette*, Oct. 4, 11; *Daily Telegraph*, Sept. 27, 29, Oct. 3; *Standard*, Sept. 11, 27, 28, Oct. 5, 26; *Daily Mail*, Oct. 9, 11, Nov. 13; *Pall Mall Gazette*, Oct. 16, 15. Bernstorff to Bülow, Sept. 8, 12, 25; *G. P.*, XIX, 636–41, 658–59, 661–63. *Belg. D.*, III, 91, 93–97.

[46] Hardinge to Lansdowne, Oct. 8; *B. D.*, IV, 208–10. On the reception of the renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance in the Russian press, see Hardinge to Lansdowne, Oct. 1; *ibid.*, IV, 202–4.

[47] *Temps*, Oct. 3, 5; Maurice Ordinaire in *République Française*, Sept. 30; *Siècle*, Oct. 3; *Petit Parisien*, Oct. 10, 11, 25, 26; *Echo de Paris*, Oct. 20.

[48] The Belgian minister at Berlin noted the reaction in official circles and the public press. *Belg. D.*, I, supp. 19–29.

During the same period, numerous articles appeared in the European daily and periodical press, which discussed the possibility of an understanding between France and Germany as a complement to the obvious Russo-German *rapprochement*. The Kaiser had long envisaged the formation of such a continental league, the Czar had entertained the idea in the autumn of 1904, and the two monarchs signed the well-known Björkö treaty in July, 1905. Count Witte, when he learned the terms of the renewed Anglo-Japanese Alliance, became a warm partisan of the Kaiser's scheme to save the world from 'Anglo-Saxon domination.'[50] It was particularly desirable, from Witte's point of view, that France and Germany should stand close enough together to permit Russia to rifle their pockets at the same time. French publicists discussed the possibility of a *rapprochement* with Germany, if they did not go so far as to speak of an alliance.[51] Some writers, particularly the French Nationalists, interpreted Bülow's Moroccan policy as a move to force France into the German orbit. "Be my friend, or I will kill you," was their explanation of the manifest inconsistencies between Bülow's Moroccan policy and the Kaiser's desire to enter the Franco-Russian Alliance as a third party.

After the historic meeting of the Kaiser and Czar at Björkö, the Moroccan policy sponsored by Bülow and Hol-

[49] *National-Zeitung*, No. 672, Nov. 27; *Münchener Allgemeine Zeitung*, No. 498, Oct. 29; *Kölnische Zeitung*, No. 1034, 1115, Oct. 4, 26.

[50] Radolin to Bülow, Sept. 23; Bülow to the Kaiser, Sept. 25; Bülow to F. O., Sept., 27; Kaiser to Bülow, Sept. 27. *G. P.*, XIX, 503–4, 505–6, 507, 508–11.

[51] An attempt to measure the sentiment favorable to a Franco-German *rapprochement* was made by *Siècle*, which published almost daily during September and October, 1905, replies to a series of questions on the possibility of a complete understanding. Among the answers printed were those from Arthur Levysohn, editor of *Berliner Tageblatt*, Adolph Harnack, Gerhart Hauptmann, and Hermann Sudermann. Practically all though a *rapprochement* possible. Other articles discussing the question were: "Konnte Frankreich sich mit Deutschland Verständigen?," by General von Lignitz in *Deutsche Revue*, Aug., 1905, pp. 147–151; under the same title an article by Senator D'Estournelles de Constans, *Deutsche Revue*, Sept., 1905; pp. 329–33. A brochure by Captain Corf (Quittons la Méditerranée et la mer de Chine), which received considerable notice in the press, set forth the naval and military advantages to France of an alliance between Russia, France, and Germany.

stein became integrated with the Emperor's plan for a continental league. On July 31, one week after the signature of the Björkö treaty, Bülow wrote that the offer of a free hand in Morocco would be a strong inducement when the time came for France to adhere to the Russo-German understanding.[52] Bülow's desire to conciliate the French was also manifested by his acceptance of their conference program in almost its original form.

Failure or success of German diplomacy depended on French adherence to the Björkö treaty. If France followed Russia into the German orbit, the specter of isolation that haunted the Wilhelmstrasse would be laid; if France drew closer to England, Russia would be drawn eventually into the same circle by the irresistible magnetism of the French purse. During the first week of October, 1905, France and Russia stood at the crossroads; one way led to Berlin, the other to London. The various lines of European policy converged at that point in a way that necessitated a decision. First, the Peace of Portsmouth had just been concluded, upon the ratification of which the Björkö treaty was to come into force; second, under the terms of this treaty Russia was bound to solicit her ally's adherence; third, the renewal and extension of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, which was regarded as an event making an Anglo-Russian *rapprochement* improbable, was announced; fourth, Witte, returning from America, had openly declared for a continental alliance in an interview appearing in *Temps;* and fifth, the Franco-German negotiations on the conference program had been concluded and favorably received in both countries. To Bülow, who gave interviews to representatives of *Petit Parisien* and *Temps* at Baden-Baden on October 2 and 3, the moment seemed opportune for a friendly gesture toward France.

In his interviews with Douvier and Tardieu, the chancellor frankly attempted to enlist the good will of France on the side of Germany. Without mentioning Delcassé's name, he explained that the former foreign minister's program had

[52] Bülow to F. O., July 31; *G. P.*, XX, 531–32.

been responsible for recent Franco-German difficulties; that Germany's Moroccan action had been "une riposte nécessaire" to a policy that had treated her as isolated; and, that happily a new spirit had manifested itself in the conduct of French foreign affairs, resulting in the friendly agreement just concluded. He hoped that the coöperation might continue at the conference and pave the way for a closer understanding between the two nations. It was the duty of the press, he continued, to promote a feeling of mutual confidence upon which such an understanding must be based.[53]

Bülow's statements awakened a sympathetic echo in Germany where they received the hearty approval of practically all the journals from *Kreuzzeitung* to *Vorwärts*. Articles appeared in the leading papers, advocating a general agreement with France.[54]

This brief Franco-German 'honeymoon' was brought abruptly to a close by the French press. In Paris, Prince Bülow's utterances produced a totally unexpected response. On September 30, the Paris correspondent of the *Daily Telegraph* reported that the agreement on the conference program had been received by the press in "a fairly conciliatory spirit," but that in private conversation there was no such reserve. "Never since the Schnaebele incident, in 1887," he wrote, "has French indignation been so excited against Germany." Following the publication of Bülow's interviews, all the pent-up indignation and resentment at Germany's Moroccan policy burst forth in a press campaign of unusual violence.

Stéphane Lauzanne, foster son of the great De Blowitz, took the lead with a series of 'revelations,' appearing in *Ma-*

[53] Lucien Vitry (Louis Douvier) in *Petit Parisien*, Oct. 4; George Villiers (André Tardieu) in *Temps*, Oct. 5. Bülow was willing at this time to enter into negotiations with France for a general agreement on the Bagdad Railroad and questions of mutual interest in Africa. Bülow to F. O., Sept. 30; *G. P.*, XX, 594–95.

[54] *Norddeutsche*, Oct. 8, suggested a general discussion of outstanding questions; Theodor Schiemann wrote in a similar vein in *Kreuzzeitung*, Oct. 11, as did also Arthur Levysohn in *Berliner Tageblatt*, Oct. 8. *Berliner Neueste Nachrichten*, Oct. 6; *Münchener Allgemeine Zeitung*, Oct. 7; *Berliner Post*, Oct. 5, 7; reports of the Berlin correspondents of *Temps*, Oct. 7, 9, 13, and *Petit Parisien*, Oct. 5.

tin.[55] These articles professed to reveal how German statesmen (Radolin, Donnersmarck, Hammann, and Rosen), under the cloak of protecting their interests in Morocco, had by sinister intrigue encompassed Delcassé's fall; Bülow now sought to bring France into a position of vassalage to the German Empire by forcing an alliance upon her. Such, declared Lauzanne, was "the brutal dream of the German Colossus." André Mévil followed Lauzanne with a similar series of articles in *Echo de Paris*, which purported to reveal "An unknown page of history."[56] Germany's savage Moroccan policy had failed to frighten France into an alliance with her; Bülow, he declared, now sought to seduce her with fair words. The general purpose of the 'revelations' in *Matin* and *Echo de Paris* was to rehabilitate Delcassé's reputation, to expose the so-called brutality of German policy, to demonstrate the loyalty with which England had supported France during the crisis, and to block any move for a *rapprochement* with the neighbor across the Vosges.

Public interest centered on the *Matin* article of October 7, entitled "A Session of the Ministerial Council." In this, Lauzanne professed to give an exact account of the proceedings of the council of June 6 at which Delcassé resigned. He declared that the foreign minister had urged rejection of the conference invitation; if such action resulted in war with Germany, Delcassé had assurances that England would aid him. In a footnote, Lauzanne stated that oral declarations had been made by England offering, in case of necessity, to seize the Kiel Canal and land 100,000 men in Schleswig-Holstein. The statement that England had given Delcassé assurances of support, or had offered to conclude an alliance for that purpose, was confirmed by Alexander Ular in *Figaro*,[57] by Jaurès in a speech at Limoges,[58] and by Maurice Sarraut in *Dépêche de Toulouse*.[59]

[55] *Matin*, Oct. 6, 7, 8, 17. Series entitled "La Verité sur l'affaire du Maroc."

[56] *Echo de Paris*, Oct. 7, 14, 24, 25, 26.

[57] *Figaro*, Oct. 13, "England and the Dismissal of Delcassé."

[58] *Humanité*, Oct. 11, 12.

[59] *Dépêche de Toulouse*, Oct. 14, "Rouvier versus Delcassé." The legend that

In the European press, the opinion was widely held that the 'revelations' were directly inspired by Delcassé. A letter to *Figaro* and an interview with the former foreign minister, in *Echo de Paris*, were couched in such equivocal language that they were not considered, by his opponents at least, to be a denial of the charge that he was the source of the sensational *Matin* articles.[60] Consequently, he was violently attacked in French journals of the extreme Right and Left for revealing secrets of state.[61] *Temps*, *Débats*, and *Figaro* maintained an attitude of reserve toward the bitter debate between Delcassé's enemies and his supporters, but they openly expressed their disapproval of the sensational manner in which the battle was waged.[62]

English journals treated the dramatic disclosures in *Matin* in a quiet and dignified manner. The Conservative organs either questioned or denied the story that English armed assistance had been offered Delcassé. On the other hand, they frankly admitted that in case of a German attack on France, England would have aided the French with all her strength.[63] The Liberal press—*Daily Chronicle*, *Manchester Guardian*, and *Daily News*—attacked the government for having assumed an attitude that might have led Delcassé or the French to expect armed support in a conflict with Germany. "It is an awful reflection," declared *Manchester Guardian*,

> that our Government should have put it in anyone's power to advertise our willingness under certain contingencies to go to war with Germany. That these contingencies never actually came is beside

England offered to conclude an alliance with France, or definitely proposed the seizure of the Kiel canal, has at last been dispelled by the publications of the *British Documents;* III, 172–87.

[60] *Echo de Paris*, Oct. 12. In reply to a letter from Gaston Calmette, Delcassé wrote: "Je voudrais bien apaiser votre trouble, mais je ne suis plus juge de l'opportunité d'une déclaration. Je vous prie de m'excuser." *Figaro*, Oct. 11. Lister to Lansdowne, Oct. 11; Bertie to Lansdowne, Oct. 14. *B. D.*, III, 83, 84. Report of the Belgian minister at Paris, Oct. 14; *Belg. D.*, III, 71, 73.

[61] *Humanité*, Oct. 11, 12, 13, 16; *Aurore*, Oct. 8, 11, 12, 14, 16, 17; *Lanterne*, Oct. 16; *Gaulois*, Oct, 11, 13, 14; *Eclair*, Oct. 10, 11: *Patrie*, Oct. 13.

[62] *Temps*, Oct. 14, 15; *Débats*, Oct. 9, 11, 13; *Figaro*, Oct. 11.

[63] *Spectator*, Oct. 14; *Saturday Review*, Oct. 14; *Daily Mail*, Oct. 9, 12; *Pall Mall Gazette*, Oct. 14; *Morning Post*, Oct. 16.

the question, inasmuch as the question was, in fact, decided by the fall of M. Delcassé and the moderation of the French Government, and not by anything that our own Government did or said later.[64]

The offer of armed assistance, alleged by Lauzanne to have been made in June, precipitated a frenzied anti-English crusade in the German press. *Matin*, charged political journalists, had revealed an "assassin's plot" in which England had played the part of *agent provocateur*. They alleged that Delcassé had been used as a convenient tool to precipitate a conflict between France and Germany; only the prompt action of German statesmen and the unwillingness of the French nation to follow Delcassé's lead had prevented a resort to arms; the fact that the foreign minister had been repudiated by the French press, the Chamber, and the nation, made England's responsibility even greater. Semi-official denials of the 'revelations' and a quieting statement in the *Norddeutsche*[65] failed to end the clamor in the public press. Despite such refutations, maintained the journalists, it was evident that England had convinced Delcassé that he could count on British assistance in a war with Germany. They concluded that henceforth the unalterable hostility of England was a factor that must be taken into account.[66]

Bülow's directions for handling the 'revelations' in the press division of the foreign office are revealed in three despatches from Baden-Baden. The disclosures were not to be treated too skeptically; Delcassé had consciously sought to provoke a war while Germany's aims were entirely pacific; personal attacks on King Edward were to be avoided, but what the French papers published about his intervention on

[64] *Manchester Guardian*, Oct. 13. Similar views expressed by *Daily News*, Oct. 13, and *Daily Chronicle*, Oct. 10. The observations of the Belgain minister at London are recorded in *Belg. D.*, III, 75–77.

[65] *Norddeutsche*, Oct. 15; *B. D.*, III, 85–86.

[66] *Vossische Zeitung*, Nos. 478, 486, 488, 595, Oct. 11, 16, 17, Dec. 20; *Kölnische Zeitung*, Nos. 1050, 1062, 1073, 1077, 1086, Oct. 9, 12, 15, 16, 18; *Frankfurter Zeitung*, Nos. 282, 283, 284, Oct. 11, 12, 13; *Münchener Allgemeine Zeitung*, Nos. 472, 474, Oct. 14, 15; *Hamburger Nachrichten*, Nos. 713, 749, Oct. 10, 24; *Berliner Post*, Oct. 12, 27; *Kreuzzeitung*, Oct. 11, 14, 25; *Berliner Neueste Nachrichten*, Oct. 10, 13, 15, 17; report of the Belgian minister at Berlin, Oct. 13, *Belg. D.*, III, 77, 79.

behalf of Delcassé could be quoted; Germany had no intentions to promote an anti-English coalition or to play France against her; and on the other hand, Germany would not be terrorized by France and England. According to the chancellor, it must be impressed upon the public that German policy was pacific; that the international situation was serious for Germany; and, that the 'revelations' showed the necessity for the strongest of armaments on land and sea. These ideas should not be expressed in a single newspaper or review, but should be the main theme running through a number of articles in the daily press.[67]

The *Matin* 'revelations' as they were treated in the German press greatly stimulated national ill-will toward England and created a powerful sentiment favorable to further increases in the German naval program. Bülow told Von Tirpitz that he might make his demands as high as he wished in the supplementary naval bill that was in preparation. He would guarantee its acceptance.[68] The Belgian minister at Berlin reported that practically all parties were united on the necessity of increasing the fleet, due to the conviction that Germany was in danger of a British attack.[69]

Under the impression created by the 'revelations,' the Liberal independent *Frankfurter Zeitung* formulated a question that it thought Germany had the right to ask France: "In case we are drawn into a conflict with England, will you be her ally and our enemy, or will you be loyally neutral?"[70] In answering, the French press clearly and unmistakably rejected the overtures for a "bonne entente," made by Bülow in his interviews with the representatives of *Temps* and *Petit Parisien*. *Débats*, *Temps*, *Figaro*, *Aurore*, *Petite République*—in short, the papers of all parties gave a strikingly unanimous answer: Maintain the alliance with Russia and existing friendships with Italy, Spain, and England; preserve the independence of our foreign policy and our full liberty of

[67] Bülow to F. O., Oct. 10, 12, 15; *G. P.*, XX, 664, 665, 668–69.

[68] Tirpitz, *Aufbau der deutschen Weltmacht*, p. 25.

[69] Reports dated Nov. 18 and Dec. 2, 1905; *Belg. D.*, III, 99, 101–3.

[70] *Frankfurter Zeitung*, No. 289, Oct. 18.

action; but on the other hand, neither an alliance with England nor an *entente* with Germany.[71]

What the French feared was not so much a wanton German attack as a war between the two great divisions of the Germanic race into which France might be drawn if she took sides too openly in the Anglo-German quarrel. The Entente Cordiale had made great gains with the French public during the summer. Suspicion that British statesmen wished to make an English soldier of France had disappeared, but not a single journal went so far as to advocate an alliance with the island Power.

Germany's Moroccan policy, the sensational disclosures of Delcassé's partisans in the French press, and the reaction that they provoked in Germany intensified international suspicion and animosity. They raised a chauvinistic tide upon which jingoes floated their craft. The effect on Germany's naval program has been noted. In France, the net result was a revival of the national spirit and a general demand for

[71] *République Française*, Oct. 18: "We have escaped German vassalage and preserved the independence of our foreign policy. . . ." *Lanterne*, Oct. 16: "Friendly relations with all, but free to choose our allies and our policies. . . ." *Débats*, Oct. 22: "We intend to retain the freedom of our policy, freedom to do or not to do, freedom to act or to abstain, according to our interests. . . ." Jaurès quoted in *Figaro*, Oct. 24:"We wish France to reserve toward all her complete liberty of action. . . ." *Patrie*, Oct 14: "Neither Germany nor England has the right or the power to say to the French people: Be my brother or I will kill you. The brotherhood of France and Germany would be a crime against honor. The brotherhood of England and France would be contrary to reason." *Echo de Paris*, Oct. 6: "France has one ally, Russia, and one friend, England. She intends to remain true at the same time to her alliance and her friendship." *Gaulois*, Oct. 5: "Remain friends with England, . . . Russia will not take offense at our *entente* any more than Germany is disturbed by the cordial sentiments we entertain for Italy; but under all circumstances conserve our complete freedom of action." *Temps*, Oct. 9: "England's friendship is valuable to us, and we wish to preserve it. . . An alliance, on the contrary, would be in Europe a source of trouble which, while compromising us, would not afford us a sufficient guarantee in case of a conflict. The ally of Russia, the friend of England and Italy, that is our natural situation and our lasting interest." *Frankfurter Zeitung's* question was answered by *Temps* in almost identical language on Oct. 21. Similar views expressed in *Figaro*, Oct. 23, quoting Gerault-Richard, prominent Radical editor of *Petite République; Humanité*, Oct. 22, reproducing a letter from Maurice Sarraut, influential politician and journalist. Also Theodor Wolff's despatches to *Berliner Tageblatt*, Oct, 11, 17; and his account in *Le Prélude*, pp. 204–6.

reorganization and strengthening of the country's military defenses.[72] In December, a heavy increase in national armaments was carried through the Chamber with a large majority.

The solidarity of the French press in rejecting the idea of a *rapprochement* with Germany shattered the Kaiser's dream of a continental league, for at the height of the campaign, Nelidov, the Russian ambassador at Paris, was sounding French statesmen on the possibility of adherence to the Björkö treaty. On October 14, the Belgian minister at Paris wrote: "If there existed not so long ago, some politicians who envisaged a Franco-German *rapprochement* as a desirable possibility, there is not one today who would dare to formulate such a project. . . ."[73] On October 15, Nelidov informed Lamsdorff that to broach the subject now, considering the state of French public opinion, would alienate France from Russia, bring the latter completely under the German yoke, and prevent the flotation of the much-needed Russian loan with Parisian bankers.[74] In the meantime, the Czar, convinced by Lamsdorff's arguments, had informed the Kaiser that the treaty could not come into force until France became a party to it, "because its obligations in the present wording, point at any European Power and France too—Russia's ally."[75] It was the *Matin* 'revelations' and French public

[72] "National chauvinism is reviving, people discuss the efficiency of the national defenses and show themselves disposed to make new sacrifices in order that the army and navy shall be prepared for every eventuality." Report of the Belgian minister at Paris, Oct. 24; *Belg. D.*, III, 85. The press was filled with attacks upon pacifism, articles on national defense and the crisis in national patriotism. Only a few of the more important articles are indicated here. De Lanessan in *Matin*, Oct. 21, 22, 23; G. Piquart in *Aurore*, Oct. 22, 25; *Gaulois*, Oct. 24, 28, 29; *Temps*, Oct. 27; *Echo de Paris*, had carried on a campaign since July—July 12, 15, 20, 29, 31, Aug. 22, Sept. 2, 11, 28, Oct. 11, and subsequent issues. See also Bülow's memorandum for a press article on this subject, Dec., 1905; Hammann, *Bilder*, pp. 43–44. And Ernest Dimnet, *France Herself Again* (N. Y., 1914), pp. 151–391, *passim*.

[73] *Belg. D.*, III, 69.

[74] *KSF*, Nov., 1924, pp. 489–92. Another despatch, dated Oct. 18, relates a conversation with Rouvier, who unequivocally stated that the French nation would not countenance a close understanding with Germany. *Ibid.*, pp. 492–93.

[75] Czar to the Kaiser, Oct. 7; Witte to Eulenburg, Oct. 8. *G. P.*, XIX, 512–13, 518–20. For the part played by Lamsdorff see Savinsky, *Recollections of a Russian Diplomat*, pp. 118–24.

opinion to which the Czar referred when he wrote to the Kaiser on November 23: "The events of the last weeks have shown that there is not much chance of winning her [France] over to our treaty 'à trois' at least for the present."[76]

Russia was faced with the alternative of following France into the English circle or standing by the Kaiser and the Björkö treaty. Germany had been her friend during the conflict with Japan, but France was her banker and she needed a huge loan to liquidate the war. Moreover, England had more to offer a defeated Russia than had Germany; hence, while Lamsdorff, Nelidov, and Witte scuttled the Björkö agreement they cleared the ground for the Anglo-Russian *entente*.[77] Results of the complete failure of German policy were foreseen by the Kaiser: "The coalition [against us] exists *de facto*! King Edward has indeed played his cards well."[78]

[76] Czar to the Kaiser, Nov 23; *ibid.*, XX, 522–24.

[77] Johannes Haller, *Die Aera Bülow*, pp. 23 ff.; *KSF*, Nov., 1924, pp. 477 ff.; *B. D.*, IV, 195–232, *passim*; Hammann, *World Policy*, pp. 166 ff.; Bourgeois and Pagès, *Les origines et les responsabilités de la grande guerre*, pp. 312–19; E. J. Dillon, *The Eclipse of Russia*, pp. 356 ff.; Anderson, pp. 300 ff.

[78] Kaiser to Bülow, Nov. 26; *G. P.*, XIX, 524–25.

Chapter IX

CONCLUSION

WITHIN the period 1904–1906, policies of the European Powers were conditioned to a high degree on the growing estrangement between England and Germany. This feeling was intensified by the press. German correspondents in England invariably quoted as representative of British opinion the unkind statesments of the *Times, Daily Mail, Spectator,* and *National Review.* Conversely, the English correspondents quoted from the nationalistic and Pan-German papers such as *Reichsbote, Rheinisch-Westfälische Zeitung,* and *Berliner Neueste Nachrichten.* Thus, utterances of the English chauvinists became so many reasons for increasing the German navy, while the Pan-Germans performed a similar service for the British. The playful buttings and prancings of the 'quill cattle' on both sides of the North Sea would have been sheer comedy had it not been for the damage that they did to Anglo-German relations.

The revolution in English public opinion toward Germany was marked by a corresponding growth of public sentiment favorable to France. This movement culminated in the accords signed on April 8, 1904. According to Jacques Bardoux, an eminent French publicist writing in *Journal des Débats* (April 13, 1904), the Entente Cordiale could never have been effected "without the methodically organized press campaign from the beginning of 1901 by the most authoritative organs of the Conservative party. . . ."

In Germany, the announcement of the sweeping Anglo-French agreement was received without "irritation" or "jealousy" by the responsible papers, as Von Bülow directed. When President Loubet visited Rome three weeks later and received a warm welcome from the Italians, many English and French political journalists announced the isolation of

Germany as a well-accomplished design. Bülow counseled the press to maintain an attitude of reserve in the face of foreign rejoicing.

The uneasiness with which recent incidents had been regarded by thinking people in Germany was dispelled in a measure by a series of immediate events. In the latter part of June, King Edward joined the Kaiser at the Kiel regatta; a German naval squadron visited Plymouth on July 10; and the conclusion of an Anglo-German arbitration treaty was announced on July 12. English journals, however, regarded these demonstrations with suspicion, declaring that the new friendship with France should not be jeopardized by a too ardent flirtation with Germany. The parading of the German navy before King Edward and his staff at Kiel, and the visit of the squadron to Plymouth, far from creating a favorable impression on the English public, only served to impress and alarm the British at the speed and ability with which their cousins were transforming 'paper ships' into cold realities of iron and steel. With the discovery that the Kaiser's fleet was no longer "a plaything," England's press campaign against the German navy began in earnest. Henceforth, fear of German economic and commercial development was subordinated to recurrent polemics against the naval program, the aims, and the ambitions of German policy.

During the autumn of 1904, the unfriendly tone of editorial comment, loose talk in English naval circles, and the significant concentration of British maritime strength in the North Sea, occasioned a war scare in Germany. It was not a mere coincidence that at this time German negotiations were begun with Russia, which culminated later in the well-known Björkö treaty.

Against this darkening background of fear and suspicion, Germany's Moroccan action was initiated. While German statesmen desired to restore public opinion to its normal course so that they could quietly continue with their naval program, they adopted a policy certain to stir up resentment and passion in England.

It was generally assumed by the European press that the Moroccan accord of April 8, 1904, would result in the establishment by France of a virtual protectorate over the Sultan's empire. This was accepted without protest by the more responsible papers in Germany, but all emphasized the extent and importance of German commercial interests and the necessity for safeguarding them.

French officials made no move to assure Germany that her interests would not be prejudiced by their action. Indeed, they disregarded "paper ships" sent out through the press in the following months, as well as the direct statement of the German representative in Tangier that Berlin expected France to come to an understanding with respect to Morocco.

When the French undertook to execute their policy of 'pacific penetration' they met with stout resistance from the Moorish tribesmen. Anarchy and general hostility to all foreigners grew apace in the Sultan's dominions. In January, 1905, German statesmen began secretly to support the Sultan in his resistance to French policy. Thus, international complications were added to native opposition and internal disorders. The Kaiser's landing at Tangier in March, 1905, was a gesture designed to give emphasis to the Moroccan policy pursued by Bülow and Holstein. It was accompanied by a campaign in the semi-official German press calculated to prepare public opinion at home and abroad for the government's action.

Statesmen of the Wilhelmstrasse thought that the English would be lukewarm in their support of French policy in Morocco after they had obtained what they wanted in Egypt. They also thought that by stressing the 'open door' and refraining from an attack on the Anglo-French Entente, a recrudescence of the press war with England could be avoided. In this they were mistaken since the English journals, almost without exception, disregarded the legitimate grounds upon which Germany based her protest at French action. They declared that this was only a pretext designed to cover an attack on the new Anglo-French friendship.

Metternich and Bernstorff could do nothing to stem the current of unfavorable newspaper opinion.

The English press outdid the French in its support of M. Delcassé and his policy. Unaccustomed to such Francophil enthusiasm in London, French statesmen suspected that the English wished to embroil them with their neighbors across the Vosges. This distrust of English motives was one of the factors contributing to the fall of the French foreign minister.

Delcassé's resignation on June 6, 1905, was due to the loss of political and public support, disloyalty of his colleagues, and pressure from Berlin. His retirement was welcomed almost unanimously by the Parisian press. Beneath the newspaper comment ran a strong current of opinion favorable to Germany and opposed to a closer understanding with England. If the Wilhelmstrasse had consolidated its gains by a conciliatory policy after June 6, further strengthening of Anglo-French ties might have been prevented. Due, however, to the stupid action that forced the conference on M. Rouvier, who wished to settle the question out of court, Delcassé's reputation was later rehabilitated and his policy justified in the eyes of his countrymen.

On July 8, Rouvier accepted the conference after Germany had recognized France's special interests in Morocco. The agreement, however, was only reached after a severe crisis had been precipitated by the uncompromising and menacing attitude assumed by German officials. Negotiations, which were now instituted to form an acceptable program for the conference, were soon deadlocked owing to the spirit of legal formalism in which Holstein and Kriege conducted the conversations. Von Tattenbach's action in encouraging the Sultan to grant concessions to German firms provoked a storm of protest from the French press and heightened the mistrust with which Paris now began to regard German policy. The unaccommodating attitude assumed by Berlin, and Von Tattenbach's activity at Fez occasioned a complete change in French press opinion toward Germany during the summer, a significant fact not fully appreciated in Berlin.

After the historic meeting of the Kaiser and Czar at Björkö on July 24, the Moroccan policy sponsored by Bülow and Holstein became integrated with the Kaiser's plan for a continental league. Bülow perceived the necessity for conciliating Russia's ally, for after the Björkö treaty came into force France's adherence was to be solicited. The chancellor's interviews with representatives of the Parisian press was a direct appeal to the French to forget past differences and become fast friends with Germany. His statements provoked the sensational articles by Stéphane Lauzanne and André Mévil. The significance of these 'revelations' is that they were but one form of the general press reaction against the prospect of a Franco-German *rapprochement*. The French press campaign was well timed, for it occurred during the weeks when the Russian ambassador was sounding official opinion on the possibility of a close understanding between France, Germany, and Russia. Daily observation of the press and conversations with leading politicians convinced Nelidov that the French could not be drawn into such a relationship with Germany.

This fact in turn largely determined Russian policy. Russia was closely bound to France by political and financial ties; English hostility was a certain corollary to a formal Russo-German understanding; Russia, defeated abroad and torn by revolution at home, could not afford to excite the animosity of England, for her interests in the Far East were at the mercy of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance; the Björkö treaty, limited in its scope to Europe, offered no protection to these interests. On the other hand, as Russian statesmen clearly perceived, a direct accord with England would make all others unnecessary. Moreover, Lamsdorff was convinced that the Franco-Russian Alliance was necessary for the maintenance of an independent policy. Without it Russia would be entirely dependent upon Germany, and, wrote Lamsdorff, "Ich kenne nichts schwereres als das deutsche Joch."[1] Before the ink was dry on the protocols of Ports-

[1] Lamsdorff to Nelidov, Oct. 9, 1905; *KSF*, Nov., 1924, p. 486.

mouth, the Anglo-Russian *rapprochement* was in the air. The *Matin* 'revelations' mark the failure of German policy to block the formation of the Triple Entente.

Apparent opposition between the Kaiser's policy and that pursued by the Wilhelmstrasse has previously been noted. While the Emperor aimed at reconciliation with France and Russia, the foreign office gave the impression abroad that Germany contemplated war against France. The inconsistency of the two programs was more apparent than real. It is to be explained by the character of the two men with whom they originated, namely, William II and the privy councillor, Baron Holstein. The Kaiser's plan was direct and theatrical, as indicated by Björkö; Holstein's policy, too, reflects the workings of his warped and twisted mind. No less than the Kaiser, he envisaged an eventual understanding with France, but he reasoned that before she would join Russia in the circle of Germany's friends she must suffer such a diplomatic defeat as England had inflicted on her at Fashoda. Only when France realized that she could make no headway by openly opposing Germany, would she become her friend.

> The *rapprochement* between France and England began immediately after Fashoda, when the French saw that they could gain nothing by opposing England [wrote Holstein]. Likewise the French will first entertain the idea of friendship for Germany when they understand that English friendship . . . is not sufficient to secure Germany's consent to the acquisition of Morocco, but that Germany wishes to be loved for her own sake.[2]

Like a skilled billiard player, Holstein scorned a simple direct stroke, choosing rather to score by a difficult bank-shot off the cushion.

Haller and Anderson severely criticize Bülow's lack of determination in dealing with foreign policy, for he apparently subscribed at the same time to the policies of both Holstein and the Kaiser.[3] Sontag admits that Bülow's posi-

[2] Mem. by Holstein, Feb. 22, 1906; *G. P.*, XXI, 207–8. R. J. Sontag, "German Foreign Policy, 1904–1906," *A. H. R.*, Jan., 1928, p. 291.

[3] J. Haller, *Die Aera Bülow*, pp. 13–14, 28–30; Anderson, *The First Moroccan Crisis*, p. 264.

tion is difficult to determine because his views were constantly changing.[4] It is not impossible, however, to trace the development of his ideas. He welcomed both the policies of Holstein and the Kaiser because it gave him two strings to his bow. Hence he sanctioned the Kaiser's efforts, in the autumn of 1904, to conclude an alliance with Russia although he was not optimistic about the results. When this failed he gave his support to Holstein's Moroccan program. Then came Björkö. Bülow practically took the negotiations out of Holstein's hands when he sent Dr. Rosen to Paris in September, hoping to achieve a definitive settlement of the Moroccan question. Conclusion of Rosen's negotiations coincided with Witte's return from Portsmouth and his interview with Bülow in Berlin. Their reports encouraged the chancellor to make advances and explanations through *Temps* and *Petit Parisien*. Then followed the uproar in the French press, Rouvier's rejection of his proposal to discuss a general clearing agreement, and finally, in December, Rouvier's determined declaration on French rights in Morocco. Bülow then perceived Germany's position and the folly of the Kaiser's plan to approach France through Russia. Only Holstein's program remained, and when at the Algeciras Conference it seemed that affairs were drifting to a definite break, Bülow again took the negotiations out of his adviser's hands, gave in to the French, and liquidated the whole affair. His policy throughout was one of woeful indecision, ending in rank opportunism. Perhaps this, too, reflected his character, as in the case of Holstein and the Kaiser. For Bülow's biographer reminds us that one of his favorite quotations was from Goethe: "Heute nur, heute, lass Dich nicht fangen, so bist du tausendmal entgangen."[5]

Alteration of the political balance in Europe was not the sole objective of the Wilhelmstrasse's Moroccan program. Through it runs two distinct threads: first, that of German continental policy and national prestige; second, economic

[4] Sontag, pp. 280–81.

[5] Spickernagel, *Fürst Bülow*, p. 88.

interest and colonial expansion. At no time during the prolonged crisis did German statesmen clearly separate the two strands and pursue a consistent policy along one line. The growing danger of continental isolation might have been averted by the graceful sacrifice of Morocco in return for French friendship, or at least French neutrality in the Anglo-German quarrel. On the other hand, the policy of *Weltpolitik* and colonial expansion required that Germany assert her claim to be considered in the division of African plunder. Holstein and Bülow thought that the balancing of their respective claims in Morocco would provide an easy point of equilibrium, which could be altered in favor of France at the psychological moment. Such a *beau geste* might have won French friendship immediately after Delcassé's resignation, at a time when distrust of English motives was widely entertained in French political circles. But a close understanding as envisaged in the Björkö treaty was impossible after the the prolonged and painful crisis of the summer.

German statesmen completely miscalculated the effect of their policy on the public press. In the British papers it was interpreted as a sinister plot to break up the Entente Cordiale and strike an indirect blow at England. It was, moreover, a powerful factor in persuading the French, who were by no means anxious to take part in the Anglo-German quarrel, that English friendship was an indispensable guarantee against the surprises of German policy and the uncertainties of the international situation. By the end of October, 1905, the attempt to create a continental league through a *rapprochement* with France, on the basis of Morocco, had manifestly failed. On the contrary, out of a state of flux into which the relations of the Great Powers had been thrown by the Russo-Japanese war emerged the tentative form of an international combination highly unfavorable to Germany. The Conference of Algeciras marks a new chapter in the history of European relations. There, for the first time, England, Italy, Russia, and the United States coöperated diplomatically to support France against Germany.

From 1904 to 1906 it was generally recognized by writers and statesmen that fundamental changes were taking place in the relations of the Powers. Such changes were considered and discussed in light of their relation to the growing antagonism between England and Germany. By diplomats and publicists this was regarded as the important factor conditioning new and old friendships. As the course of events was pictured in the European press, it was Anglo-German hostility that divided Europe into two camps. Jaurès, Clemenceau, Tardieu, Osten-Sacken, Leghait,—in fact, most neutral observers agreed that the greatest danger to the peace of Europe and of the world was the growing hostility, the growing antagonism, between Germany and England.

Upon what grounds was such an opinion based? Not on the relations between government and government, because the documents recently published in both countries clearly show that there were no outstanding questions of a nature to occasion a sharp conflict. It was based upon the attitude of mutual hostility and ill-will assumed by the press. From the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese war to Algeciras, Anglo-German press relations formed an unbroken chain of misunderstandings, false statements, malicious suppositions, invidious criticisms, and acrimonious polemics. While official relations were correct if not cordial, the press seemed bent on maintaining such an atmosphere of suspicion and hostility in the public mind that an incident might have precipitated an armed conflict. The press during this period strikingly exemplifies the fact that in the field of diplomacy and international affairs the *vox populi* may easily become the *vox diaboli*.

Certain observations on specific aspects of press opinion, which do not accord with interpretations frequently met in writings on pre-war diplomacy, may well be set down here. Some recent writers, discussing the Lansdowne-Grey commitments and the Anglo-French military conversations, have emphasized their concealment from the cabinet and Parliament. Such criticism implies that if the veil of secrecy had been lifted English public opinion would have repudiated the

minister's actions. In view of the recorded attitude of the British press, that assumption is unfounded. A perusal of newspaper files leads one to predict that if conclusion of a defensive alliance with France had been announced in 1905, it would have been universally acclaimed. In all probability *Daily News* would have denounced it, *Manchester Guardian* and *Westminster Gazette* (C. E. Montague and J. A. Spender) would have expressed vague misgivings, and *Saturday Review* would have been sarcastic; but the vast majority of the newspapers would have applauded it as a master stroke of statesmanship.

Anyone who has paged the files of leading French journals for this period cannot fail to be impressed with the unimportant part played by the *revanche* idea in public discussion of foreign policy. It has been too frequently assumed by recent writers, who base their conclusions solely on diplomatic documents, that this was a constant and unvarying factor. In reality, at this time *revanche* was featured only in the Nationalist press, and there it was largely nullified by the unalterable hostility shown toward England.

On the whole, the attitude of the German press was one of conciliation toward a defeated nation. Even ultra-nationalist organs such as *Berliner Post*, *Berliner Neueste Nachrichten*, and *Reichsbote* manifested far less hostility toward France than toward Great Britain, at whom they were always carping.

With regard to relations between the conduct of foreign affairs and the newspapers, it seems fair to say in conclusion that the French press only asserted itself decisively in questions of foreign policy when a crisis arose or in times of pressure. Then it was scarcely subject to governmental influence and direction, but on the contrary frequently forced action as likely to be productive of evil as good. The influence of the English press on the government's policy was a steady, constant, and determining factor. Minor questions were frequently handled on party lines, but important policies were discussed on their merits in a notably non-partisan spirit. In

Germany, the government was able to influence and direct press opinion within certain limits. There were, however, many organs of Right and Left views that did not hesitate to criticize official policy, although it must be admitted that their influence was not decisive. Finally, it may be safely concluded that the English press exerted the greatest influence and received the widest hearing abroad, the French press considerably less than the English, and the German least of all.

In the period covered by this study, the press functioned as a great engine of publicity and propaganda. The British press destroyed the memory of former Anglo-German sympathies and cemented ties of friendship with France; the French journals knocked the Kaiser's plan of a continental league into a cocked hat and mediated at every opportunity between England and Russia; the results of official inspiration and control of a section of the German press were largely negative abroad and productive of self-deception at home. The rise of the modern newspaper press has been accompanied by many platitudes such as 'the voice of the nation,' the 'expression of the national will,' the 'mouthpiece of public opinion,' and the 'mirror of public opinion'—assigning to it a purely passive rôle of transmission or reflection. However true this may be in domestic affairs, it is misleading when applied to the European press during the diplomatic revolution at the turn of the century. There it was more frequently used as an instrument, sometimes by governments, sometimes by parties and groups, and frequently by individuals with an axe to grind. If the press is a 'mirror,' then these parties were at great pains to paint on it the picture that they wished the public at home and abroad to see reflected upon its surface.

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German Newspapers

Berliner Lokal Anzeiger was a popular and sensational daily with a wide circulation among all classes. It was reputed to be closely related to the Wilhelmstrasse and Potsdam, and it served up the

activities of royalty in popular form. In domestic politics it was conservative; in foreign affairs, intensely nationalistic.

Berliner Neueste Nachrichten advertised itself as "non-partisan." It gave unqualified support to the government's foreign policy, the Navy League, and Tirpitz' program. It was decidedly hostile to England and advocated "*zu Lande ein starkes Heer, zur See eine starke Flotte.*"

Berliner Tageblatt, a Jewish enterprise, was one of the most important German dailies. It was radically liberal, and independent of any royal or official influence. The weekly review of foreign affairs by the editor, Arthur Levysohn, was a conspicuous feature. It maintained its own foreign news service; and its unbiased reports and opinions on foreign affairs enjoyed a high reputation. It circulated widely in middle class commercial and financial circles.

Die Post (Berlin) was a conservative reactionary organ and a loyal supporter of government policies, both foreign and domestic. Occasional anti-English outbursts were contradicted by frequent expression of a desire to bring about more cordial relations with Great Britain.

Frankfurter Zeitung represented the financial and industrial interests of the new Germany as opposed to the agrarian Junker class of East Prussia. It was liberal in domestic politics, but it usually struck an independent note on foreign affairs. It advocated a fleet commensurate with the development of the German merchant marine, but heartily disapproved the tactics of the Navy League.

Hamburger Nachrichten, the old Bismarckian organ, distinguished itself by its Anglophobia. It opposed the government's Moroccan policy. It was reputed to have close connections with Russia, and never ceased to advocate renewal of former treaty relations with the Czar's empire.

Kölnische Zeitung, according to Bismarck, was worth an army corps on the Rhine. It was still a frequent channel for official communications. Telegrams from the Berlin correspondent were closely observed, and on subjects of international significance it was generally assumed that they reflected the views of the Wilhelmstrasse. It also maintained an extensive foreign news service, ranking in this respect with *Berliner Tageblatt* and *Frankfurter Zeitung*.

Münchener Allgemeine Zeitung represented the conservative agrarian interests of Bavaria. Frequently inspired from Berlin, it gave the official lead to south German public opinion in foreign affairs.

Toward England it appeared indifferent, although it supported the German naval program.

Neue Preussische Zeitung, usually referred to as the *Kreuzzeitung*, was a Berlin daily representing the most reactionary elements in Germany—the Junkers, the army, and the Lutheran church. Its masthead bore the words: "*Vorwärts mit Gott für König und Vaterland.*" Its most conspicuous feature was the Wednesday review of foreign affairs by Professor Schiemann.

Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung was the official organ of the Wilhelmstrasse. It represented no party, its circulation was small, and it had no special foreign correspondents. But it was to be found on every editor's desk, and its communications were quoted extensively at home and abroad.

National-Zeitung (Berlin), founded in 1848, was a National Liberal organ, occasionally inspired by the foreign office. It ceased publication on January 1, 1905.

Reichsbote (Berlin) was an exceedingly reactionary chauvinistic organ much quoted in England as representative of the German Protestant clergy. It never recovered from its anti-English hysteria of the Boer war period. Its importance was grossly exaggerated in England.

Vossiche Zeitung (Berlin) was a scholarly liberal paper with a large circulation among professional and upper-middle classes. It was an independent and unsparing critic of the more reactionary domestic policies of the government, but in foreign affairs it usually supported the chancellor. It was friendly toward England and never chauvinistic in discussing foreign affairs.

Vorwärts (Berlin) was the central organ of the Social Democratic party. It bitterly attacked Bülow's foreign policy, the Navy League, and the Pan-Germans. Foreign affairs were commonly used as a point of attack on the government.

German Periodicals

Deutsche Rundschau, edited by Julius Rodenberg

Deutsche Revue, edited by Richard Fleisher

Deutsche Monatsschrift, foreign editor, Theodor Schiemann

Preussische Jahrbücher, edited by Hans Delbrück

English Newspapers

Daily Chronicle belonged to the imperial wing of the Liberal party and appealed to 'the man in the street' through a combination of liberalism and jingoism.

Daily Express was founded in 1900 by Arthur Pearson to compete with the Harmsworth *Daily Mail*. *The Express* was cheap and sensational, seeking "to stampede rather than to inform" its readers. It supported the Chamberlain wing of the Conservative party.

Daily Mail, which exemplified modern journalism, was owned by Alfred Harmsworth. In its columns the news was prepared for the quickest consumption. It was sensational and chauvinistic, with a particular animus toward Germany.

Daily News was the property of George Cadbury, cocoa and chocolate manufacturer. It was the chief organ of the radical nonconformists, with a wide circulation in Liberal circles and among the lower middle class. "It is Liberal, peace-loving when there is no war, and wedded to Free Trade. It preaches social reform within the present economic system; it professes sympathy with 'sound' labour, and becomes peevish when strikes occur." (*The Press*, Labour Research Dept. p. 32.)

Daily Telegraph was an influential organ aligned with the Balfour interests of the Conservative party. It was a bulwark of capitalism against labor and enjoyed a large circulation among middle class business men. In its service were J. M. Lesage, W. L. Courtney, and E. J. Dillion. Its editorial policy toward Germany was eminently fair and did not reflect the personal bias of Dillon and Courtney.

Manchester Guardian stood for the best tradition in English journalism. It was the most scholarly if not the most influential Liberal daily. After the *Times* it was probably the English paper most frequently quoted abroad. Because of its liberalism it was unsympathetic toward the German government. It was never bigoted.

Morning Post, an influential Conservative journal with a strong national bias, watched over British imperial interests. Associated with the editor, Fabian Ware, were Hilaire Belloc and Winston Churchill, while it was represented in Washington by A. Maurice Lowe. It was one of the few British organs to criticize the French agreement, but the Wilhelmstrasse's Moroccan policy drove the *Post* into the ranks of Germany's bitterest antagonists.

Pall Mall Gazette, a Conservative organ, maintained a high literary reputation. On its staff were H. B. Marriott Watson, Sir Charles Dilkie, H. G. Wells, Nicol Dunn, and Spenser Wilkinson. Toward Germany it endorsed the views and emulated the policy of Maxe's *National Review*.

Standard, a former independent Tory paper, was purchased in 1904 by Mr. Pearson. H. A. Gwynne, former chief of the foreign section of Reuter's Agency, became the editor. Sidney Low, also on the editorial staff, contributed, in the autumn of 1905, a series of articles on modern Germany which were well received in England. Under Gwynne's direction the *Standard* was friendly to Germany.

The Times, owned by Arthur Fraser Walter, followed an independent conservative policy. It maintained an extensive foreign news service and was reputed to have been the most widely read English paper on the continent and in America. Moberly Bell was manager and Valentine Chirol the foreign editor. *The Times* was a warm friend of the Anglo-French understanding, advocated an *entente* with Russia, and distinguished itself as a bitter foe of Germany.

Westminster Gazette, under the editorship of J. A. Spender, was one of the foremost London dailies, and was regarded, before the founding of the Tribune, as the leading organ of the Liberal party. It did not boast an extensive foreign news service, but in the judgment of an opposition organ (*Spectator*, November 12, 1904) "The Westminster Gazette has never been surpassed in English journalism for its ability to shed dry light. It is never trivial or unfair, and though loyal to its party, always maintains its intellectual independence."

English Periodicals

Saturday Review (weekly)
The Spectator (weekly)
National Review
Fortnightly Review
Contemporary Review
Nineteenth Century
Blackwood's Magazine

French Newspapers

L'Aurore was the organ of Georges Clemenceau, who advocated a "*politique de précautions défensives.*" His daily editorials were marked by opposition to colonial expansion, personal attacks on Delcassé, and bitter animosity toward Germany.

L'Echo de Paris, "*journal politique, litteraire, et d'information du matin,*" represented conservative opinion, particularly of academic, military, and naval circles. By an agreement with the London *Daily Telegraph* the news service of the English paper was placed at its disposal. On the editorial staff was André Mévil, staunch defender of Delcassé's policy and author of *De la paix de Francfort à la conférence d'Algésiras.*

Le Figaro, edited by Gaston Calmette, was a conservative republican journal that reflected the opinion of academic and literary circles, and the Parisian social world.

Le Gaulois was the leading French Monarchist organ. Under the directorship of Arthur Meyer it was moderately nationalistic, although editorially it did not emphasize foreign affairs.

L'Humanité, directed by Jean Jaurès was the official organ of the Socialists. Among its contributors were Aristide Briand, Réné Viviani, and Lucien Herr. The principal writer on foreign affairs was Deputy Francis de Préssensé, who, together with Tardieu and De Lanessan, formed a trio of keen observers, each representing a different political point of view.

Le Journal des Débats professed moderate republican views and liberalism in economic and political thought. In foreign affairs it consistently supported the Quai d'Orsay; its tone was always moderate, conciliatory, and scholarly. It appealed to high financial and industrial circles, and the university world.

La Lanterne, a political daily, reflected the views of M. Combes. It was violently anti-clerical and concentrated its attention on the Separation Law. It opposed colonial adventures and the policy of M. Delcassé.

Le Matin was essentially a *journal d'information.* Through an arrangement with the *Times* it reproduced each day many of the telegraphic despatches appearing in the London daily. It enjoyed a large circulation because of its popular and sensational treatment of the news. Under the editorship of Stéphane Lauzanne it was intensely patriotic; it was generally credited with close relations to M. Delcassé.

La Patrie, "*Organe de la Défense Nationale*," subscribed nominally to the old Bonapartist tradition, but by 1904, under the directorship of M. Lucien Millevoye, this feature was completely overshadowed by its extreme nationalism. On the relations of France to Great Britain and Germany, it championed a policy of "hands free and powder dry."

Le Petit Parisien was an important news journal, owned by Senator Jean Dupuy. Its excellent foreign news service and its moderate views assured it a wide circulation.

La Petite République was a political journal, edited by Gerault-Richard, leading Socialist Deputy and journalist.

La République Française, founded by Gambetta in 1871, was in 1904–1906 the organ of Jules Méline, leader of the moderate Republicans. It numbered among its regular contributors Jules Legrand, Georges Lachapelle, and Maurice Ordinaire.

Le Siècle was primarily a political organ representing moderate Radicalism. It stood for free trade, the Anglo-French Entente, and separation of Church and State. The political director, De Lanessan, was a close student of foreign affairs. Among its contributors were ex-ministers Brisson, Baudin, Buisson, Caillaux, Decrais, and Guyot. The brilliant daily feature articles of J. Cornely were of special note.

Le Temps was the leading French daily, and found its widest circle of readers among republicans of the middle class. It was generally regarded as the semi-official organ of the Quai d'Orsay, and on foreign affairs it was the most frequently quoted of French papers abroad. Adrien Hebrard was political director and George Villiers (André Tardieu), who left *Le Figaro* in 1902, was foreign editor. *Temps* was a firm supporter of the Anglo-French Entente and the Russian alliance, and although it deserted Delcassé in the crisis of June, 1905, it consistently upheld French action in Morocco.

French Periodicals

Bulletin du comité de l'Afrique française—organe du comité du Maroc.

Questions diplomatiques et coloniales.

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